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INTRODUCTION
For most of our history, the legislative process, unlike the adminis-
trative and judicial processes,' has not been the focus of sustained legal
scholarship. There are many reasons for the historical absence of
equivalent legal attention. For one, the presumed legitimacy of popu-
larly elected representation has probably obviated the need, in the eyes
of many scholars, for the development of any general legal theory eval-
uating the constitutionality of internal legislative procedures or struc-
tures.2 As a practical matter, moreover, many scholars have viewed the
I See R. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CRISIS AND REFORM 336 (1985)
("Few [legal academics] study legislation as an object of systematic inquiry comparable
to the common law."); Eskridge & Frickey, Legislation Scholarship and Pedagogy in
the Post-Legal Process Era, 48 U. Pirr. L. REV. 691, 691 (1987) ("legal academe's
approach to the systematic study of 'legislation' resembles Congress' attitude toward
balancing the federal budget: everyone agrees that it is a good thing, but laments that it
is not done"); Weisberg, The Calabresian Judicial Artist: Statutes and the New Legal
Process, 35 STAN. L. REV. 213, 213 (1983) (statutory interpretation not systematically
studied); Note, Intent, Clear Statements, and the Common Law: Statutory Interpreta-
tion in the Supreme Court, 95 HARV. L. REV. 892, 892 (1982) (same). For a satirical
criticism of this attitude, see Cohen, On The Teaching of "Legislation," 47 COLUM. L.
REV. 1301, 1303 (1947) ("To set up a quarantine in the law-school around [those
skills needed by a lawyer within the legislature] on the ground that they deal with the
'political' and not the 'legal' would seem as unreal as to deny medical school students
access to birth control films on the ground that they are 'immoral' and not
'scientific.' ").
2 Alexander Bickel is most closely associated with this view. See A. BICKEL, THE
LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 16-20 (1962). This judicial deference finds expression in
a variety of constitutional doctrines and decisions. The most noteworthy is the political
question doctrine, which holds that it is inappropriate for the judiciary to pass judg-
ment on issues when there is, among other things, a "textually demonstrable constitu-
tional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department." Baker v. Carr,
369 U.S. 186, 217 (1961); see also id. (listing numerous other factors relevant to the
recognition of a political question). For applications of the political question doctrine,
see Davis v. Bandemer, 106 S. Ct. 2797, 2806 (1986) (partisan gerrymandering is not a
political question); Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 518-22 (1969) (Congress's
refusal to seat a duly elected representative is not a political question).
Similarly, the enrolled bill rule, which ordinarily precludes courts from examining
the internal deliberations and journals of Congress to identify possible violation of con-
stitutional and statutory procedures, reflects this hands-off attitude. See Field v. Clark,
143 U.S. 649, 670-73 (1892) (in reviewing the validity of a statute, courts will not look
at congressional journals to determine whether Congress violated its procedures); cf.
Vander Jagt v. O'Neill, 699 F.2d 1166, 1177 (D.C. Cir.) (relying on court's "discre-
tion to withhold equitable and declaratory relief" to refuse to review method of commit-
tee assignments in Congress), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 823 (1983); Metzenbaum v.
FERC, 675 F.2d 1282, 1287 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (challenge to federal statute based on
passage in contravention of parliamentary rules held to be a nonjusticiable political
question). But see Yellin v. United States, 374 U.S. 109, 114 (1963) (political question
doctrine may not insulate violation of congressional procedures if individual rights are
infringed); United States v. Smith, 286 U.S. 6, 32 (1932) (internal congressional proce-
dures must be consistent with the Constitution). Under the Constitution, each House is
entrusted with determining the rules of its own proceedings. See U.S. CONsT. art. I,
§ 5, cl. 2.
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worlds of politics and law as distinct and separate.' Those activities
that often occupy politicians in the rough-and-tumble world of legisla-
tive and political life-logrolling, constituent-servicing, and public-pos-
turing-have been considered quite foreign to, if not inconsistent with,
the professional activities of judges, who, at least as an aspirational
ideal, engage in reasoned development of the common law and the for-
mulation and application of constitutional and statutory principles."
From this perspective, imposing the standards of the legal system upon
legislative decisionmaking might lead to incoherent scholarship with lit-
tle practical usefulness.5
The immunity from lawsuit of members of Congress and their staffs under the
speech or debate clause, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6, cl. 2, also insulates certain legislative
activities. See Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 443 U.S. 111, 130-33 (1979) (speech or debate
clause does not protect senator's newsletter because scope of the privilege is limited to
the "deliberative process" and not the "informing function" of Congress); Gravel v.
United States, 408 U.S. 606, 625 (1972) (speech or debate clause protects members of
Congress and their aides engaged in "the deliberative and communicative processes...
with respect to the consideration and passage or rejection of proposed legislation or
with respect to other matters which the Constitution places within the jurisdiction of
either House"); United States v. Brewster, 408 U.S. 501, 525 (1972) (speech or debate
clause forbids inquiry into acts and motivations that occur as part of the legislative
process); see also Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87, 123 (1810) ("The validity of
a law cannot be questioned because undue influence may have been used in obtaining
it.").
3 For the clearest articulation of this view, see Linde, Due Process of Lawmaking,
55 NEB. L. REV. 197, 222-35, 253 (1976) (noting that the elected may be filled with
"ignorance, sloth, gluttony, avarice, short-sightedness, political cowardice and ambi-
tion" and questioning the putative efficacy of "rationality" review); Posner, The
DeFunis Case and the Constitutionality of Preferential Treatment of Racial Minori-
ties, 1974 Sup. CT. REV. 1, 29 (Although many statutes lack a rational relationship to
the "public interest," they should survive judicial scrutiny because they are "the prod-
uct of the constitutionally created political process of our society.").
' See E. LEvi, AN INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL REASONING 1 (1949) (describing
the "process of legal reasoning in the field of case law and in .the interpretation of
statutes and the Constitution" as a "forum for the discussion of policy in the gap of
ambiguity"); Eskridge, Dynamic Statutory Interpretation, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 1479,
1534 (1987) (judges "are not only removed from the political process but are also in
positions that give them few incentives to slant their interpretations . . . in favor of
regulated groups"); Fiss, Objectivity and Interpretation, 34 STAN. L. REV. 739, 744-
45 (1982) [hereinafter Fiss, Objectivity] (interpretation by judges can be objective
within a given legal interpretative community); Fiss, The Supreme Court, 1978
Term-Foreword: The Forms of Justice, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1, 9-10, 14 (1979) [here-
inafter Fiss, Foreword] (the perceived role of the legislature is to mirror the will of
those who elected it; the task of the judiciary, which is not "a participant in interest
group politics," is "to give meaning to consitutional values"); Fuller, The Forms and
Limits of Adjudication, 92 HARV. L. REV. 353, 366 (1978) (adjudication "gives formal
.. . expression to the influence of reasoned argument in human affairs"). But see, e.g.,
J. GRAY, THE NATURE AND SOURCES OF THE LAW 170-78 (2d ed. 1927) (interpreta-
tion is an art, not a science, less influenced by reason than by the feelings and emotions
of the judge); Brest, Interpretation and Interest, 34 STAN. L. REV. 765, 770-73 (1982)
(describing the inherent political nature of interpretation and adjudication).
I For an example of this view, see Posner, supra note 3, at 26-31. One possible
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When the legal profession did scrutinize the internal mechanisms
of the legislative process, moreover, in many cases the review was on a
rather superficial level. In the influential legal process materials pre-
pared by Henry Hart and Albert Sacks, legislative deliberations were
generally presumed to be rationalistic and public-regarding.6 Under
their approach to statutory construction, for example, the courts were
to examine the broad goals supposedly furthered by the legislation and
then fill in technical language and statutory interstices with reference to
these broad goals, much like a common law judge would fill in the
nuances of developing doctrines by reference to the underlying purposes
of earlier decisions.7 Thus, to the extent that lawyers did examine the
internal mechanisms of the legislative process and legislative materials,
they often viewed them somewhat in the manner of a common law
judge reviewing the opinions in prior cases-rationalistic and public-
regarding.
exception to this general approach is the views of the legal realists, who sought to
understand and expose the seamier side of all legal processes, including the legislature.
See W. RUMBLE, AMERICAN LEGAL REALISM (1968). The legal realists, however, did
not seek to develop any clear guiding normative principles or offer any distinctly legal
or structural solutions to the legislative problem. See L. FULLER, THE LAW IN QUEST
OF ITSELF 59-64 (1940) (criticizing the legal realists for "assuming that a rigorous
separation of is and ought is possible, and that one may study the law in isolation from
its ethical context"). But see McDougal, Fuller v. The American Legal Realists: An
Intervention, 50 YALE L.J. 827, 835 (1941) (legal realists "have sought to distinguish
between the is and the ought, not for the purpose of ignoring or dismissing the ought,
but for the purpose of making a future is into an ought for its time"); Schlegel, Ameri-
can Legal Realism and Empirical Social Sciences: From the Yale Experience, 28 BUF-
FALO L. REV. 459, 459-61 (1979) (those who denounce legal realism for its failure to
find a solution ignore the historical significance of the movement).
6 See H. HART & A. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE
MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW 1415 (10th ed. 1958). See generally id. at 1287-
1380 (using Court cases to illustrate their method of statutory interpretation). As Bruce
Ackerman observes:
[T]he legal process construction was plainly inadequate . . . . Instead of
building realistic, let alone rigorous, models of . . . legislative behavior,
they were content with simplistic conceptions of these institutions. Al-
though legal process scholars were perfectly aware that legislatures . . .
made bad mistakes, these errors were treated as a series of isolated blun-
ders, not the product of systematic failures. For each individual blunder,
the job of the court was to engage the errant institution in Socratic dia-
logue, focusing the attention of legislators . . . on dimensions of the prob-
lem they somehow missed the first time around. The hopeful implication
was that, under proper legal questioning . . . legislators would redeem
their claims to democratic legitimacy.
B. ACKERMAN, RECONSTRUCTING AMERICAN LAW 39-40 (1984). For a detailed
description of the assumptions underlying the legal process approach, see Eskridge,
supra note 4, at 1544-49; Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 1, at 694-734.
1 See H. HART & A. SACKS, supra note 6, at 1410 (offering the "golden rule" of
interpretation: judges decide what ought to be the meaning of a statute within the con-
fines of a specific factual case setting).
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This image within the legal community of pristine legislative de-
liberations paralleled a favorable view among economists of the proper
functioning of government. Building on work by Arthur Pigou and
Paul Samuelson, economists envisioned government as correcting mar-
ket breakdowns caused by high transaction costs, information limita-
tions, and collective action problems.8 Since a major purpose of govern-
ment was to achieve Pareto optimality,9 government decisionmakers
needed only to identify and ensure the appropriate production of public
goods. Moreover, this process-ultimately a scientific one-was pre-
sumably best undertaken through rational deliberation by those en-
trusted with running government."' While the economic literature was
perhaps more model-building than descriptive, the economic and legal
process approaches complemented and reinforced each other rather
well.
This picture of the legislative process, however, has been subjected
to serious factual challenge-a challenge that is the subject of this Arti-
cle. Based on the seminal work of George Stigler, many scholars (econ-
I See generally A. PIGOU, THE ECONOMICS OF WELFARE 3-22 (4th ed. 1938)
(outlining public good theory); Samuelson, A Theory of Public Expenditure, 36 REv.
ECON. STATISTICS 387 (1954) (same). Ronald Coase's groundbreaking work was writ-
ten to explore the circumstances in which these economic arguments for government
intervention might not apply. See Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J. L. & ECON.
1, 42-43 (1960) (with zero transaction costs, efficient distribution of resources is achiev-
able regardless of how the courts set the initial entitlement). Of course, this insight has
been the subject of extensive legal comment and critique. See, e.g., Baker, The Ideology
of the Economic Analysis of Law, 5 PHIL. & PuB. AFF. 1, 4, 12 (1975) (noting that the
assignment of rights can affect preferences and wealth and concluding that "welfare
economics provides an ideological, and frequently objectionable, basis for policy guid-
ance"); Kelman, Consumption Theory, Production Theory, and Ideology in the Coase
Theorem, 52 S. CAL. L. REV. 669, 673 (1979) (the Coase theorem mistakenly assumes
"that people treat 'opportunity cost' income and 'received' or 'realized' income in the
same way"); Kennedy, Cost-Benefit Analysis of Entitlement Programs: A Critique, 33
STAN. L. REV. 387, 401-21 (1981) (concluding that "the notion of efficiency. . . has a
limited heuristic usefulness"). See generally Tribe, Constitutional Calculus: Equal
Justice or Economic Efficiency?, 98 HARV. L. REV. 592 (1985) (criticizing the utilita-
rian approach to legal problems because it minimizes distributional effects and over-
looks social values).
' Economic efficiency of government can be measured by several related criteria,
including Pareto optimality and, in a somewhat looser sense, Kaldor-Hicks efficiency.
See R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 12-15 (3d ed. 1986); Friedman, Does
Altruism Produce Efficient Outcomes? Marshall versus Kaldor, 17 J. LEGAL. STUD. 1,
1 (1988); Veljanovski, The New Law-and-Economics: A Research Review, in READ-
INGS IN THE ECONOMICS OF LAW AND REGULATION 12, 19-20 (1984).
10 See W. BAUMOL, WELFARE ECONOMICS AND THE THEORY OF THE STATE 17-
24 (1965); R. MCKEAN, EFFICIENCY IN GOVERNMENT THROUGH SYSTEMS ANALYSIS
3-22 (1958); E. MISHAN, ECONOMICS FOR SOCIAL DECISIONS 12-13 (1973). For a
description of this period, see Kennedy, supra note 8, at 389-98 (tracing the develop-
ment of cost/benefit analysis from simple applications involving government adminis-
trative programs to broad theories of property entitlement and externality regulation).
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omists and lawyers alike) began to examine a different side of legisla-
tive behavior-groups' and individual actors' pursuit of their self-
interest, resulting many times in irrationally (and regressively) redis-
tributive legislation."1 The legal process ideal was thus criticized as
naively unrealistic.12 Indeed, in legal scholarship adopting this perspec-
tive, Frank Easterbrook and Richard Posner have directly challenged
traditional approaches to statutory construction-the heart of the legal
process materials. In their view, the narrowly self-interested motiva-
tions of legislative actors often undermine traditional techniques of stat-
utory construction, which presuppose a public-regarding legislative
body.1 Thus, while legal academia once ignored the legislative process
11 See Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT.
SC. 3, 3 (1971) ("as a rule, regulation is acquired by [an] industry and is designed and
operated primarily for its benefit"); see also Peltzman, Constituent Interest and Con-
gressional Voting, 27 J.L. & EcoN. 181, 210 (1984) (presenting a statistical study of
congressional voting trends and arguing that there is a principal-agent relationship be-
tween a legislator and those who "pay" for her services via votes or contributions);
Peltzman, Toward a More General Theory of Regulation, 19 J.L. & EcoN. 211, 213
(1976) (formalizing Stigler's "producer protection" view but noting that the market for
legislation has built-in checks against increasingly powerful interest groups and redis-
tribution in their favor); Posner, Theories of Economic Regulation, 5 BELL J. EcoN. &
MGMT. SC. 335, 335-36 (1974) (rejecting a public interest theory of legislation in
favor of an interest group model favored by economists).
12 See Posner, supra note 3, at 27.
13 See Easterbrook, The Supreme Court, 1983 Term-Foreword: The Court and
the Economic System, 98 HARV. L. REV. 4, 46 (1984) [hereinafter Easterbrook, Fore-
word] (because congressional legislation often does not reflect an attempt to further a
"public interest," but rather represents a compromise among special interest groups, a
mode of statutory interpretation that always seeks to identify a public purpose and then
broadly enforces it is illegitimate); Easterbrook, Statutes' Domains, 50 U. CHL L. REV.
533, 540-43 (1983) [hereinafter Easterbrook, Statutes' Domains] (a judge's filling in
the statutory gaps through judicial interpretation is incompatible with the private inter-
est group process that often produced the legislation); Posner, Statutory Construc-
tion-In the Classroom and in the Courtroom, 50 U. CHi. L. REV. 800, 819-20
(1983) [hereinafter Posner, Statutory Construction] (developing a typology of statutory
construction based on whether the statute was the result of private interest compromise
or public spirited activity); cf. Posner, Economics, Politics, and the Reading of Statutes
and the Constitution, 49 U. CH. L. REV. 263, 272-80 (1982) [hereinafter Posner, The
Reading of Statutes] (describing the significance of "private" and "public" interest leg-
islation to various issues of statutory construction). But cf. Landes & Posner, The Inde-
pendentJudiciary in an Interest Group Perspective, 18 J.L. & ECON. 875, 879 (1975)
(while in form the judiciary is independent of interest group politics, it validates their
efforts by interpreting statutes with an eye toward identifying specific legislative in-
tent). This skeptical view of legislative deliberations is not limited to members of the
University of Chicago law faculty. See, e.g., Fiss, Foreword, supra note 4, at 10 (the
primary role of the legislature is to reflect the will and preferences of those elected);
Schuck, The Thickest Thicket: Partisan Gerrymandering and Judicial Regulation of
Politics, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 1325, 1336 (1987) ("legislative selflessness" is not "likely
to obtain in the American polity or indeed in any robustly competitive, complex politi-
cal system"). While many scholars have begun in turn to question the superficiality of
the assumptions underlying this rather pessimistic literature, see infra note 36, it surely
is the case that the views set forth in the Hart and Sacks materials no longer are
1988]
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or viewed it as inherently legitimate, many quarters now perceive it as
significantly flawed by the influence of narrow self-interested actors.14
In response to this special interest problem, scholarly commentary
has varied on the proper judicial role. Some authors have simply de-
scribed the judicial function as enforcing interest .group "bargains."' 5
As a positive matter, some have suggested that the courts should de-
velop one system of legal analysis when legislatures are supposedly act-
ing in their "private-regarding" mode and another when they are
"public-regarding," assuming it is possible to distinguish between the
two.' 6 This approach, however, tends to be both amoral and passive,
seeking merely to adopt a legal standard that mirrors the perceived op-
eration of the legislative process.
In light of this pessimistic view of legislative deliberations, and in
part perhaps as a reaction to the passivity of other approaches, legal
academics have expressed renewed interest in improving the perform-
ance of legislative decisionmaking through judicial review."a Much of
this effort' has been directed at formulating ways in which legislative
dominant.
"' At the same time as the legal profession was questioning the motivation of leg-
islative actors, public choice experts began to question the ability of scholars or judges
to construct a rational system of legislative procedures. The basis of these criticisms
was, of course, the work of Kenneth Arrow, who, along with others, demonstrated that,
given a particular distribution of preferences within a legislative population, consistent
results could not be assured; the person or persons who controlled the agenda determine
the outcome. Thus, legislative procedures were viewed not only as potentially perni-
cious (or at least private-regarding), but also as irrational. See K. ARROW, SOCIAL
CHOICE AND INDIVIDUAL VALUES 59-60 (1951); see also infra note 163 (noting situa-
tions where this problem may not be as serious as previously thought).
"5 See Landes & Posner, supra note 13, at 879; cf. Easterbrook, Statutes' Do-
mains, supra note 13, at 547 (unless a statute provides otherwise, the role of the court
in interpreting a provision is to apply it only in circumstances clearly anticipated by the
legislature, which "is faithful to the nature of compromise in private interest
legislation").
16 See Easterbrook, Foreword, supra note 13, at 46; Posner, Statutory Construc-
tion, supra note 13, at 818-20; Posner, The Reading of Statutes, supra, note 13, at
269-72. Obviously, the question of mixed motives-both of an individual and of differ-
ent people and groups within a legislature-complicates this dichotomy immensely,
perhaps irreparably. See infra notes 98-109 and accompanying text.
17 To some extent, one can view traditional doctrines of judicial review as serving
generally to displace legislative decisionmaking by "supplanting" its judgments in cer-
tain specified circumstances by reference to substantive values located in the Constitu-
tion. See Linde, supra note 3, at 203; Tribe, The Puzzling Persistence of Process-
Based Constitutional Theories, 89 YALE L.J. 1063, 1067 (1980). The new effort is
distinguishable from the courts' traditional role in that it does not appear to question
outcomes per se, but rather seeks to transform in a comprehensive manner general
legislative motivation.
18 A variety of authors fall into this category. See Griffin, Reconstructing Rawls's
Theory of Justice: Developing a Public Values Philosophy of the Constitution, 62
N.Y.U. L. REV. 715, 772-75 (1987); Macey, Promoting Public-Regarding Legislation
Through Statutory Interpretation: An Interest Group Model, 86 CoLum. L. REV. 223,
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actors-principally representatives, but sometimes their constituents as
well-can be made more "public-regarding" or "civically virtuous" on
a day-to-day basis.19 Civically virtuous legislators are thus similar to
those legislators presupposed by the Hart and Sacks materials, except
the courts are now faced with transforming actual representatives into
this legislative ideal.
At the same time as these intellectual efforts were underway, polit-
ical scientists and economists were pursuing parallel strategies. While
early economists noted the perverse incentives created by group activ-
ity,2" new efforts have focused on the circumstances in which mutually
240-50 (1986); Mashaw, Constitutional Deregulation: Notes Toward a Public, Public
Law, 54 TUL. L. REV. 849, 866-76 (1980) [hereinafter Mashaw, Constitutional De-
regulation]; Michelman, Politics and Values or What's Really Wrong with Rationality
Review?, 13 CREIGHTON L. REV. 487, 506-11 (1979); Stewart, Regulation in a Lib-
eral State: The Role of Non-Commodity Values, 92 YALE L.J. 1537, 1566-76 (1983);
Sunstein, Interest Groups in American Public Law, 38 STAN. L. REV. 29, 45-48
(1985) [hereinafter Sunstein, Interest Groups]; Sunstein, Naked Preferences and the
Constitution, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1689, 1693-1704 (1984) [hereinafter Sunstein, Na-
ked Preferences]; Sunstein, Public Values, Private Interests, and the Equal Protection
Clause, 1982 Sup. CT. REV. 127, 129-38 [hereinafter Sunstein, Public Values]; C.
Sunstein, Beyond the Republican Revival 54-68 (Dec. 22, 1987) (forthcoming in 97
YALE L.J.); cf. Epstein, Toward a Revitalization of the Contract Clause, 51 U. CHI.
L. REV. 703, 713-17 (1984) (arguing for an invigorated contract clause review to inval-
idate certain legislation passed as a result of interest group pressures); Wiley, A Cap-
ture Theory of Antitrust Federalism, 99 HARV. L. REV. 713, 723-28, 788 (1986) (ex-
plaining heightened federal scrutiny of state antitrust regulation as a consequence of
greater judicial awareness that such regulation typically benefits private interests at the
expense of the public). Other articles have discussed the use of statutory construction or
judicial intervention to inject into the legislative agenda political issues that would not
otherwise be considered. See, e.g., Mashaw, A Comment on Causation, Law Reform,
and Guerilla Warfare, 73 GEo. L.J. 1393, 1395-96 (1985); Zacharias, The Politics of
Torts, 95 YALE L.J. 698, 714-25 (1986); cf. G. CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR
THE AGE OF STATUTES 163-66 (1982) (proposing the invalidation of obsolete statutes
when they are based on principles that are no longer part of the legal framework).
Some civic virtue writers, such as Ackerman, do not seek to transform the daily
deliberations of legislative actors but rather advocate judicial enforcement of those sub-
stantive ideals supposedly adopted by the populace when it periodically enters into a
higher level of dialogue. See Ackerman, The Storrs Lectures: Discovering the Constitu-
tion, 93 YALE L.J. 1013, 1030, 1044-51 (1984).
19 The exact meaning of these terms will be developed in more detail below, but a
public-regarding legislator is sensitive to arguments based on principle, that is, argu-
ments geared toward improving society as a whole, rather than merely based on a
selfish desire of the particular political actor or group to advance her or its own partic-
ular interests alone within the society.
20 In his now classic exposition, Mancur Olson argued that, all things being
equal, as group size increased, individual members were often less likely to work for
group interests. See M. OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION 36 (1965) [here-
inafter M. OLSON, COLLECTIVE ACTION]; cf. Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons,
162 ScI. 1243, 1244-45 (1968) (suggesting how individual and group interests diverge
in the environmental context). But cf. R. HARDIN, COLLECTIVE ACTION 38-49 (1982)
(qualifying the conclusion about group size in certain factual settings). Olson has re-
cently applied this insight to explain the inefficiency of governments dominated by nar-
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cooperative arrangements can develop, 2 not only in the classroom and
the laboratory,22 but in the cloakroom as well.23
In this Article, I wish to raise a caveat to the general direction of
the public-regarding or civic virtue approach as it applies to reform of
the legislative process. The civic virtue literature, which parallels ef-
forts in other legal contexts to facilitate rational dialogue,24 would im-
row interest groups. See M. OLSON, THE RISE AND DECLINE OF NATIONS 17-19, 29-
34, 47-53 (1982) [hereinafter M. OLSON, RISE AND DECLINE].
21 The political economy literature focuses not on making representatives public-
regarding per se, but rather on forming arrangements so that private-regarding activity
will not lead to free rider problems or prisoners' dilemmas. See infra note 51 (explain-
ing the prisoners' dilemma).
22 Through computer game theory experiments, Robert Axelrod shows that a "tit
for tat" strategy is likely to elicit mutually beneficial cooperation. See R. AXELROD,
THE EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION 27-54 (1984). Thus, the "single property which
distinguishes the relatively high-scoring entries from the relatively low-scoring . . . is
the property of being nice, which is to say never being the first to defect." Id. at 33.
More generally, in a full evaluation of different models of interest group activity,
Russell Hardin identifies various characteristics of successful collective action, including
individuals not acting in a narrowly self-interested manner; entrepreneurial politicians
who perceive responding to mass sentiment as being consistent with their personal ca-
reer goals; an asymmetrically composed group that includes wealthy benefactors; and
groups with ongoing interactions and relations. See R. HARDIN, supra note 20, at 125-
37.
23 A variety of authors have begun to examine the historical circumstances in
which activity that appears truly public regarding has been undertaken by political
representatives. See M. DERTHICK & P. QUIRK, THE POLITICS OF DEREGULATION
253-54 (1985) (factors such as "the rise of the mass media, the decline of political
parties as organizations capable of electing or controlling officeholders, the growth of
analytical staffs in both legislative and executive branches, and the decentralization and
democratization of power in Congress" may have encouraged more public-regarding
legislators); S. KELMAN, MAKING PUBLIC POLICY 231-47 (1987) (citing deregulation
and protectionism as examples of "public spirit" rather than "the dominance of self-
interest"); A. MAASS, CONGRESS AND THE COMMON GOOD 5 (1983) ("government
conducts a process of deliberation and discussion that results in decisions that are based
on broader community interests, and it designs and implements programs in accordance
with these decisions"); D. ROBYN, BRAKING THE SPECIAL INTERESTS 1-11 (1987) (the
historical factors of "a highly inflationary economy, greater intellectual acceptance of
the competitive-market ideal, and the rise of a consumer movement followed by the
mobilization of business interests" enabled members in Congress to forsake their usual
system of catering to special interests and focused constituencies); see also S. VERBA &
G. ORREN, EQUALITY IN AMERICA: THE VIEW FROM THE ToP 248 (1985) (A "cen-
tral theme of this study . . . is that values and the conflict over values play an impor-
tant part in determining the nature and extent of equality [in America].").
24 See, e.g., B. ACKERMAN, SOCIAL JUSTICE AND THE LIBERAL SFATE 4-6, 358-
59 (1980); R. BURT, TAKING CARE OF STRANGERS: THE RULE OF LAW IN DocTOR-
PAIENIT REI.ATIONS 124-43 (1979); G. CALABRESI, supra note 18, at 163-81; R.
DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE 225-75 (1986); Fiss, Foreword, supra note 4, at 13; Fiss,
Objectivity, supra note 4, at 754-55. See generally Weisberg, supra note 1, at 241-49
(reviewing some of these writers and discussing the emergence of dialogue as a descrip-
tion of what he calls "the new legal process"). While most of this literature concerns
rational dialogue between judges, or between judges and litigants or legislators, one can
extend the normative insight to legislative deliberations. For earlier analyses of dialogue
between courts and legislatures, see A. BICKEL, supra note 2, at 26; Bickel & Welling-
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pose a legal model of rational public-regarding decisionmaking on the
legislative arena in order to help alleviate the problem of special inter-
est groups. Scholars no longer view the legal process as separate from
politics, but rather as its solution. Whatever the usefulness of this mode
of decisionmaking elsewhere, however, there are serious questions
whether many of these wholesale efforts to stimulate moral dialogue
within day-to-day legislative deliberations will ultimately improve the
quality of our public policy. Indeed, as suggested below, the substance
of legislative decisions may actually deteriorate if the new legal process
writers extend their current focus to its logical conclusions.
In developing this argument, I rely upon a distinctly different
literature on the legislative process-the political science scholarship
emphasizing the positive role of political parties, refered to below as the
"political party approach." With some important exceptions discussed
below, writers in this tradition place primary reliance on centralization
of power as the most positive mechanism for minimizing the effect of
special interest groups. Of course, no one scholar embraces all of the
specific proposals that various individual political party authors have
put forward for concentrating power, especially in light of the impor-
tant pluralistic and antityrannical goals that may not be protected by
this approach. This general perspective, however, does highlight the ex-
tent to which many academics, writing in the historical mainstream of
political science, adopt a distinctly different approach from the new
civic virtue writers. Indeed, not only may these two traditions paint
different visions for reform, but pursuit of the "public-regarding view"
might actually undermine the efforts and goals of those mechanisms,
such as a strong president and strong political parties, traditionally re-
lied on to limit the perverse effect of self-interested public actors.
To summarize the thesis, many of the doctrinal changes being ad-
vanced by civic virtue writers in order to stimulate greater public-re-
garding activity will, if extended to their logical conclusion, most likely
disperse political power and insulate government actors from popular
control.25 Unfortunately, this approach, which is quite different from
the centralization strategy advocated by political party proponents, may
well have the perverse effect of enhancing the influence of narrow self-
ton, Legislative Purpose and the Judicial Process: The Lincoln Mills Case, 71 HARV.
L. REV. 1, 14-35 (1957); Wellington & Albert, Statutory Interpretation and the Politi-
cal Process: A Comment on Sinclair v. Atkinson, 72 YALE L.J. 1547, 1559-66 (1963);
see also Cover & Aleinikoff, Dialectical Federalism, 86 YALE L.J. 1035, 1052-60
(1977) (discussing how dialogue between state and federal judges is engendered by fed-
eral habeas corpus).
25 See infra notes 168-79 and accompanying text.
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interested groups.26 Moreover, the ideological discussion that civic vir-
tue writers seek to stimulate -may disadvantage poor and less educated
groups by reducing their ability to exercise popular control over politi-
cal developments. These changes also may impede the ability of govern-
ment to undertake effective action-a conservative bias these writers
presumably eschew.2 Indeed, while precise predictions are hazardous,
past reform movements in Congress aimed at increasing the insulation
and independence of individual members of Congress have tended to
have this precise effect-enhancing the collective influence of narrow
self-interested actors and reducing the ability of Congress to take coor-
dinated actio,. 28 In short, the civic virtue reforms may well have a re-
sult contrary to what is intended.
Organizationally, Part I outlines the specifics of the special inter-
est group problem. Part II sketches the solutions to this difficulty of-
fered in the new civic virtue literature. Part III summarizes the princi-
pal elements of the traditional political science approach to the problem
of special interest groups. Part IV examines the theoretical tensions be-
tween the civic virtue and political party strategies, while Part V dis-
cusses various historical and analytical reasons for concern with any
singular pursuit of the new civic virtue solution. Finally, Part VI ex-
plores other drawbacks with wholesale adoption of the civic virtue ap-
proach in terms of government effectiveness and reduced protection for
the poor. The conclusion briefly discusses two possible systems, worthy
of further investigation, that seek to stimulate greater virtue without
dispersing collective responsibility.
The purpose of this effort is two-fold. First, as an academic mat-
ter, it seeks to highlight and illustrate the central difference in overall
theoretical perspective between the civic virtue and the political party
literature, in much the same spirit in which A.O. Hirschman con-
trasted the reform traditions in economics and political science in his
powerful work, Exit, Voice and Loyalty.29 Second, in undertaking this
2 See infra notes 185-205 and accompanying text.
27 See infra notes 238-47 and accompanying text.
2 See infra notes 206-26 and accompanying text.
29 See A. HIRSCHMAN, EXIT, VOICE AND LOYALTY (1970). In developing this
argument, this Article will attempt to draw together some of the common threads and
insights of the legal writing on civic virtue as it applies to the reform of the legislative
process. Because much of this literature is still at a formative stage, in some instances
the Article will discuss only its general policy direction or attempt to extend proposals
to their most probable conclusion. Unfortunately, this approach may not do justice to
the specific recommendations and views of particular authors.
In addition, I will focus solely on those students of civic virtue who seek to explore
the practical but immensely important question of how to structure legislative institu-
tions so as to elevate the motivation of political actors through reasoned dialogue. The
extensive literature examining the historical origins of different forms of civic virtue is
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comparison, the analysis is intended to contribute to, and perhaps help
to shape, a legal literature that is still at a nascent stage.
In general, civic virtue offers a peculiarly legal solution to a prob-
lem that has perplexed economists and political scientists-special in-
terest groups and externalities. In the tradition of the legal process
school, civic virtue writers seek to solve these and other difficulties
through the imposition of a rational dialogue. This dialogue is designed
to induce legislative actors to be considerate of the interests and aspira-
tions of those outside their group or constituency, as well as to examine
and understand better their own goals and aspirations. Those who wish
to pursue the civic virtue strategy, however, must come to grips with
the theoretical and historical insights of political science, which suggest
that this approach has the potential for making matters worse.
I. THE SPECIAL INTEREST GROUP PROBLEM
In recent years, lawyers, political scientists, and economists have
increasingly directed their attention to what they perceive as the inade-
quate and sometimes perverse performance of the legislative process.
Not all of the criticisms of the process adopt the same perspective or
even are consistent. Nevertheless, many of these analyses develop a
common theme: the disproportionate influence of so-called narrow self-
interested groups in legislative decisionmaking, all at the expense of the
broad diffuse public interest.
While few academics, let alone politicians, explain with any rigor
exactly what is meant by the term "special interests" (or, for that mat-
ter, what is meant by its contrapositive, the "public interest"), three
aspects of many of these groups raise concern. First, and foremost, spe-
cial interests are often disproportionately self-interested; they are con-
cerned primarily with promoting the interests of members of their par-
ticular group, rather than with promoting the "broader public
interests."3 What is meant by pursuing the interests of society as a
beyond the purview of this Article. See, e.g., D. McCoy, THE ELUSIVE REPUBLIC:
POLITICAL ECONOMY IN JEFFERSONIAN AMERICA (1980); J. POCOCK, THE MACHIA-
VELLIAN MOMENT: FLORENTINE POLITICAL THOUGHT AND THE ATLANTIC REPUB-
LICAN TRADITION (1975); G. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC
1776-1787 (1969); Berthoff & Murrin, Feudalism, Communalism, and the Yeoman
Freeholder: The American Revolution Considered as a Social Accident, in ESSAYS ON
THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION (1973). So too is the theoretical examination by various
legal and other philosophers attempting to understand the many nuances of abstract
dialogue and human interaction. See, e.g., 1 J. HABERMAS, REASON AND THE RA-
TIONALIZATION OF SOCIETY (T. McCarthy trans. 1984); J. HABERMAS, THEORY AND
PRACTICE U. Viertel trans. 1973); Cornell, Toward a ModernlPostmodern Recon-
struction of Ethics, 133 U. PA. L. REV. 291 (1985).
30 Macey, supra note 18, at 223. Certainly not all or even most groups are wholly
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whole is far from clear; in most contexts, it appears to mean that deci-
sions are made on the basis of so-called "reasoned or principled argu-
ments," rather than on arguments advanced "merely" as a response to
power or to personal advantage. 3 Thus, a principled discussion might
properly lead to advancement of the interests of the participants or
their constituents, but only because they have been motivated in their
decisionmaking by pursuit of the social good and not by self-interest or
their own power.
In addition to being disproportionately self-interested, special in-
terests also suffer from a second normative problem: they are narrow,
that is, they speak for only a small segment of the democratic polity.
Although few lawyers (let alone political economists) who criticize our
democratic institutions present a sustained defense of majority rule,
most usually presume that rule by a substantial majority of the eligible
voting population is preferable over the long run to rule (or effective
rule) by a very narrow subset of the population. 2 This understanding
obviously enjoys constitutional underpinnings. While the Constitution
protects a variety of minority groups and interests in specific contexts,
as a general matter, "[m]inorities are supposed to lose in a democratic
system . . ... " Thus, to the extent that they are influential, the nar-
self-interested. There appears instead to be a continuum of different levels of legislative
motivation. See infra note 100. At this point, this Article seeks only to identify an ideal
type. te This description masks some differences among the proponents of this view. In
some instances, civic virtue is described as making decisions in the absence of political
pressure or power. See Macey, supra note 18, at 229 n.29. Elsewhere it is described in
the positive sense of making decisions on the basis of principle or deliberation. See
Sunstein, Interest Groups, supra note 18, at 58. The two processes are not necessarily
the same.
32 A. BICKEL, supra note 2, at 16-17; Macey, supra note 18, at 225-26. For a
discussion of some of the problems with majority rule, see infra notes 163-66 and ac-
companying text.
3' Ackerman, Beyond Carolene Products, 98 HARV. L. REv. 713, 719 (1985).
The Court has apparently attempted to protect majority rule most directly in the one
person/one vote and gerrymandering decisions, in which each individual is held entitled
to an "effective and adequately weighted vote." Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 581
(1964); see also Davis v. Bandemer, 106 S. Ct. 2797 (1986) (political gerrymandering
can result in unconstitutional vote dilution); Karcher v. Daggett, 462 U.S. 725 (1983)
(establishing a rigorous standard of numerical equality of population in congressional
redistricting); Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1 (1964) (enunciating the principle of one
person/one vote). But see Ball v. James, 451 U.S. 355 (1981) (water district can devi-
ate from one person/one vote rule); Salyer Land Co. v. Tulare Lake Basin Water
Storage Dist., 410 U.S. 719 (1973) (water storage district can limit voting rights to
landowners and apportion votes among landowners according to the number of acres
owned). There is a rich literature examining whether and to what extent these deci-
sions necessarily further majority rule. See, e.g., Baker, Neutrality, Process, and Ra-
tionality: Flawed Interpretations of Equal Protection, 58 TEX. L. REv. 1029, 1074-76
(1980) (arguing that the Court's remedy for malapportionment-reapportionment
guaranteeing equally populated districts-does not guarantee majority rule); Lowen-
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row nature of special interest groups threatens majority rule.
This leads to the third and related normative concern with special
interest groups: they can be quite powerful. As a variety of political
and economic scholars have pointed out, the polity suffers from serious
collective action problems that afford disproportionate influence to nar-
row concentrated interests. 4 These problems are exacerbated in the
legislative process, since individual legislators lack an incentive to work
for issues or projects that redound to the public in general (especially
voters outside their district). They are therefore more likely to respond
stein & Steinberg, The Quest for Legislative Districting in the Public Interest: Elusive
or Illusory?, 33 UCLA L. REv. 1, 6-7 & n.16 (1985) (same (citing Bernoulli's theo-
rem)); Note, The Constitutional Imperative of Proportional Representation, 94 YALE
L.J. 163, 177-82 (1984) (examining the tension in Reynolds between group and indi-
vidual rights); see also Lucas v. Forty-Fourth General Assembly, 377 U.S. 713, 750
n.12 (1964) (Stewart J., dissenting) (equally populated districts nonetheless permit mi-
nority rule). The issue is further complicated by the divergent and shifting preferences
of individual voters and their group allegiances. See, e.g., Baker, supra, at 1078;
Schuck, supra note 13, at 1373. In addition, any system of majority rule, once the
majority representatives are selected, almost by definition "devalues" the weight of the
losing minority voters. See Grofman & Scarrow, The Riddle of Apportionment: Equal-
ity of What?, 70 NAT'L Civic REV. 242, 247 (1981); Levinson, Gerrymandering and
the Brooding Omnipresence of Proportional Representation: Why Won't It Go Away?,
33 UCLA L. REV. 257, 265 (1985); Lowenstein & Steinberg, supra, at 14 n.36.
"' For example, where the opposition to (or support for) particular programs is
spread diffusely acros the public at large and the support for (or, alternatively, opposi-
tion to) such programs is concentrated in a particular group, individual members of the
public-and therefore "the public" in general-do not have strong incentives to inform
themselves or lobby on the particular issues, even though (from a social sense) the costs
of the project might outweigh the benefits by a wide margin and/or the majority of the
population would favor the projects. With respect to the public at large, the diffuse
impact of the costs means that each individual member lacks the proper incentive to
obtain the information or, even if she has the information, to expend effort on behalf of
the particular project, because of its modest individual effect. This, coupled with the
incentive to free ride as the group becomes larger, means that such interests are less
likely to find organizational expression. Narrowly concentrated interests, which are less
subject to such perverse incentives, will be more likely to find organizational support.
Olson was the first to explore this problem in detail. See M. OLSON, COLLECTIVE
ACTION, supra note 20, at 43-52; see also J. BUCHANAN & G. TULLOCK, THE
CALCULUS OF CONSENT 38 (1962) ("individuals may be expected to be somewhat less
rational in collective than in private choices"); R. HARDIN, supra note 20, at 42-49
(examining the effect of group size on the ability to achieve group objectives); cf. R.
POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 497 (3d ed. 1986) (noting the existence of
"free-rider" problems in which an individual (or firm) who is "within the protective
scope of some proposed piece of legislation will benefit from its enactment whether or
not he makes any contribution, financial or otherwise, to obtaining its enactment").
Numerous authors have since attempted to expand and supplement this theory
into a richer typology of interest group power, recognizing the circumstances in which
ideological and other motivations can become the basis for group action. See, e.g., R.
HARDIN, supra note 20, at 101-24; M. HAYES, LOBBYISTS & LEGISLATORS: A THE-
ORY OF POLITICAL MARKETS 64-127 (1981); J. WILSON, POLITICAL ORGANIZATIONS
327-45 (1973); Wilson, The Politics of Regulation, in THE POLITICS OF REGULATION
357, 357-72 (J. Wilson ed. 1980); Schuck, The Politics of Regulation (Book Review),
90 YALE L.J. 702, 723 (1981) (reviewing THE POLITICS OF REGULATION).
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to those interests, usually geographically concentrated, that concern
their districts. 5  The result is often-though certainly not al-
ways3 6-narrowly concentrated interests exercising disproportionate in-
fluence, even though the vast majority of the population, if it took the
time and expense to educate itself on all issues and to exercise its voice,
might often reject many of the policies that result from this process.
Despite these concerns, a variety of arguments have historically
been offered in favor of influence by special interest groups. Many
economists, of course, have suggested that the partisan, self-interested
motives of individual actors in the private sector can promote at least
some of the goals of society as a whole.3 7 Political scientists, writing in
the pluralist tradition, have also maintained that an analogous phenom-
enon operates within the political process, where countervailing politi-
11 See L. DODD & R. SCHOTT, CONGRESS AND THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE
92-105 (1979); M. FIORINA, CONGRESS: KEYSTONE OF THE WASHINGTON EsTAB-
LISHMENT 56-70 (1977); D. MAYHEW, CONGRESS: THE ELECTORAL CONNECTION
52-61 (1974).
' There is a growing literature questioning the magnitude of this problem or at
least exploring circumstances in which this bias has been and can be overcome. For
discussion by lawyers, see Farber & Frickey, The Jurisprudence of Public Choice, 65
TEX. L. REV. 873, 883-901 (1987); Hazard, Principles in Legislation, 41 REC. B.
CITY N.Y. 685, 691-93 (1986); J. Mashaw, Positive Theory and Public Law 44-51
(Feb. 3, 1986) (on file with the University of Pennsylvania LaW Review). For exami-
nations by political scientists, see M. DERTHICK & P. QUIRK, supra note 23, at 237-
58; S. KELMAN, supra note 23, at 60-66; A. MAASS, supra note 23, at 64-74; D.
ROBYN, supra note 23, at 234-57; S. VERBA & G. ORREN, supra note 23, at 248; Kalt
& Zupan, Capture and Ideology in the Economic Theory of Politics, 74-1 AM. ECON.
REV. 279, 279-98 (1984). Of course, one can view a great deal of so-called public
spirited activity as also serving the interests of various groups and the resulting legisla-
tion as being passed or amended partly at their instigation. See B. ACKERMAN & W.
HASSLER, CLEAN COAL/DIRTY AIR 1-4, 54-57 (1981) (aspects of the Clean Air Act,
while perceived as public-serving, in fact served the interests of certain industrialists);
Elliott, Ackerman & Millian, Toward a Theory of Statutory Evolution: The Federali-
zation of Environmental Law, 1 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 313, 326 (1985) (first significant
federal statutes regulating air pollution passed at instigation of well-organized indus-
trial groups); see also R. HARDIN, supra note 20, at 117-24 (discussing complex bal-
ance of interests behind environmental and civil rights movements); R. KATZMANN,
INSTITUTIONAL DISABILITY: THE SAGA OF TRANSPORTATION POLICY FOR THE DIs-
ABLED 41-44, 58-60 (1986) (discussing the influence of the automotive and airline in-
dustry on the development of transportation policy for the elderly and handicapped); R.
NOLL & B. OWEN, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF DEREGULATION: INTEREST
GROUPS IN THE REGULATORY PROCESS 155 (1983) (much of the deregulation of the
early 1980's, while ostensibly designed to protect consumers, in fact aided the special
interests involved).
"i As Adam Smith first proclaimed, through a division of labor and an appeal to
the "self-love" of the individual, individuals and small groups are able to increase the
productivity and, therefore, the wealth of themselves and the nation. See 1 A. SMITH,
AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 1-16 (E.
Cannan ed. 1966) (5th ed. 1789). For a philosophical defense of market behavior, see
R. POSNER, THE ECONOMICS OF JUSTICE 60-87 (1983) (suggesting link between in-
creased wealth of society as a whole and social justice).
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cal interests, through a process of representation, pressure and accom-
modation,3" adopt a public policy package sensitive to the interests and
needs of society as a whole. 9 Indeed, recent economic literature has
attempted to merge these two traditions.4 While a variety of principles
might be offered in defense of this analysis, in many respects it pur-
ports to be more sensitive, in comparison to its more democratic com-
petitors, to the intensity of social interests,4' rather than merely to an
aggregation of their numerical support.
Despite these more traditional defenses, however, there remains a
troubling consensus that the invisible hand does not solve the legisla-
ture's problems of legitimacy. The cumulative effect of self-interested
motivation, narrow focus, collective action disincentives, and potential
bias toward wealthier groups and interests continues to undermine the
legislature's authority. While legal scholarship once focused on the bias
" This process, labeled "partisan mutual adjustment," refers to a decentralized
decisionmaking and policymaking system that consists of interdependent decisionmakers
making rational and therefore coordinated decisions to achieve incrementally accommo-
dating policies. C. LINDBLOM, THE INTELLIGENCE OF DEMOCRACY 3-34, 87-101
(1965).
11 See A. BENTLEY, THE PROCESS OF GOVERNMENT 447-59 (1967); R. DAHL, A
PREFACE TO DEMOCRATIC THEORY 141-45 (1956); D. TRUMAN, THE GOVERNMEN-
TAL PROCESS 501-35 (1951).
40 See Becker, A Theory of Competition among Pressure Groups for Political In-
fluence, 98 Q.J. ECON. 371, 372-73 (1983). Like the pluralists, Becker appears to
downplay the pervasive effect of transaction costs in ensuring organizational parity be-
tween different groups in the general population. For an earlier attempt to reconcile
these two traditions, see A. DOWNS, AN ECONOMIC THEORY OF DEMOCRACY 282-94
(1957).
41 The exact meaning of the intensity of overall support is unclear, since it ulti-
mately presumes the ability to make interpersonal utility comparisons. Economists and
philosophers have had serious debates over this issue, both as a technical as well as a
normative matter. On the difficulties in measuring utility, especially between individu-
als, see, e.g., A. MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE: A STUDY IN MORAL THEORY 64 (2nd
ed. 1984); J. MACKIE, ETHICS: INVENTING RIGHT AND WRONG 127, 139 (1977); B.
WILLIAMS, MORALITY: AN INTRODUCTION TO ETHICS 100-03 (1972). On the norma-
tive difficulties in basing moral judgments merely on summations of group happiness,
thereby ignoring the individual as something deserving of intrinsic worth, see, e.g., J.
MACKIE, supra, at 145, 147. See generally J. SMART & B. WILLIAMS, UTILITARIAN-
ISM FOR AND AGAINST (1973) (discussing the merits of utilitarianism). Of course, a
separate debate has ensued over whether wealth maximization is a normatively attrac-
tive goal. Compare Dworkin, Is Wealth a Value?, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 191, 194 (1980)
(the goal of maximizing social wealth is mistakenly premised on the personification of
society) with Posner, Utilitarianism, Economics, and Legal Theory, 8 J. LEGAL STUD.
103, 104-11 (1979) (economic analysis is helpful in making ethical decisions). Most
people probably agree, however, that the political system should take account of differ-
ent intensities of interest within the population, in at least some cases. See J.
BUCHANAN & G. TULLOCK, supra note 34, at 125 (noting distinctions between inten-
sity and numerical aggregation of support); Komesar, Housing, Zoning, and the Public
Interest, in B. WEISBROD, J. HANDLER & N. KOMESAR, PUBLIC INTEREST LAW-AN
ECONOMIC AND INSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS 218, 221 (1978) (labeling the distinctions
as majoritarian and influence models).
1988) 1583
1584 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
of the majority as perhaps the central dilemma of constitutional law,42
now the bias and power of narrow special interests groups may have
become a greater constitutional worry.4
II. THE CIVIC VIRTUE PERSPECTIVE
In light of the special interest concern, several legal academics re-
cently have offered a variety of reform proposals to combat the first
element of the special interest group equation-the disproportionately
self-regarding motivation of many representatives and/or their constitu-
encies. This concern over the self-interest component of special interest
groups can probably be traced to A Theory of Justice,44 in which John
Rawls' heuristic and analytic device, the original position, seeks to im-
bue public decisionmakers with civic virtue so that they may better de-
liberate on the structure of a just society.45 According to Rawls, a group
of individuals, if placed behind a "veil of ignorance," would not know
their place in society or even their preexisting values or belief systems,
which historical experience has shown often support the individual's
desired social position.46 As a result, with self-interest having been ex-
cised from social decisionmaking, they would be in a position to agree
on a just structure for society.
Along similar lines, a number of philosophical and legal writers
have recognized the value of rational dialogue, undertaken in the ab-
sence of a veil of ignorance, as a normatively attractive system for
reaching ethical public decisions. 7 Ideally, intellectual exchange should
assist participants to understand and reach agreement on factual and
ethical differences, as well as shape their own values toward norma-
tively attractive ends.48 From Ackerman to Fiss to Michelman, from
42 See A. BICKEL, supra note 2, at 16-32; J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST
71 (1980).
"3 See Ackerman, supra note 33, at 745-46; Bruff, Legislative Formality and Ad-
ministrative Rationality, 63 TEX. L. REV. 207, 213-18 (1984); Posner, The Reading
of Statutes, supra note 13, at 266. Within this literature, there is disagreement over
exactly what general normative principle is being contravened by the power of special
interest groups. One can probably view a system of strong special interest groups as
contravening, in a very loose sense, majority rule, Pareto optimality, Kaldor-Hicks effi-
ciency, utilitarianism, and/or some alternative normative principle of rational dialogue.
"4 J. RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971).
45 See id. at 11-22.
46 See id. at 136-42.
"I See, e.g., B. ACKERMAN, supra note 24, at 4-6, 358-59; R. BURT, supra note
24, at 124-43; G. CALABRESI, supra note 18, at 96-98, 163-81; R. DWORKIN, supra
note 24, at 225-75; Fiss, Objectivity, supra note 4, at 754-55; Fiss, Foreword, supra
note 4, at 13.
"' See Michelman, supra note 18, at 509; Stewart, supra note 18, at 1566-76;
Sunstein, Legal Interference with Private Preferences, 53 U. CH. L. REV. 1129, 1154-
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institutional litigation to child custody disputes, rational dialogue has
been offered as a legitimate basis for helping to resolve disputes and
make public decisions.49
Indeed, even economists, while operating from an entirely different
conceptual framework, have recognized that a public-regarding motiva-
tion-altruism-can be an important device for overcoming the per-
verse incentives of individuals who ignore, and are not held accountable
for, the external consequences of their actions.5 In this sense, altruism
can overcome the "prisoners' dilemma" inherent in political and eco-
nomic externalities, though without the typical economic solution of
self-interested actors having to surmount transaction costs and reach
binding enforceable agreements or undertake so-called "tit-for-tat"
strategies."1
58 (1986); Tribe, supra note 8, at 595.
"' See B. ACKERMAN, supra note 24, at 4-6, 358-59; R. BURT, supra note 24, at
124-43; Fiss, Foreword, supra note 4, at 13; Fiss, Objectivity, supra note 4, at 754;
Michelman, The Supreme Court, 1985 Term-Foreword: Traces of Self-Government,
100 HARV. L. REV. 4, 32-33 (1986).
"' See, e.g., Becker, Altruism, Egoism, and Genetic Fitness: Economics and Sod-
obiology, 14 J. ECON. LIT. 817, 818-26 (1976) (outlining an economic model of how
altruism might develop that incorporates sociobiological principles and individual ra-
tionality); Hansmann, The Role of Nonprofit Enterprise, 89 YALE L.J. 835, 848-54,
859-62 (1980) (discussing altruism as one mechanism for overcoming market break-
down in those markets in which nonprofit enterprise has arisen); Kolm, Altruism and
Efficiency, 94 ETHICS 18 2728 (1983) (reviewing economic advantages of altruistic be-
havior). But see Wintrobe, It Pays to Do Good, But Not to Do More Good than It
Pays: A Note on the Survival of Altruism, 2 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 201, 212
(1981) (criticizing Becker's theory of how altruism might develop). In a series of psy-
chological experiments, Elizabeth Hoffman and Matthew Spitzer have found that, con-
trary to predictions based on a utilitarian model of self-interested human behavior,
experimental subjects distributed gains according to their perceptions of fairness and
distributive justice, not legal entitlements. See Hoffman & Spitzer, Entitlements,
Rights, and Fairness: An Experimental Examination of Subjects' Concepts of Distrib-
utive Justice, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 259, 259-62 (1985). For a discussion of the possible
evolutionary benefits to the group or species of various ethical norms, see Rubin,
Evolved Ethics and Efficient Ethics, 3 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 161, 165-68 (1982).
See generally E. WILSON, ON HUMAN NATURE 5 (1978) (one form of altruism, re-
spect for other citizens' social rights, may stem from innate "motivators" in the brain);
H. MARGOLIS, SELFISHNESS ALTRUISM AND RATIONALITY 4 (1982) (developing an
equilibrium of human behavior, balancing group and self-interest motives).
51 See Harrison, Strategy and Biology: The Continuing Interest in Self-Interest
(Book Review), 86 COLUM. L. REv. 213, 216-17 (1986) (reviewing R. AXELROD,
supra note 22; J. BECKSTROM, SOCIOBIOLOGY AND THE LAW (1985)). As lawyers
now recognize, the prisoner's dilemma offers a game theory demonstration of how pri-
vate short-term advantage and long-term public interests can diverge. Under the com-
mon scenario, two partners in crime are offered separate collusive deals by the prosecu-
tor for reduced sentences if they squeal on their compatriot. If both capitulate, however,
they will each receive enhanced sentences. Even though they will be better off agreeing
to stonewall the government, their private incentive, assuming they are unable to reach
a prior agreement, is to confess. The result, paradoxically, is that they both are worse
off by following their narrow self-interest. See R. HARDIN, supra note 20, at 2. For a
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While this disparate group of scholars all accept some type of dia-
logue or altruism as a legitimate technique for improving public deci-
sionmaking, legal scholars have been less certain as to how to stimulate
such motivation among political representatives. The approaches can be
usefully divided into two categories. The first includes the "new" civic
virtue writers, typified, and perhaps led, by Cass Sunstein, who are
attempting to transform the motivations of day-to-day political actors
through changes in judicial review and legislative structure intended to
stimulate debate and dialogue in Congress' The second, included here
only for comparative purposes, covers those scholars who rely on the
traditional constitutional technique of a temporal veil of ignorance to
transform long-term legislative motivation. The first approach is the
focus of this Article's critical analysis.
A. The New Civic Virtue Writers
Cass Sunstein has clearly provided the most extensive, important,
and comprehensively developed scholarship in this first category, detail-
ing a variety of legal doctrines that could facilitate rational debate.
The first and most important is direct judicial review of legislative
decisionmaking. In a series of pieces, including a forthcoming Yale Law
Journal article,52 Sunstein argues that the Court should invalidate leg-
islation that is "an exercise of political power by the advantaged class,"
rather than a "deliberative" exercise of "principle" or "public inter-
ested judgment.""3 Previously, Sunstein maintained that several consti-
tutional provisions-including the contracts, privileges and immunities,
due process, takings, and equal protection clauses-impose this type of
condition in specific contexts.54 In his latest expositions, Sunstein urges
the courts to adopt this as a general constitutional requirement of legis-
lative decisionmaking. Sunstein's approach is thus notable in its call for
a comprehensive and fundamental transformation of legislative deliber-
ations, rather than merely heightened standards of review when discrete
values or interests are threatened.
55
description of how the problem of public goods can be conceptualized as a prisoner's
dilemma, see id. at 25-30.
51 C. Sunstein, supra note 18.
5 See Sunstein, Interest Groups, supra note 18, at 69; C. Sunstein, supra note
18, at 15, 58.
" See Sunstein, Naked Preferences, supra note 18, at 1689-90; see also Sunstein,
Public Values, supra note 18, at 128 (suggesting that the function of the equal protec-
tion clause is to "prohibit unprincipled distributions of resources and opportunities").
15 In proposing a motivational review of legislative decisions, Sunstein's analysis
might be compared to that of several other scholars, such as Gerald Gunther, who have
advocated more searching constitutional review of legislation to determine whether the
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In addition to recommending strengthened judicial review, Sun-
stein also applauds structural mechanisms that increase the indepen-
dence of political representatives from the public and other representa-
tives, thereby, at least in theory, offering them greater opportunity to
exercise civic virtue. "Madisonian republicanism," according to Sun-
stein, "calls for substantial autonomy" of the people's representatives
and "insulation" from "constituent pressures. ""6 The most important
device, in Sunstein's view, appears to be the representatives' indepen-
dence from the electoral public; he argues that the existence of repre-
sentative democracy was itself intended to ensure some independence,
as was the original election of senators by state legislatures 57 and the
president by the Electoral College.5"
In addition to this "vertical" distance, Sunstein's approach implic-
itly suggests that members of Congress should enjoy some "horizontal"
independence from other politicians in order to further the dialogic
ideal. According to Sunstein, courts should ensure that representatives
are acting in a deliberative fashion when making policy, with no deci-
provisions of the legislation are rationally related to its goals. See Gunther, The Su-
preme Court, 1971 Term-Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing
Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1, 20-48 (1972).
This earlier literature was criticized on the grounds that much legislation, when its
actual goals are uncovered, is motivated by pure self-interest, to which its particular
provisions are almost always tautologically related. See Linde, supra note 3, at 222-35;
Michelman, Political Markets and Community Self-Determination: Competing Judi-
cial Models of Local Government Legitimacy, 53 IND. L.J. 145, 175-77 (1977-78);
Posner, supra note 3, at 29. Sunstein's approach suggests that the more searching stan-
dard of review proposed during this earlier effort was not misguided, although its pro-
ponents should have acknowledged that the gpal was to expose and invalidate legisla-
tion that was rationalized only on self-interested grounds. See Sunstein, Interest
Groups, supra note 18, at 69 n.177.
While the breadth of Sunstein's proposed motivational review is particularly far
reaching, several other authors have offered similar proposals for invalidating legisla-
tion that was adopted merely because of the exercise of political power, suggesting the
increasing attractiveness of this approach to a variety of members of the legal academic
community. See Epstein, supra note 18, at 713-17; Griffin, supra note 18, at 772;
Mashaw, Constitutional Deregulation, supra note 18, at 867.
5' C. Sunstein, supra note 18, at 30-33.
" See Sunstein, Interest Groups, supra note 18, at 43; see also U.S. CONsT. art.
I, § 3, cl. 1, amended by U.S. CONST. amend. XVII, § 1 (direct election of senators).
The seventeenth amendment provided for popular election of United States senators in
place of selection by state legislatures.
58 See U.S. CONsT. art. II, § 1, cls. 2-3. While this is a linchpin of civic republi-
can philosophy, Sunstein himself does not specifically propose any further structural
changes for increasing this independence, perhaps because it confronts so directly the
democratic character of our institutions. Other authors have explored this, however.
See, e.g., Elliot, Constitutional Conventions and the Deficit, 1985 DUKE L.J. 1077,
1105-06 (suggesting a possible reform to the structure of Congress, such as a twelve-
year senate term without the possibility of reelection, to insulate Congress from pres-
sures of special interest groups).
1988]
1588 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
sions based on "raw power" or "pluralist compromise." 59 Instead, leg-
islators must give "detailed explanations" to ensure that "participation
[is] afforded" and "the relevant officials engage[] in a genuine attempt
to discern the public interest."6" Procedural devices that bypass political
actors, such as the legislative veto, are unconstitutional, in Sunstein's
eyes, because they do not afford independent political actors the oppor-
tunity to engage in deliberative democracy."1 As a general matter,
"[i]mpartiality within republican theories . . . requires public regard-
ing investigations offered after multiple points of view have been con-
sulted and (to the extent possible) genuinely understood."62 Thus, "dis-
agreement" is to be "a creative and productive force," with political
actors treating one another as independent, intellectual ends."3
In his forthcoming article, Sunstein develops this philosophy fur-
ther, arguing that civic virtue also supports a system of proportional
representation because it serves to stimulate a rich and diverse dialogue
among legislators. Under one possible approach, "all those groups that
are able to attain more than a minimal share of the vote," as well as
"disadvantaged groups," would be guaranteed representation so that
they would have the "political power to exert influence on political out-
comes.""& In defense of the requirement, he explains, "The basic con-
stitutional institutions of federalism, bicameralism, and checks and bal-
ances share some of the appeal of proportional representation, . . .
[proliferating] the points of access to government, increasing the ability
of diverse groups to influence policy, multiplying perspectives in gov-
ernment, and improving deliberative capacities.
65
" Sunstein, Interest Groups, supra note 18, at 50-51.
60 Id. at 65.
61 See id. at 53. Scholars have already found that the legislative veto offers a stra-
tegic advantage to special interest groups, not necessarily because of its effect, on legisla-
tive deliberations, but due to the effective bypassing of approval by both houses of
Congress. See Bruff & Gelhorn, Congressional Control of Administrative Regulation:
A Study of Vetoes, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1369, 1417-20 (1977).
62 C. Sunstein, supra note 18, at 51-52.
83 Id. at 53.
" Id. at 63-64. But see Comment, Politics and Purpose: Hide and Seek in the
Gerrymandering Thicket after Davis v. Bandemer, 136 U. PA. L. REv. 183, 213
(1987) (civic virtue and proportional representation are inconsistent). Sunstein recog-
nizes that there is some tension between the exercise of power and a more general civic
virtue philosophy. See C. Sunstein, supra note 18, at 65.
5 C. Sunstein, supra note 18, at 63. In a recent administrative law article, Sun-
stein offers a similar analysis on behalf of heightened presidential, legislative, and judi-
cial oversight of administrative agency decisions. See Sunstein, Constitutionalism after
the New Deal, 101 HARv. L. REV. 421, 429, 487, 509 (1987) (simultaneous presiden-
tial, legislative, and judicial control can, "by proliferating points of access to govern-
ment . . . increase the opportunity for groups to seek and obtain reform" and "bring
about something close to the safeguards of the original constitutional framework"); see
also id. at 489-90 (arguing for a dispersal of power in administration because, as in the
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In his proposals for reform, then, Sunstein envisions the Constitu-
tion and the courts imposing a deliberative model on Congress, through
judicial review of the discussions and interactions between legislators,
protection of legislators' independence from constituents, and stimula-
tion of greater access of different groups to legislative deliberations, all
with the purpose of ensuring that representatives can and will express
their view of legislation in a thoughtful manner. While the full breadth
of judicial and structural changes that civic virtue proponents would
support are still evolving, Sunstein, along with other authors who claim
to be sympathetic to this approach, appears to be exploring ways in
which the "courts [would] play a role in structuring the processes of
representation to insulate representatives from pressures so that they
can better deliberate in the public interest."
'66
In addition to motivational review, two related devices for stimu-
lating civically virtuous legislation deserve mention. The first is the
supplementation of formal and informal congressional procedures,
which Sunstein does not specifically advocate but which may be im-
plicit in his "deliberative requirement" and certainly is a time-honored
technique for ensuring that "multiple points of view have been con-
sulted and . . . genuinely understood." 6 While a number of academics
have explored the value of procedures in stimulating a public-regarding
case of separate branches, usually "at least one branch will be responsive to the inter-
ests of politically weak groups and thus will become an advocate for reform"). Other
writers have emphasized the value of diversity as a mechanism for stimulating partici-
pation and dialogue. See, e.g., Michelman, supra note 49, at 32-33; Rapaczynski,
From Sovereignty to Process: The Jurisprudence of Federalism After Garcia, 1985
SuP. CT. REv. 341, 357, 395-405; Stewart, supra note 18, at 1566-76.
66 Farber & Frickey, supra note 36, at 912 n.224 (citing Sunstein, Interest
Groups, supra note 18, at 31-35). Other authors have praised or advocated increasing
the insulation of representatives from their constituency. See, e.g., Bruff, supra note 43,
at 217-18 (suggesting that representatives are able to resist monitoring by interest
groups and their constituents because such monitoring is expensive); Elliot, supra note
58, at 1105-06 (suggesting a possible reform to the structure of Congress, such as a
twelve-year senate term without the possibility of reelection, to insulate Congress from
pressures of special interest groups). For scholars advancing some type of general moti-
vational review of the legislative process, see Epstein, supra note 18, at 713-17; Griffin,
supra note 18, at 772; Mashaw, Constitutional Deregulation, supra note 18, at 867.
Along parallel lines, some states have adopted conflict of interest codes that would
be applicable to legislative staffs, as well as legislators. See, e.g., MAss. GEN. LAWS
ANN. ch. 268A § 6 (West 1980) (same code of ethics applicable to all state and munici-
pal elected officials, appointed officials, and employees); R.I. GEN. LAws § 36-14-4, -5
(Michie Supp. 1987) (same). See generally Purdy, Professional Responsibility for Leg-
islative Drafters: Suggested Guidelines and Discussion of Ethics and Role Problems,
11 SETON HALL LEGIs. J. 67, 78, 82 (1987) (proposing a model code for legislative
drafters in which they should serve the "legislature," and not specific legislators).
6I C. Sunstein, supra note 18, at 52; see also supra note 65 (discussing the role of
dialogue).
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dialogue within the administrative process, 68 some have focused this
type of analysis on the legislative context as well.69 Indeed, members of
the Court have found that the Constitution may impose a type of due
process of lawmaking obligation on legislation involving race.70 Where
applicable, this requirement may have both a procedural and a deliber-
ative component-Congress and its committees are to consider issues
through some procedures (perhaps including hearings and written re-
ports). In subjecting legislation to this scrutiny, moreover, the congres-
sional record would need to reflect consideration of the merits and de-
"8 See, e.g., Mashaw, Administrative Due Process: The Quest for a Dignitary
Theory, 61 B.U.L. REV. 885, 886 (1981) (discussing dignitary theories of due process,
where the emphasis is on the "degree to which decisional processes preserve and en-
hance human dignity and self-respect"); Michelman, Formal and Associational Aims
in Procedural Due Process, in NOMOS XVIII: DUE PROCESS 126, 127 (1977) (formal
explanatory procedures "seem responsive to demands for revelation and participa-
tion"); Tribe, The Emerging Reconnection of Individual Rights and Institutional De-
sign: Federalism, Bureaucracy, and Due Process of Lawmaking, 10 CREIGHTON L.
REV. 433, 444 (1977) [hereinafter Tribe, Emerging Reconnection] ("Rules governing
permissible structures of [administrative] enforcement may ... take the form of
mandatory opportunities for participation by various affected individuals."); Tribe,
Structural Due Process, 10 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 269, 301 (1975) (structural due
process "envision[s] the Supreme Court as structuring a dialogue between the state and
those whose liberty its laws confine, a dialogue in which the continuing legitimacy of a
law turns on the current willingness and ability of the state to come forth with rational
justifications for the laws' continued enforcement.").
89 See, e.g., Baird, State Empowerment after Garcia, 18 URB. LAW. 491, 514-15
(1986); Days, Fullilove, 96 YALE L.J. 453, 469-70 (1986); Tribe, Emerging Reconnec-
tion, supra note 68, at 441-44; Comment, The Tenth Amendment after Garcia: Pro-
cess-Based Procedural Protections, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 1657, 1679 (1987).
70 See Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 456-67 (1980) (Burger, C.J., opinion
of the court) (upholding classification since Congress extensively deliberated on the is-
sue); id. at 497-502, 508-10 (Powell, J., concurring) (noting that Congress had con-
ducted sufficient fact-finding to justify its decision to employ a race-conscious remedy);
id. at 535-36, 548-54 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (doubting whether Congress carefully
considered the legislation); Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 307-10
(1978) (Powell, J., opinion of the court) (describing the necessity of legislative or ad-
ministrative factual findings in upholding the constitutionality of legislation favoring
one group over another); cf. Davis v. Bandemer, 106 S. Ct. 2792, 2832-33 (1986)
(Powell, J., concurring and dissenting) (suggesting that in order to determine the con-
stitutionality of a redistricting plan, the Court should first examine the state legislative
process by which the plan was passed).
A weak version of the due process of lawmaking model is the "call [for] courts to
employ clear statement principles of statutory construction so as to help bring about
consistency and coordination in the law." C. Sunstein, supra note 18, at 81; see, e.g.,
Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 242 (1985) ("in determining whether
Congress in exercising its Fourteenth Amendment powers has abrogated the States'
Eleventh Amendment immunity, we have required 'an unequivocal expression of con-
gressional intent to 'overturn the constitutionally guaranteed immunity of the several
states.' " (quoting Pennhurst State School and Hospital v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89,
99 (1984) (quoting Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 342 (1979))). While a judicially
enforced clear statement requirement forces Congress to make its intentions explicit, it
does not necessarily guarantee that Congress considered the issue as part of a public-
regarding dialogue.
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merits of the proposal. 1
The Court's current position, though, is obviously quite limited. It
(and particularly Justice Stevens in several influential concurring opin-
ions) appears to have imposed this type of condition only in certain
special circumstances where important constitutional interests are at
stake. 2 Nevertheless, when those interests are affected, the analysis
shares some of the same goals as that of Sunstein. Indeed, some cases
may portend an expansion of this requirement to a variety of other
contexts as well."3 More importantly, scholars who object to motiva-
tional or "deliberative" review have called for enhanced enforcement by
courts of existing internal legislative procedures, on the apparent theory
that increased proceduralization of legislative activities, although not
necessarily adjudicative in format, will also improve legislative
decisionmaking 4
A final device that courts might use to stimulate dialogue among
legislative actors is statutory construction. In perhaps the fullest explo-
ration of this issue, Jonathan Macey maintains that courts should con-
strue statutes according to their public-regarding goals-those purposes
that express "principle"-unless Congress makes clear on the face of
the statute or in the legislative history that its purpose is simply to
further private-regarding goals. 75 Under Macey's approach, courts
would not strike down legislation passed to further private interests, as
evidenced by its legislative history, but would interpret legislation ac-
cording to the public-regarding goals that, according to Macey, are in-
variably offered by members of Congress as the rationale for legisla-
tion's passage. 6 Courts would ignore any private regarding explanation
unless Congress publicly presented it as the preeminent goal of the leg-
islation. By suggesting that courts should refuse to dig for the private-
regarding purpose and instead give legislation a public-regarding con-
struction unless Congress openly admits its goal, Macey seeks to facili-
tate and stimulate public awareness and oversight of special interest
71 See, e.g., Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 456-67; Bakke, 438 U.S. at 307-10.
712 See supra note 70.
73 See Farber & Frickey, supra note 36, at 917 n.247.
"I See id. at 920-24; Linde, supra note 3, at 235-55. Farber, Frickey, and Linde
all support enforcement of legislative procedures by courts, without exploring in detail
what type of procedures ought to be adopted by legislatures, or why those they have
adopted ought to be of some value. The implication appears to be that such procedures,
like their judicial and administrative counterparts, would help stimulate deliberation
and dialogue within the legislative process.
71 See Macey, supra note 18, at 240-56.
1 See id. at 251 ("[W]here [there is] a sharp divergence between the stated pub-
lic-regarding purpose of the legislature and the true special interest motivation behind a
particular statute, courts will . . . resolve any ambiguities in the statute consistently
with the stated public-regarding purpose.").
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legislation, and thereby reduce, in his view, the amount of legislation
adopted as a result of special interest pressures.7 7 Thus, Macey also
envisions the courts as stimulating virtue within the legislature, but in a
fundamentally different manner than the general civic virtue analy-
sis-by enhancing popular accountability.78
B. Alternative Methods of Stimulating
Public-Regarding Deliberation: Temporal Filters
In general, then, enhanced judicial review of legislative motivation
and deliberation, greater legislative insulation, proportional representa-
tion, and supplementation of legislative procedures are the main devices
being explored for enhancing civic virtue. With the exception of Ma-
cey's approach to statutory construction, which, as discussed below, is
more closely aligned with the political party literature,79 these tech-
niques all seek to affect legislative motivation largely by insulating gov-
ernment actors from electoral and popular accountability. For compara-
tive purposes, however, it is important to contrast these approaches
" Macey's approach should be contrasted with that of William Eskridge, who
envisions the deliberative and rationalistic aspects of judicial interpretation as introduc-
ing a public-regarding element into legislation./See Eskridge, supra note 4, at 1529
("The role of the courts . . . is to be further deliberative filters, as envisioned by
Hamilton, mitigating the effect of unwise laws and exploring their full consequences.").
Unlike Macey, Eskridge does not foresee courts facilitating democratic oversight of leg-
islation in order to give effect to the deliberative elements within the legislative- arena;
rather, they should impose their own deliberative approach to statutory construction of
ambiguous provisions, unless and until reversed by clear legislative enactment. See id.
at 1542; see also C. Sunstein, supra note 18, at 74-83 (discussing courts introducing
deliberative and rationalist elements into the construction of statutes). Thus, like Fiss,
and others, Eskridge appears to locate the primary source of virtue in the judiciary. See
Eskridge, supra note 4, at 1530 (legislative "biases may be ameliorated by treating
judges as representatives charged with interpreting statutes dynamically"); Fiss, Fore-
word, supra note 4, at 2 ("Adjudication is the social process by which judges give
meaning to our public values"); cf. Michelman, supra note 49, at 74 ("[T]he courts,
and especially the Supreme Court, seem to take on as one of their ascribed functions
the modeling of active self-government that citizens find practically beyond reach.").
Because Eskridge's constructive technique relies fundamentally on a conditional delega-
tion of deliberative responsibility to the courts, and not on a stimulation of such activity
within Congress, it is not a focus of the present analysis.
" In some respects, Macey's article may be attempting to synthesize the two
ideal-typical approaches outlined in this Article, arguing that the democratic (or politi-
cal party) solution is also the deliberative solution. For example, he states, "[b]y defini-
tion, the benefits from public spirited legislation fall on the public generally." Macey,
supra note 18, at 231 n.44. As noted below, however, this is certainly not logically
required nor factually true in many cases. See infra notes 105-09 and accompanying
text. Public scrutiny does not necessarily lead to principled legislation, at least in a civic
virtue sense. For this reason, Macey's approach should probably be seen as merely
furthering democratic accountability and, in this sense, is more consistent with the po-
litical party approach. See infra note 105 and accompanying text.
" See infra note 105 and accompanying text.
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with methods geared toward enhancing the public-regarding quality of
government decisions through the imposition of a temporal veil of igno-
rance. These latter techniques, which rely on the prospective applica-
tion and generality of rules to excise the self-interest of the framers, do
not raise the same type of problems of popular accountability that are
the major focus of this Article.
Historically, the most important device has been constitutional
amendment. By making policy decisions through constitutional revision,
government actors and the population at large contemplate issues, one
hopes, through the filter of a general, largely prospective, constitutional
lens. 0 Given a sufficient level of abstraction and temporal distance, the
precise application of the constitutional language to the future circum-
stances of individual voters and politicians may be unclear. As a result,
the actors should be less inclined to identify and act out of concern for a
specific personal or group benefit, and more likely to consider the effect
of the amendment on the nation as a whole.
81
81 See J. BUCHANAN & G. TULLOCK, supra note 34, at 77-78 ("uncertainty that
is required in order for the individual to be lead by his own interest to support consti-
tutional provisions that are generally advantageous to all individuals and to all groups
seems likely to be present at any constitutional stage of discussion"); Ackerman, supra
note 18, at 1020-23 (the population is ordinarily in a period of high politics when
amending the Constitution); Elliot, supra note 58, at 1106-07 (a constitutional conven-
tion would transcend politics as usual and frame the issues on a general and abstract
level); Mueller, Constitutional Democracy and Social Welfare, 87 Q.J. ECON. 60, 61
(1973) (the drafters of a constitutional amendment should consider the impact on all
citizens and future generations). Based on the work of Schelling, there is an expanding
analogous literature on the value of an individual establishing rules to limit her future
decisions. See e.g., T. SCHELLING, CHOICE AND CONSEQUENCE: PERSPECTIVES OF AN
ERRANT ECONOMIST 57-112 (1984); Schelling, Enforcing Rules on Oneself, 1 J.L.
ECON. & ORG. 357, 365-73 (1985); Schelling, Self-Command in Practice, in Policy
and in a Theory of Rational Choice, 74-2 AM. ECON. REV. 1, 1-3 (1984). But cf.
Burt, Commentary on Schelling's "Enforcing Rules on Oneself," 1 J.L. ECON. &
ORG. 381, 382 (1985) (critiquing Schelling's failure to recognize "free will;" that is, a
person's ability to "recognize past preference in the light of present knowledge and
values").
81 The bill of attainder clause establishes a similar requirement through separa-
tion of powers. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 3. In the specific context of imposing
punishments, it forces lawmakers to legislate with a sufficient level of generality that
the exact application of the statute by administrative agencies or courts may not be
clear. See United States v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437, 449-50 (1965) (in establishing crimi-
nal liability consistent with the obligations of the bill of attainder clause, Congress must
"set forth a generally applicable rule . . . and leave to the courts and juries the job of
deciding what persons have committed the specified acts or possess the specified charac-
teristics"). For a discussion of the separation of powers issue, see Comment, The
Bounds of Legislative Specification: A Suggested Approach to the Bill of Attainder
Clause, 72 YALE L.J. 330, 343-60 (1962).
More generally, the requirement of separate executive and legislative branches,
and the prohibition against serving in both institutions simultaneously, see U.S.
CONST., art. I, § 6, cl. 2 ("no Person holding any Office under the United States, shall
be a Member of either House during his Continuance in Office"), may have a similar
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To economists, constitutional revision has additional benefits, even
if political actors remain self-interested and the effect of the provision is
known. In their view, the greater impact of constitutional revisions on
all groups leads to greater popular interest in their adoption, thereby
surmounting some of the collective action problems that give concen-
trated interest groups greater influence than diffuse interests in every-
day legislation. 2 The broad impact of a constitutional provision can
also surmount the prisoners' dilemma inherent in some special interest
legislation by leading narrow groups to support policies that restrain
themselves and other interests simultaneously. 8
Indeed, one can view the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit
Control Act of 1985, popularly known as Gramm-Rudman-Hollings
("GR11")," as establishing this type of limitation, though on a more
temporally and structurally limited level. Under the terms of GRH,
Congress established the size of the maximum budget deficit for each of
the next five consecutive fiscal years.8 5 If the deficit, as estimated for
each of those years, did not satisfy the requisite level for a particular
year, GRH required the president to reduce proportionally defense and
influence on legislative decisionmaking by reducing legislators' ability to control and
therefore predict the precise effect of their legislative acts. See J. LOCKE, OF CIVIL
GOVERNMENT: SECOND TREATISE § 143 (R. Kirk introd. 1955) (1689) ("because it
may be too great a temptation to human frailty, apt to grasp at power for the same
persons, who have the power of making laws, to have also in their hands the power to
execute them, whereby they exempt themselves from obedience to the laws they make,
and suit the law, both in its making and execution to their own private advantage, and
thereby come to have a distinct interest from the rest of the community").
82 See R. MCCORMICK & R. TOLLISON, POLITICIANS, LEGISLATION, AND THE
ECONOMY: AN INQUIRY INTO THE INTEREST GROUP THEORY OF GOVERNMENT 127
(1981); Macey, supra note 18, at 246-47; see also supra note 34 (discussing collective
action problems in the nonconstitutional, legislative context).
13 See J. BUCHANAN & G. TULLOCK, supra note 34, at 290-91; Macey, supra
note 18, at 246-47; see also supra notes 34-36 and accompanying text (narrowly con-
centrated interests often exercise disproportionate influence in the political process). In
effect, the prisoners' dilemma of special interest legislation can be partly alleviated if
groups can simultaneously agree to limit rent-seeking.
84 Pub. L. No. 99-177, 99 Stat. 1037 (codified at 2 U.S.C. §§ 901-22 and other
scattered sections of 2 U.S.C. (Supp. IV 1986)). The Court struck down the original
act, see Bowsher v. Synar, 106 S. Ct. 3181, 3186 (1986), on the grounds that vesting
authority over deficit determinations in the Comptroller General violated the appoint-
ments clause, since she is removable by Congress through joint resolution. Id. at 3189-
91. This aspect of the Act is not at issue in this Article. For a discussion of this issue,
see Symposium: Bowsher v. Synar, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 421 (1987). Congress recently
enacted a modified version of the Act, the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit
Control Reaffirmation Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-119, 101 Stat. 754 (codified at 2
U.S.C.A. §§ 901-22 and other scattered sections of 2 U.S.C.A. (West Supp. 1987)),
which places budget authority in the Office of Management and Budget. See id. § 102,
101 Stat. 755-57. The analysis in the text applies equally as well to the second Act.
5 See 2 U.S.C. § 902 (Supp. IV 1986); see also 2 U.S.C. § 622 (Supp. IV 1986)
(definition of deficit).
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nondefense spending to meet the prescribed limit.8 6
Although Congress certainly could have overridden the deficit re-
strictions by specifically repealing GRH or adopting an implied ex-
emption, one apparent theory behind GRH was to affect the motivation
of members of Congress originally voting for the reduction and to limit
the ability and legitimacy of later Congresses to breach that "social
compact." Because the implementation date for GRH was several years
after enactment, GRH may have permitted those who voted for the bill
to act without specific knowledge of its impact on their particular con-
stituencies. The Act thereby served to erect a modified veil of ignorance
that may have affected the motivations of legislators as compared to
how they would have acted in the case of traditional budget resolu-
tions . 7 In this limited sense, one can view GRH as promoting civic
virtue.
Nevertheless, GRH did not attempt to transform the motivation of
legislators and promote civic virtue in the manner that the new civic
virtue writers are exploring. While they are studying structural devices
and reforms that serve to insulate political actors and decentralize legis-
lative power, s a temporal veil of ignorance does not have these effects.
Indeed, GRH has the opposite consequence. Rather than directing leg-
8 2 U.S.C. § 901 (Supp. IV 1986), amended by The Balanced Budget and
Emergency Deficit Control Reaffirmation Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-119, § 102,
101 Stat. 754-64.
87 These resolutions are passed each year under the Budget Control Act in order
to set forth an overall budget limit for that session of Congress only. See 2 U.S.C.
§ 632 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986); see also infra note 89 (explaining the annual budget
process). Paul Kahn has suggested that courts should hold GRH unconstitutional be-
cause it inhibits the flexibility of future Congresses to reconsider the budget judgments
made by the earlier Congress that passed Gramm-Rudman-precisely that aspect of
the bill which he recognizes is its chief innovation. See Kahn, Gramm-Rudman and the
Capacity of Congress to Control the Future, 13 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 185, 187-88
(1986). While Kahn presents a novel and thought-provoking perspective, it is hard to
understand how GRH differs from many other statutes that explicitly or implicitly set
forth rules of construction for future legislation. Indeed, under his analysis, it is not
clear why each new Congress would not be required to ratify all prior legislation,
including the internal rules and committee structure of Congress, immediately upon
taking office, since the existence of that legislation requires Congress to pass new legis-
lation to return to the preexisting status quo. For a thoughtful discussion of this general
issue, see Eule, Temporal Limits on the Legislative Mandate: Entrenchment and Ret-
roactivity, 1987 AM. B. FOUND. REs. J. 379, 425 n.215. Eule also argues that, as a
matter of constitutional law, each new Congress must be able to repeal existing proce-
dural rules through majority vote. Id. at 407-12. The lessons of public choice theory
suggest this could raise a problem, however: it is unclear how Congress could avoid
Condorcet cycling if it had to resolve decisions on the rules through majority votes
without a preexisting procedural system. In effect, a prior legislature may necessarily
have to "control" the future, at least to the extent of establishing a procedural system to
decide on the new Congress's procedures. For a discussion of the problems of majority
rule decisionmaking, see supra note 14 and infra note 163.
1s See infra notes 168-179 and accompanying text.
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islators to vote on each individual appropriation bill separately, which
can afford greater influence to each group pushing for a particular
item, GRH sets forth one binding vote on the size of the overall budget
deficit, much like budget restrictions adopted by each Congress for that
Congress under the Budget Control Act.89 Like the constitutional pro-
visions discussed above,90 a single vote on overall budget levels can
overcome some of the perverse incentives of narrow "special interest"
legislation by establishing an agreement to cut all such appropriations
simultaneously. Thus, GRH may have sought to induce a type of civic
virtue, except without attempting to insulate political actors from pres-
sure or to decentralize decisionmaking.91
Finally, a related constitutional technique for enhancing the pub-
lic-regarding quality of government decisions has been proposed by
Bruce Ackerman. Under his approach, courts would be charged with
fostering public-regarding policies during periods of what he calls nor-
mal or low politics, that is, moments in which he says the population
and their representatives are motivated predominately by self-interest.92
In order to limit the possible perverse incentives of the public during
this time, courts, in Ackerman's view, should look to the general goals
and purposes that the public articulated during prior periods of what
Ackerman calls "high politics," that is, those moments when the popu-
lace at large has been in a public-regarding or civically virtuous
mode.9" Like the new civic virtue writers, then, Ackerman views the
89 Under that Act, after the president submits his budget to Congress, and each
committee of Congress with legislative jurisdiction submits its views and estimates to
the House and Senate Budget Committees, Congress passes a nonbinding resolution
setting forth the overall budget which will be adopted for that fiscal year. See 2 U.S.C.
§§ 631-32 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986). A second binding budget resolution is not adopted
until September, after individual appropriation bills are reported out of committee. Id.
§ 635(a); see also J. KERNOCHAN, THE LEGISLATIVE PROCESS 27-31 (1981) (describ-
ing the budget process); Elliott, Regulating the Deficit After Bowsher v. Synar, 4 YALE
J. ON REG. 317, 356-57 (1987) (same); Fisher, Congressional Budget Reform: The
First Two Years, 14 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 413, 416-17 (1977) (same).
90 See supra notes 82-83 and accompanying text.
91 See infra text preceding note 267.
92 Ackerman, supra note 18, at 1030, 1049-72.
9 See id. at 1051-56. Ackerman identifies three points that satisfy these criteria:
the Revolution, the Civil War, and the New Deal. This approach draws some theoreti-
cal and historical support from the political science literature on critical elections,
which are those elections when the population reaches a higher level of political partici-
pation and dialogue and fundamentally reassesses existing institutional and political
norms, as well as party affiliations. See W. BURNHAM, CRITICAL ELECTIONS AND THE
MAINSPRINGS OF AMERICAN POLITICS 11-33 (1970) (discussing various political
realignments throughout American history); J. SUNDQUIST, DYNAMICS OF THE PARTY
SYSTEM: ALIGNMENTS AND REALIGNMENTS OF POLITICAL PARTIES IN THE UNITED
STATES 35 (1983) (realignment occurs when a major "issue arises that cleaves the
electorate on a different line and hence divides each of the parties internally"); Camp-
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role of the courts as facilitating government decisions that are made by
public-regarding actors.94
There are important differences between the approaches of Acker-
man and the new civic virtue analysis, however. Ackerman believes that
most of the population naturally and ineluctably adopts a public-re-
garding perspective at various times in history, thereby affording the
basis for subsequent courts to enforce those understandings during peri-
ods of low politics. Thus, while both Ackerman and Sunstein invest the
greatest legitimacy in the decisions reached by government actors when
infused with such ideals, Ackerman's approach avoids the necessity of
constructing a legal system capable of transforming the public or their
representatives into a higher level of political dialogue. In his view, the
bell, A Classification of Presidential Elections, in ELECTIONS AND THE POLITICAL
ORDER 63, 63-77 (1967) (discussing maintaining, deviating, and realigning elections);
Key, A Theory of Critical Elections, 17 J. POL. 3, 4 (1955) (critical elections occur
when "the depth and intensity of electoral involvement are high"). Some authors have
previously explored the significance of the phenomenon to judicial review. Compare
Adamany, Legitimacy, Realigning Elections, and the Supreme Court, 1973 Wis. L.
REV. 790, 820-43 (analyzing the Court during times of political realignment and con-
cluding that the Court does not respond to the newly entrenched popular government)
with Dahl, Decision-Making in a Democracy: The Supreme Court as a National Pol-
icy-Maker, 6 J. Pun. L. 279, 293-95 (1957) (the Court, through judicial review, ulti-
mately legitimizes the policies of the newly dominant political group after a critical
election).
This literature, however, raises several potential concerns with relying on critical
elections as a basis for judicial review. Samuel Huntington, for example, argues that
periods of high politics may not be appropriate moments for public decisionmaking due
to the supposed irrationality and passion of the general population when in that state.
See S. HUNTINGTON, AMERICAN POLITICS: THE PROMISE OF DISHARMONY 221-62
(1981) (expressing concern over the wisdom of political judginents expressed during
periods of what he calls "credal passion," which appear to be analogous to critical
elections); cf. A. HIRSCHMAN, THE PASSIONS AND THE INTERESTS 128-35 (1977)
(self-interest motivation implicit in and motivated by capitalism was intended as a
mechanism for avoiding the irrationality of passion). The problem of a possible "bias"
to American ideological thinking and its implications for civic virtue writers is discussed
infra note 232.
In addition, theories predicated on "high politics" might raise some difficulty if
society cannot expect to experience further or at least the same type of high political
moments, as some have cautioned. See W. BURNHAM, supra, at 175-93 (a lack of stim-
ulus to mobilize the population can prevent critical alignments from occurring and the
ability to predict this phenomenon may have ended); R. NEUSTADT, PRESIDENTIAL
POWER: THE POLITICS OF LEADERSHIP 188 (1960) (While "our history suggests that
only sustained crises, striking deep into the private lives of voters everywhere, will pro-
duce stable partisan alignments[,] a comparable crisis in our time would strike so deep
that there might well be nothing left of our contemporary party system."); c. Chubb &
Peterson, Realignment and Institutionalization, in THE NEW DIRECTIONS IN AMERI-
CAN POLITICS 1, 5-6, 9 (1985) [hereinafter NEW DIRECTIONS] (suggesting that the
effect of political realignment may have moderated, since "[pirograms are so complex,
associated interests are so entrenched, and procedural protections so extensive that the
rate of change is inevitably slowed").
'4 See Ackerman, supra note 18, at 1049-72.
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public does so naturally and periodically.95
In addition, Ackerman does not appear to view the decisions
reached through private-regarding behavior as necessarily suspect.96
Protecting or pursuing one's own interests is not necessarily illegitimate
or unconstitutional. Only to the extent that such decisions conflict with
the substantive principles espoused by the public during periods of high
politics, and enforced by the court through subsequent "meta-constitu-
tional" interpretation,97 would the courts view them as illegitimate and
strike them down as unconstitutional. Since Ackerman's approach does
not attempt through judicial review or structural reform to transform
the motivation of everyday political actors, it does not raise the same
structural issues as the proposals put forward by the other civic virtue
writers discussed above.
C. Technical Criticisms of Civic Virtue Reforms
While most of the substantive discussion of the new civic virtue
approach can be deferred until Parts IV, V, and VI, two technical
problems with these and other similar efforts to elevate legislative moti-
vations through judicial review should be noted.
First, the requirement that a legislative body act with a specific
motivation presupposes a system for identifying which subunit of that
body speaks for the body as a whole. Does an oversight committee, a
floor leader, a majority coalition, a committee that controls the agenda
such as the rules committee, or one chamber, speak for "Congress"? In
other words, what legislative evidence can the courts rely upon as the
basis for determining the legislature's intent and motivation?" This de-
9 See id. at 1023-24.
See id. at 1034-35 (noting the high costs to curing private-regarding behavior);
id. at 1022 ("Normal politics must be tolerated in the name of individual liberty."); cf.
Ackerman, supra note 33, at 739 ("Given the complexity of the human comedy, a
judge is bound on a fool's errand if he imagines that the good guys and bad guys of
American politics can be neatly classified according to the seriousness with which they
have considered opposing points of view.").
17 Since Ackerman's system of judicial review does not require a constitutional
amendment consistent with article V, it raises special problems in determining the arri-
val and meaning of a constitutional moment. See Michelman, supra note 49, at 60-65
(discussing the issue). This difficulty could be especially troublesome if the nature of
high political moments has changed. See supra note 93. For this reason, the term
"meta-constitutional" interpretation best captures the Court's constructive role within
the Ackerman framework.
"B Obviously, a great deal of insightful paper has been consumed on the question
of whether or how a court can ascertain the true motivation of legislative actors. See,
e.g., Brest, Palmer v. Thompson: An Approach to the Problem of Unconstitutional
Motivation, 1971 SuP. CT. REv. 95; Ely, Legislative and Administrative Motivation
in Constitutional Law, 79 YALE L.J. 1205 (1970); see also R. DWORKIN, supra note
24, at 313-27 (any realistic view of the legislative process must recognize the influence
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cision rule is critical, as the teachings of public choice theory constantly
warn us, since it is often impossible to determine whether any actor's
purpose or statement would have been ratified by the group as a
whole." Although this difficulty is certainly not peculiar to civic virtue
of numerous groups such as members of Congress, executive officials, and assistants
who prepare the initial drafts, as well as various lobbies); Brest, The Misconceived
Quest for the Original Understanding, 60 B.U.L. REV. 204, 214-15 (1980) (discussing
the impossibility of determining motivation in the context of constitutional interpreta-
tion); Dworkin, How to Read the Civil Rights Act, N.Y. REV. BooKs, Dec. 20, 1979,
at 37, 37 (distinguishing between institutional and subjective intent in statutory con-
struction); Eskridge, supra note 4, at 1533-38 (discussing the inherently discretionary
role of courts in statutory construction); MacCallum, Legislative Intent, 75 YALE L.J.
754, 756 (1966) (detailing ambiguities in ascertaining the "existence, discoverability
and relevance of legislative intent"); Moore, The Semantics ofJudging, 54 S. CAL. L.
REV. 151, 246-65 (1981) (arguing that when judges find the interpretations of statutes
less than satisfactory under provisional interpretations, they should be willing to stretch
their linguistic intuitions in order to "discover" more suitable purposes); Note, Reading
the Mind of the School Board: Segregative Intent and the DeFactolDejure Distinc-
tion, 86 YALE L.J. 317, 320-21 (1976) (examining the various interpretations and
problems in establishing "segregative intent" in the area of public schooling). The orig-
inal debate on this conundrum occurred between Radin, Statutory Interpretation, 43
HARV. L. REV. 863 (1930) and Landis, A Note on "Statutory Interpretation," 43
HARV. L. REV. 886 (1930).
1 See supra note 14 (describing significance of agenda control in determining out-
comes when there are multipeaked preferences). Indeed, Judge Easterbrook has main-
tained that this fact precludes courts from resorting to legislative history in order to
interpret statutes. See Easterbrook, Statutes' Domains, supra note 13, at 547. While
Judge Easterbrook appears to be one of the first scholars to confront the agenda control
issue in statutory construction, the conclusions he draws from this observation are
troubling. No court can avoid reliance on some sources outside the text to construe a
statute, if for no reason other than to consult a dictionary or other document necessary
to understand the meaning and context in which the language was used. See id. at 533
n.2, 536; see also L. WITTGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL EXPLANATIONS §§ 23, 43 (G.
Anscombe trans. 1953) (arguing that language has no intrinsic meaning). To further
support his contention, Judge Easterbrook suggests that resort to outside sources would
violate the spirit, if not the letter, of the constitutional requirements of bicameralism
and presentment to the president, as set forth in INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 948-59
(1983), since Congress did not vote on legislative documents or present them to the
president. See Easterbrook, Statutes' Domains, supra note 13, at 549. Unfortunately,
that *argument would apply to dictionaries as well. More importantly, once the courts
adopt a clear rule of statutory construction, outside sources implicitly become part of
the bill passing through Congress, thereby avoiding this constitutional problem.
Finally, Judge Easterbrook defends his novel approach on the grounds that the
Framers had a preference for private autonomy and against government action, a doc-
trine presumably imbedded in the Constitution. See id. at 549-50. Curiously, his rigid
theory of statutory interpretation seems to be in tension with his approach to interpret-
ing the Constitution, from which this principle must be broadly derived. See Easter-
brook, Substance and Due Process, 1982 SuP. CT. REV. 85, 91 (stating that "language
and structure, informed by constitutional history, are the proper basis of interpretation
and that, perhaps, they are all that count"). But even accepting his approach to consti-
tutional interpretation, it is unclear why liberal statutory construction necessarily un-
dermines private autonomy, or, conversely, narrow construction to its promotion; the
effect depends on the nature of the preexisting statutory and common law protections
and their development by the courts. See Sunstein, Lochner's Legacy, 87 COLUM. L.
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writers, such theories must develop some defensible basis for selecting
the sources they will look to within the legislative history to determine
whether the body has acted in a principled fashion."00
Of far greater concern, however, is the problem of deception-how
do the courts determine whether in fact the relevant actors in a legisla-
ture, once identified, are indeed engaging in the type of principled deci-
sionmaking that is the heart of the civic virtue ideal. In a world of
paper records, it is quite easy for legislators, like their administrative
counterparts, to create a paper record that bears little relationship to
what in fact is going on in the internal legislative deliberations.0 For
this reason, the civic virtue theorists are subject to all of the objections
that Rawls' original position sought to avoid-namely, the intrusion of
REv. 873, 874 (1987) (criticizing the earlier view that "[m]arket ordering under com-
mon law [is] a part of nature rather than a legal construct"). In his subsequent Fore-
word, Judge Easterbrook appears to have relaxed this strict approach to statutory con-
struction. See Easterbrook, Foreword, supra note 13, at 14-18.
100 See Epstein, The Pitfalls of Interpretation, 7 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 101,
104 (1984) (criticizing theories of statutory construction that are based on legislative
motivation owing to the complexity of groups and motivations within diverse legislative
bodies); Farber & Frickey, supra note 36, at 908-11 (criticizing efforts to base judicial
review upon the motivation of the legislative body on similar grounds).
10I See Farber & Frickey, supra note 36, at 908-09; Mashaw, Constitutional De-
regulation, supra note 18, at 868; J. Mashaw, supra note 36, at 42-43; see also Linde,
supra note 3, at 231 ("pursued into the legislative process, the hope for candor is more
likely to produce hypocrisy").
Peter Schuck has made a similar observation regarding political explanations for
gerrymandering, noting that it "is surely the rare plan that cannot be rationalized on
the basis of a plausibly legitimate districting criterion other than mere partisan advan-
tage." Schuck, supra note 13, at 1354.
The experience of the analogous hard-look doctrine in the context of judicial re-
view of administrative action, see Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mutual
Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 48 (1983), has had mixed success. For commentary critical
of the hard-look doctrine, see R. MELNICK, REGULATION AND THE COURTS: THE
CASE OF THE CLEAN AIR AcT 357-61 (1983) (court enforcement of the Act was "part
of the problem . . . because [the courts] made so little effort to investigate the conse-
quences of their action"); Mashaw & Harfst, Regulation and Legal Culture: The
Case of Motor Vehicle Safety, 4 YALE J. OF REG. 257, 272 (1987) (fear of judicial
review led to reduction in safety regulatory activity by the National Highway Traffic
Safety Administration); Sax, The (Unhappy) Truth about NEPA, 26 OKLA. L. REv.
239, 245 (1973) (obligation to give detailed explanation does not change substantive
decisions); cf. Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88 HARV.
L. REv. 1667, 1701-02 (1975) (while "[s]tiffened requirements of formal justice may
weaken agency effectiveness by draining resources and affording opponents new litigat-
ing weapons[, judicial review can] serve as a useful, selective judicial tool to force recon-
sideration of questionable decisions and to direct attention to factors that may be disre-
garded"). For a more favorable view of the hard look doctrine, see Bruff, supra note
43, at 237-40 (hard-look doctrine can "force agencies to pursue the creation of public
rather than private goods"); Sunstein, Deregulation and the Hard-Look Doctrine,
1983 SuP. CT. REv. 177, 182 (hard-look doctrine ensures that judicial review is "a
'reasoned' exercise of discretion and not merely a response to political pressures").
[Vol. 136:1567
CIVIC VIRTUE REFORMS
self-interest into public decisionmaking °2 In the absence of the veil of
ignorance or a realistic judicial substitute, the civic virtue theorists raise
the specter of government actors masking their true intentions behind a
smoke screen of public-regarding verbiage. It simply is not possible to
ensure that people are public-regarding merely because they defend or
rationalize their actions on those grounds, 03 or alternatively, that legis-
lative actors are private-regarding simply because they rationalize their
actions-particularly to constituents-on those grounds.
Macey's approach is subject to the same difficulties, though the
reasons are more complicated. He suggests that his proposed system of
statutory construction makes it more politically costly for legislators to
hide their true intentions by using public-regarding language. Under
his analysis, legislators who mask their actual objectives risk having the
legislation they support interpreted to pursue the public goal they
enunciate and against their true private goals. By suggesting that courts
force legislators to choose between using public-regarding language to
-rationalize their private goals and being candid about their narrow in-
terests at the risk of losing popular support, Macey believes that the
amount of legislation passed at the instigation of private-regarding ac-
tors would be reduced. 104 In this sense, Macey's hybrid analysis offers a
link between the civic virtue and the political party approaches, sug-
gesting that the latter leads to the former.
It is far from clear, however, whether this system is realistic, at
least as a mechanism for promoting virtue.105 First, it assumes a strict
connection between popular control and public-regarding motivation
that is neither logically nor factually supported. 06 The underlying as-
sumption of most other writing on civic virtue is that virtue must be
stimulated by insulation and autonomy of decisionmakers. In addition,
Macey's approach is subject to the same problems of deception as other
civic virtue techniques. Almost any legislative program can be rational-
ized, especially to the public, in public-regarding language ("what is
good for Ford Motor Co. is good for America") without significant
cost. 10 7 Indeed, the ability of legislators to mask their actions from con-
"02 Rawls' heuristic device-the original position-assured that a person's knowl-
edge of her own position in society would not intrude on her thinking on the appropri-
ate structure of society. See supra notes 45-46 and accompanying text.
103 See supra note 101 and accompanying text.
104 See Macey, supra note 18, at 250-51.
105 Instead, Macey's approach could and should be appropriately defended as an
adjunct to a political party perspective.
108 There is serious doubt as to the strength of this link. See infra notes 146-66
and accompanying text (discussing the tension between the civic virtue and political
party approaches).
107 See Farber & Frickey, supra note 36, at 910-11.
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stituents in abstract, public-regarding rhetoric is viewed as one of the
most serious problems of the legislative process. 08 If true, a system that
enforces the publicly-stated goals of legislators might, as Judge Easter-
brook has argued, have the practical effect of extending most private
interest "deals" by giving to groups more than they were able to extract
from legislative bargaining."' 9 The impact of this motivational review
on legislative decisionmaking would then be minuscule or perhaps even
counterproductive.
These are complicated technical problems that some critics have
suggested are insuperable."' Without resolving this question, it is clear
that no system exists for magically transforming legislative deliberations
through judicial review of legislative motivation. At a minimum, struc-
tural changes such as increased insulation, supplemented checks and
balances, proportional representation, as well as perhaps other innova-
tions, would need to be a part of any civic virtue program. The more
important question, however, is whether the civic virtue writers are
pursuing the best overall strategy; that is, whether the procedural and
judicial reforms being explored in order to elevate the motivation of
political actors are not only the best means of minimizing the influence
of special interest groups and improving legislative decisionmaking, but
worth the social cost.
108 See D. MAYHEW, supra note 35, at 132; Fiorina, The Decline of Collective
Responsibility in American Politics, DAEDELUS, Summer 1980, at 25, 44; see also D.
MAYHEW, supra note 35, at 73 (a member of Congress engages in three kinds of
electorally oriented activities: advertising, credit-claiming, and position-taking); Nash, A
Tale of Two Legislators and How They View their Institution: Garn's Dissatisfaction
Is such that He Is Getting "Really Sick," N.Y. Times, Dec. 21, 1987, at B10, col. 6
(senators' "primary intention is to look good, get on television and get quoted in the
media" (quoting Senator Jake Garn)).
'09 See Easterbrook, Foreword, supra note 13, at 49; Easterbrook, Statutes' Do-
mains, supra note 13, at 541-42. Judge Easterbrook also contends that because "bal-
ance" is an important element of public interest statutes, legislators may have intended,
due to compromise, respect for private orderings, or uncertainty, that such statutes
should be read narrowly. He thus cautions against the courts' unchecked enforcement
of the public interest aspect of these statutes as well. See Easterbrook, Statutes' Do-
main, supra note 13, at 540-41. But see Easterbrook, Foreword, supra note 13, at 46
(recognizing that public interest statutes might be interpreted in light of their underly-
ing purposes).
10 Farber and Frickey suggest that courts cannot systematically combat the efforts
of special interests by heightened scrutiny of legislation since judges are "unable to
identify, in any principled fashion, individual instances in which that process has mal-
functioned because of undue influence of special interests." Farber & Frickey, supra
note 36, at 911-12, 925; see also supra note 98 (discussing whether and how a judge
can ascertain legislative motivation). On the other hand, Farber and Frickey accept the
importance of insulating legislators from pressures. See Farber & Frickey, supra note
36, at 912.
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III. THE TRADITIONAL POLITICAL PARTY APPROACH
To REFORM OF THE POLITICAL PROCESS
In contrast to those civic virtue scholars who have argued for in-
creased insulation of the legislative process, other scholars pursue the
"cpolitical party" approach. Rather than seeking to change the motiva-
tions of political actors, writers in this tradition have sought largely to
broaden the constituencies of political representatives and have ap-
plauded those institutions, especially the Presidency and political par-
ties, which represent a wider constituency. In other words, they have
focused their attention on making those institutions more democratic,
rather than attempting to make the actors within those institutions
more public-regarding. By reducing the number of actors who must
assent before there is agreement to any action, centralized political sys-
tems are thought to enhance majority rule, reduce collective action
problems, and improve the operation of the decisional processes.
A. Major Benefits of Centralized Political Institutions
Although it would be inaccurate to suggest that the political sci-
ence profession has ever adopted one particular view of the ideal politi-
cal system,"' an important school favors strengthening the Presidency
and political parties as the best method for counteracting the influence
of narrow special interest groups. This literature, which can be traced
back to Professor (later President) Woodrow Wilson,112 views the ab-
sence of strong parties as a serious weakness of the American political
system, especially in comparison to the United Kingdom,1 3 and inter-
... For example, pluralism, the political theory to which most civic virtue writers
see themselves as responding and providing a more attractive alternative, is probably
the primary competitor of the political party approach within political science. See, e.g.,
C. LINDBLOM, supra note 38, at 327 (criticizing party rule).
11" See W. WILSON, CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT IN THE UNITED STATES
(1961) [hereinafter W. WILSON, CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT]; W. WILSON, A
CROSSROADS OF FREEDOM (J. Davidson ed. 1956).
"I One author notes that:
Wilson and others took the British parties-supposedly disciplined and
cohesive, and unhampered by constitutional barriers in their governing
function-as their model of responsible parties, though they disagreed con-
cerning the extent to which British-style parties could or should be trans-
planted to the American setting. In general, they anticipated that the social
and economic upheaval of the day not only would leave the parties with
critical tasks of political integration to perform, but also would make them
better equipped to do so-less parochial, more programmatic, and more
nationally oriented.
D. PRICE, BRINGING BACK THE PARTIES 103 (1984); see also Burnham, Party Systems
and the Political Process, in THE AMERICAN PARTY SYSTEMS, 277, 279 (2d ed. 1975)
(American political parties lack internal cohesion and organizational capacity to per-
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prets the decline of party organization and party identification as a po-
tential crisis in the current American political process.
According to this school, strong political parties and/or a strong
President promote majority rule. Specifically, political parties serve as
"the special form of political organization adapted to the mobilization
of majorities.""" 4 At the same time, because parties must attract diffuse
majority support for controlling the Presidency and Congress, they
serve to "generate countervailing collective power on behalf of the
many individually powerless against the relatively few who are individ-
ually-or organizationally-powerful." 1 5 A similar evaluation under-
lies the academic writing on the Presidehcy. Scholars view a strong
President as representing society as a whole, not narrow constituencies
such as geographic or cross sectional interest groups.116
form sustained policymaking, especially in comparison to the United Kingdom).
"" E. SCHATTSCHNEIDER, PARTY GOVERNMENT 208 (1942) [hereinafter E.
SCHATTSCHNEIDER, PARTY GOVERNMENT]. A variety of political scientists can be
placed in this school. See, e.g., W. BURNHAM, supra note 93, at 133 (recognizing and
lamenting a trend toward politics without parties); A. RANNEY, THE DOCTRINE OF
RESPONSIBLE PARTY GOVERNMENT 10-11 (1962) (arguing that party government is a
proposal for implementing majority rule); E. SCHATTSCHNEIDER, THE SEMI-SOVER-
EIGN PEOPLE 75, 78-96 (1960) [hereinafter E. SCHATTSCHNEIDER, SEMI-SOVEREIGN]
("The party system is by a wide margin the largest mobilization of people in the coun-
try. [The parties] are the only organizations that can win elections."); see also A.
DOWNS, supra note 40, at 136-37 ("The tendency toward agreement between parties
under a bipartisan system flows from the fact that party leaders must seek to build a
majority of the electorate." (citation omitted)).
Much of the academic comment on the decline of parties reflects this view of the
value of political parties in promoting democratic rule. See W. CROTTY, AMERICAN
PARTIES IN DECLINE 275-79 (1984); N. NIE, S. VERBA & J. PETROCIK, THE CHANG-
ING AMERICAN VOTER 73 (1979); D. PRICE, supra note 113, at 105-07; Burnham,
American Politics in the 1970's: Beyond Party?, in THE AMERICAN PARTY SYSTEMS,
supra note 113, at 308, 340; Fiorina, supra note 108, at 28-33; Sundquist, Whither the
American Party System?, 88 POL. SCI. Q. 559, 576-79 (1973).
Similarly, Justice Powell has expressed concern over Court decisions that can un-
dermine the strength of the parties. See, e.g., Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S. 507, 521
(1980) (Powell, J., dissenting) ("With scarcely a glance at almost 200 years of Ameri-
can political tradition, the Court further limits the relevance of political affiliation to
the selection and retention of public employees."); Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 379
(1976) (Powell, J., dissenting) ("Patronage also strengthened parties, and hence en-
couraged the development of institutional responsibility to the electorate on a perma-
nent basis.").
"I W. BURNHAM, supra note 93, at 133. Indeed, it has been suggested that "[tihe
only way collective responsibility has ever existed, and can exist given our institutions,
is through the agency of the political party . . . ." Fiorina, supra note 108, at 26.
This view of the importance of strong political parties gained perhaps its greatest
official institutional support in the 1950 report of the American Political Science Asso-
ciation, which called for major changes to strengthen our two party system. See COM-
MITTEE ON POLITICAL PARTIES, AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE ASS'N, Toward a
More Responsible Two-Party System, 44 AM. POL Sci. REV. 1, 17-19 (Supp. 1950)
[hereinafter AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE ASS'N].
' "Generations of American political commentators have argued that the Presi-
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These centralized political institutions are valuable in part because
they experience fewer collective action problems. 117 Splintered collegial
decisionmaking bodies such as the House of Representatives tend to
serve narrower constituencies, because an expenditure of effort by rep-
resentatives on behalf of big-ticket legislative items that have impact
across a broad constituency is unrewarding politically; the benefits of
working on such legislation will inure to the advantage of other repre-
sentatives or their constituencies. Conversely, work by other representa-
tives on such topics would allow inactive representatives to free ride on
their efforts.1 8 As a result, representatives have a disincentive to con-
cern themselves with issues that affect the citizenry as a whole and a
greater incentive to concern themselves with those interests that concern
only their own constituents-local projects, local issues, and constituent
services.'1 9
The relative importance of these local issues to the general popula-
tion, moreover, can be irrelevant to the incentives upon the representa-
dent is the only elected official with a direct political interest in the stake of the entire
nation." Fiorina, The Presidency and Congress: An Electoral Connection?, in THE
PRESIDENCY AND THE POLITICAL SYSTEM 411, 423-24 (M. Nelson 2d ed. 1988); see
also G. MCCONNELL, PRIVATE POWER AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 351-52 (1966)
("the constituency of this majestic office is all the people"); J. SUNDQUIST, THE DE-
CLINE AND RESURGENCE OF CONGRESS 451 (1981) ("in conflicts between the
branches, the executive appears, usually, to reflect the national interest, the legislature
the local or special interest"); cf Mashaw, Prodelegation: Why Administrators Should
Make Political Decisions, 1 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 81, 95-99 (1985) (noting the greater
accountability and responsiveness of the president than Congress). President Wilson
also came to hold this view of the Presidency. See W. WILSON, CONSTITUTIONAL
GOVERNMENT, supra note 112, at 60.
111A splintered representative body, such as the House of Representatives, is
elected and voted on, like the President, by the entire citizenry, although members of
the House are elected from separate districts of equal size. On this formal level, the
House might appear to be as democratic as the Presidency or as a political system that
has strong political parties. In particular, the House would seem to be just as likely to
give effect to broad diffuse interests, which are "contained" within its constituency, as it
is to give effect to narrower, more concentrated interests.
118 This is a classic prisoners' dilemma problem. See supra note 51.
19 A variety of political scientists have described the operation of this phenome-
non in Congress. See L. DODD & R. SCHOTT, supra note 35, at 125-26; M. FIORINA,
supra note 35, at 36-37; D. MAYHEW, supra note 35, at 99, 114-15; Shepsle & Wein-
gast, Legislative Politics and Budget Outcomes, in FEDERAL BUDGET POLICY IN THE
1980's 343, 350-51 (1984). Moreover, there is considerable evidence that Congress has
organized itself to facilitate this type of activity through the decentralization of power.
See L. DODD & R. SCHOTT, supra note 35, at 106-29; M. FIORINA, supra note 35, at
62-67; D. MAYHEW, supra note 35, at 85-88. For example, House rules now require
that each committee have a minimum number of subcommittees, that each bill be re-
ferred to a subcommittee, and that no member hold more than one chairmanship. See
RULES OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES OF THE UNITED STATES X, cls. 5-6,
reprinted in CONSTITUTION, JEFFERSON'S MANUAL, AND RULES OF THE HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES OF THE UNITED STATES, ONE HUNDREDTH CONGRESS, H.R.
Doc. No. 279, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 408-19 (1987).
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tives; as a general matter, the public may care more about arms control
than civil defense, but the interest in civil defense may be quite concen-
trated in individual districts. Thus, given the structure of Congress,
there are powerful incentives for individual members of Congress to
devote their time disproportionately to those of their constituents' inter-
ests about which they feel other representatives will not be concerned
and for which they-and they alone-will be given credit or held
accountable.
In addition to these collective action disincentives, members of
Congress are concerned less often with broad public issues because of
an absence of general public scrutiny. In contrast to the public stands
and activities of the president, which are open to rather close review,12
the activities and public positions of individual representatives are not
as closely scrutinized by the press or the public at large, simply because
of their numbers and the inability to hold individual members account-
able for group actions in a collective body. 21 This creates rather pow-
erful incentives for individual representatives to respond disproportion-
ately to those groups that pay closest attention to what they are doing.
Economic theory would explain this as a transaction or monitoring cost
problem: because diffuse majoritarian interests are at a relative disad-
vantage in creating institutions to oversee government, they must rely
disproportionately on organizations such as the press to track govern-
ment actors or limit their scrutiny to the most visible and important
actor-the president. 22
To help alleviate these tendencies, commentators have offered
strong political parties and a strong institutionalized presidency with
their larger constituencies and greater visibility. A strong president or a
cohesive political party that is able to control a legislative body does not
experience the same level of free rider problems. Given that a greater
percentage of the population falls within the group constituency, there
is less of an ability to free ride on other actors, and more of an incen-
tive, all things being equal, to work for a greater and more diffuse
constituency. 23 Because of the high public visibility and accountability
of these institutions, moreover, they may be less likely to be swayed by
120 See J. SUNDQUIST, supra note 116, at 30.
121 See D. MAYHEW, supra note 35, at 115-18; Fiorina, supra note 108, at 26,
39-40.
122 See Bruff, supra note 43, at 217; Macey, supra note 18, at 232-33.
123 See AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE ASS'N, supra note 115, at 18 (discussing
how a strong party system fosters the "widest possible consent" of political goals); M.
OLSON, COLLECTIVE ACTION, supra note 20, at 163 ("political parties usually seek
collective benefits: they strive for governmental policies which . . . will help all of the
people"). See generally supra note 51 (discussing collective action problems).
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particular, narrow groups."24 In short, "a strong party that is held ac-
countable for the government of a nation-state has both the ability and
the incentive to contain particularistic pressures. It controls nomina-
tions, elections, and the agenda, and it collectively realizes that small
minorities are small minorities no matter how intense they are." '125
Indeed, Mancur Olson has offered a related analysis of political
institutions generally. In his provocative book, The Rise and Decline of
Nations,'26 Olson argues that the differential in growth rates of west-
ern countries can be attributed to the relative strength of interest groups
in the polity. According to his analysis, narrow interest groups, owing
to their small size, inherently pursue inefficient policies because they
have an incentive to ignore the costs to citizens outside the group.
127
Conversely, larger groups help solve the prisoners' dilemma by increas-
ing the size of the representative group. Thus, there is a "presumption
. . . that the highly encompassing organization will in its own interest
seek socially efficient policies, whereas very narrow common-interest
groups never have an incentive to take the interests of the larger society
into account."'28 Under this analysis, the party structure and the tradi-
tional party identification by the electorate can presumably permit
leaders of the party to surmount the narrow interests of the electorate
on particular issues and more often adopt solutions that inure to the
overall benefit of the society.'
2
B. Other Values of Political Parties
In addition to affording greater representation to diffuse majority
sentiments, strong parties improve the operation of the electoral deci-
sion process in other ways. First, political parties can increase the ra-
tionality of popular voting by giving voters a visible cue-party affilia-
124 See M. FIORINA, RETROSPECTIVE VOTING IN AMERICAN NATIONAL ELEC-
TIONS 210-11 (1981).
12 Fiorina, supra note 108, at 41; see also D. MAYHEW, PLACING PARTIES IN
AMERICAN PoLrrIcs 239-40 (1986) ("[a] clear, if short of perfect, relationship appears
between traditional organization and 'pressure politics': the more prominent the former,
the less prominent the latter"); J. SUNDQUIST, supra note 116, at 370 (decline of the
party and rise of individualistic politics has led to influence of single-issue groups).
.28 M. OLSON, RISE AND DECLINE, supra note 20, at 75-117.
127 See id. at 75.
128 Olson, The Political Economy of Comparative Growth Rates, in THE POLITI-
CAL ECONOMY OF GROWTH 7, 24 (D. Mueller ed. 1983).
129 Party identification thus may avoid the prisoners' dilemma raised by each
group voting only for its particular cause, to the detriment of the group and society as a
whole. See supra note 51. In such cases party voting can offer "slack" for politicians to
serve their constituents' long run interests, though not following their wishes on each
particular issue.
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tion-by which they can judge a candidate's connection with a broad
spectrum of issues. Subsequently, political parties can ensure greater
adherence of successful candidates once in office to the party plat-
form. 3 ' For this reason, as a number of political scientists have argued,
the decline of party voting has made many voting decisions by the pub-
lic turn on irrelevant symbolic appeals or on incumbency.'' Less edu-
cated and poorer voters are affected differentially by this development,
since they tend to vote less frequently and less rationally in the absence
of party cues. As a result, the decline or absence of parties has been
linked to increasing political influence of better educated and wealthier
voters.' 32
In addition to providing a voting cue for poor and less educated
"0o Early writing on this connection was largely theoretical and very simplified.
See A. DOWNS, supra note 40, at 227-34; Downs, An Economic Theory of Political
Action in a Democracy, 65 J. POL. ECON. 135, 142-45 (1957). Later survey research
has offered some support for the advantages of party identification as an information-
economizing device. See V. KEY, THE RESPONSIBLE ELECTORATE: RATIONALITY IN
PRESIDENTIAL VOTING 1936-1960, 52-53 (1966); Popkin, Gorman, Phillips & Smith,
What Have You Done for Me Lately? Toward an Investment Theory of Voting, 70 AM.
POL. Sci. REV. 779, 780 (1976); see also M. FIORINA, supra note 124, at 202 ("mean-
ingful parties" are a prerequisite to "attributing responsibility to government decision
making"); B. PAGE, CHOICES AND ECHOES IN PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS 104-07
(1978) (voters who use party identification often economize on information costs); D.
PRICE, supra note 113, at 110 ("it is often the party label that offers the best clue to
candidates' positions on a range of issues, the interests they will be at pains to accom-
modate, the cooperative ties they will be able to establish, and the kinds of people they
will be likely to bring into government"); Burnham, The Turnout Problem, in ELEC-
TIONS AMERICAN STYLE 97, 123 (A. Reichley ed. 1987) (parties create a "collective
identity, a kind of historical memory transmitted through party identification, and long-
term collective commitments that permit relatively easy calculation of utilities at elec-
tion time"); Cf. J. WILSON, THE AMATEUR DEMOCRAT: CLUB POLITICS IN THREE
CITIES 343 (1962) (because people are uninformed on most issues, "democracy is best
served by reducing and simplifying . . . choices to a single electoral choice"). As such,
party identification may provide a useful anchoring device. See R. NIsBETT & L. Ross,
HUMAN INFERENCE: STRATEGIES AND SHORTCOMINGS OF SOCIAL JUDGMENT 41-42
(1980); Tversky & Kahneman, Judgment under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases,
in JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES 3, 14-18 (1982).
To some extent, the literature on the information advantages of party identifica-
tion is in tension with the earlier 1950 voting studies, which viewed party identification
as primarily a socialized, noninstrumental decision. See A. CAMPBELL, P. CONVERSE,
W. MILLER & D. STOKES, THE AMERICAN VOTER 137, 146-49 (1960). The fact that,
according to public choice theory, group voting is likely to have little substantive utilita-
rian value could be cited in support of this earlier perspective. See R. HARDIN, supra
note 20, at 11 (noting the limitations of collective action analysis in predicting voters'
behavior in some contexts).
131 D. PRICE, supra note 113, at 110; Burnham, supra note 114, at 335; Fiorina,
supra note 108, at 35-39.
12 See W. BURNHAM, The Appearance and Disappearance of the American
Voter 1978, in THE CURRENT CRISIS IN AMERICAN POLITICS 121, 123 (1982); W.
CROTTY, supra note 114, at 276-77; W. HAWLEY, NONPARTISAN ELECTIONS AND
THE CASE FOR PARTY POLITICS 22-26 (1973); D. PRICE, supra note 113, at 109;
Burnham, supra note 130, at 97, 132.
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voters, strong political parties assist in the running of government by
helping to overcome the diffuse centers of power within Congress and
between the executive and legislative branches. A strong president,
backed by a strong party, may be able to secure passage and implemen-
tation of a coherent program, despite the existence of disparate centers
of power."" The effectiveness of strong political parties, moreover, fa-
cilitates democratic oversight of government, as voters are able to iden-
tify and hold accountable those who are responsible for government
decisionmaking.
Finally, political parties can serve as stable institutions for or-
ganizing and facilitating popular participation and consensus in gov-
ernment. In contrast to personality-centered political followings, parties
serve as an institutional vehicle for facilitating long-term political ac-
tivity. This may afford not only a satisfactory outlet for participants,
but perhaps also may help instill a type of dedication to public service
over the long run.134 The necessity of forging a majority coalition can
also encourage party leaders and supporters to be more open-minded
toward the interests of a broad spectrum of groups whose support they
may need-thereby stimulating a willingness to compromise and reach
agreement.13 5
'33 A broad spectrum of academics and politicians have found this splintering of
government responsibilities to be a serious problem in the effectiveness of government
and one of the most important deficiencies remedied by strong parties. See COMMITTEE
ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL SYSTEM, A BICENTENNIAL ANALYSIS OF THE AMERICAN
POLITICAL STRUCTURE: REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE COMMITTEE ON
THE CONSTITUTIONAL SYSTEM 3-7 (1987) [hereinafter COMMITTEE ON THE CONSTI-
TUTIONAL SYSTEM]; Fiorina, supra note 108, at 39-40; J. SUNDQUIST, CONSTITU-
TIONAL REFORM AND EFFECTIvE GOVERNMENT 75-78 (1986); Cutler, Party Govern-
ment under the American Constitution, 134 U. PA. L. REV. 25, 25-26 (1985);
Sundquist, The Crisis of Competence in Our National Government, 95 POL. SCI. Q.
183, 190 (1980). In the now famous words of V.0. Key, "[flor government to function,
the obstructions of the constitutional mechanism must be overcome." V. KEY, POLITICS,
PARTIES AND PRESSURE GROUPS 656 (1964). Similar observations have been made
about the value of parties to governance on the local level. See, e.g., E. BANFIELD & J.
WILSON, CITY POLITICS 126 (1963); Greenstone & Peterson, Reformers, Machines,
and the War on Poverty, in CITY POLITICS AND PUBLIC POLICY 267, 289-92 (J.
Wilson ed. 1978).
"'1 See D. PRICE, supra note 113, at 113; McWilliams, Parties as Civic Associa-
tion, in PARTY RENEWAL IN AMERICA: THEORY AND PRACTICE 51, 64 (G. Pomper
ed. 1980).
13l See D. PRICE, supra note 113, at 26; McWilliams, supra note 134, at 64; see
also J. WILSON, supra note 130, at 4 ("[p]olitics. . . consists of concrete questions and
specific persons who must be dealt with in a manner that will 'keep everybody
happy' "); Ackerman, supra note 33, at 734 n.39 (rather than alienating groups of
voters, "most would-be politicians . . . make rounds of all significant social and ethnic
groups in our society"). For a comparison of this process with rational dialogue at-
tempts to achieve consensus and instill virtue, see infra notes 240-47 and accompanying
text.
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C. Limitations of Party Rule
Of course, strengthening the Presidency and political parties may
be achieved at the expense of other values, but such goals do not appear
central to the contemporary debate. The most important is the partici-
pation of insular minorities. Small groups are generally less able to find
institutional representation in the halls of concentrated power," 8' a fact
that may be troubling to those, such as Sunstein, who believe policy is
strengthened by rational dialogue among a diverse group of
representatives.1
37
The diminished influence of narrower groups, however, obviously
has its positive aspects. Advocates of political parties, as well as civic
virtue, ordinarily believe that narrow interest groups have too great an
influence within the current political process.' 8 This concern, there-
fore, does not appear to refute the central thrust of the political science
thesis-the value (via a centralization of governmental power) of re-
ducing the influence of special interest groups.
Advocates of strong parties and presidents can also be criticized on
the ground that these institutions are less likely to protect against tyr-
anny. This is an objection occasionally leveled against law and econom-
ics scholars in other contexts-they have assumed that market actors
will protect their own self interest; or, analogously, that a strong party
will protect its own constituency.' 9 Yet by increasing the size of the
constituency one does not ensure that the interests of everyone in the
group will be served. To the contrary, the absence of alternate organi-
zations may, by eliminating countervailing power as well as competitive
138 See supra notes 124-25. This is one aspect of the pluralist criticism of the
strong party advocates. See, e.g., C. LINDBLOM, supra note 38, at 244; see also id. at
311-29 (outlining the pluralist response to the strong party literature).
137 Several political scientists have cited this diversity and stimulation of new ideas
as one possible silver lining in the cloud of dispersed power. See M. DERTHICK & P.
QUIRK, supra note 23, at 257; A. WILDAVSKY, THE POLITICS OF THE BUDGETARY
PROCESS 156-71 (1984); Huntington, Congressional Responses to the Twentieth Cen-
tury, in THE CONGRESS AND AMERICA'S FUTURE 6, 31-32 (D. Truman ed. 1973); see
also C. LINDBLOM, supra note 38, at 3-17 (describing the value of decisionmaking in a
decentralized, dispersed environment). Indeed, Sunstein's proposal for proportional rep-
resentation specifically seeks to stimulate such diversity as a means of facilitating ra-
tional dialogue.
138 See e.g., Ackerman, supra note 33, at 745; Macey, supra note 18, at 223;
Mashaw, Constitutional Deregulation, supra note 18, at 849-51; Sunstein, Interest
Groups, supra note 18, at 29.
1'9 For a similar criticism of economics for failing to consider the value of "voice,"
as well as the difficulties of "exit", in holding organizations accountable, see A.
HIRSCHMAN, supra note 29, at 1-4. Curiously, this problem-the fact that groups do
not necessarily represent the interests of their members-is one of Olson's chief in-
sights. See M. OLSON, COLLECTIVE ACTION, supra note 20, at 126-27.
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alternatives, increase the ability of government leaders to ignore the in-
terests and ideals of those in the group. 4 As separation of powers ad-
vocates have long cautioned, the need to protect against such tyranny
may necessitate that countervailing institutions be accepted as a barrier
to unreflective action.""
Here again, however, the traditional political party advocates offer
a response: the two party system. The model they advocate seeks to
hold power in check by a bimodal system of accountability-a president
faced by an effective Congress or another party out of power; or a
prime minister checked by an opposition party.142 Under this view
splintered government not only facilitates pursuit of various special in-
terest programs, but undermines the protection against tyranny that
this bimodal system affords. The greatest source of competition or check
on tyranny would be another strong party, not splintered sources of
independent power that could not provide sustained consistent opposi-
tion. Indeed, many legislative attempts to centralize power in Congress
were intended to check executive tyranny.1 43 From this perspective,
140 See J. GALBRAITH, AMERICAN CAPITALISM: THE CONCEPT OF COUNTER-
VAILING POWER 115-57 (1958) (discussing the need for countervailing power); A.
HIRSCHMAN, supra note 29, at 20-31 (describing the need for the exit option, that is,
the option to leave one organization for another); A. SCHLESINGER, THE IMPERIAL
PRESIDENCY 377-419 (1973) (discussing the tyranny of unchecked executive power).
141 See Strauss, The Place of Agencies in Government: Separation of Powers and
the Fourth Branch, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 573, 667-69 (1984) (describing the checks and
balances function of separation of powers). See generally Myers v. United States, 272
U.S. 52, 293 (1926) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (doctrine of separation of powers adopted
"not to promote efficiency but preclude the exercise of arbitrary power"); THE FEDER-
ALIST No. 10, at 77 (C. Rossiter ed. 1961) (J. Madison) (advantage of well-constructed
union is "its tendency to break and control the violence of faction"); THE FEDERALIST,
supra, No. 47, at 301 ("The accumulation of all powers, legislative, executive, and
judiciary, in the same hands, whether of one, a few, or many,. . . may justly be pro-
nounced the very definition of tyranny."). A simple statistical argument can also be
made against concentrating powers. If power is dispersed and divided, the resulting
system would, all things being equal, be less likely to be biased toward any particular
extreme than a system in which a powerful leader were chosen at random from the
group as a whole. See D. MAHEW, supra note 35, at 173. The political party advo-
cates, however, do not envision presidents or party leaders as being selected randomly
but rather as tending to converge toward the center. See A. DOWNS, supra note 40, at
140-41.
14l See A. DOWNS, supra note 40, at 140-41; E. SCHATTSCHNEIDER, PARTY
GOVERNMENT, supra note 114, at 60, 85, 89; Auerbach, The Reapportionment Cases:
One Person, One Vote-One Vote, One Value, 1964 S. CT. REV. 1, 52; see also Cut-
ler, supra note 133, at 36 (relying on the Court as a check against tyranny in a party
system).
14 The ineffectiveness of a splintered Congress in confronting President Nixon
during the Watergate scandal is cited as the prime example of this problem. See J.
SUNDQUIST, supra note 116, at 199. As Burnham has observed, the decline of a two
party system means that policymaking "rests uneasily between the alternatives of rein-
forced institutional deadlock and of executive imposition of policy on the rest of the
system." Burnham, supra note 113, at 352. For a discussion of legislative attempts to
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"the mediation of opposition efforts through party mechanisms tends to
reduce their idiosyncratic aspects and to increase the likelihood that op-
position forces will have coherent alternatives to offer and the ca-
pacity to put them into effect."'144
This debate raises fundamental policy issues. For purposes of the
present analysis, however, it is necessary to recognize only that avoid-
ance of tyranny is not a justification given for civic virtue approaches
either. Their concern is with the influence of self-interested actors in
day-to-day legislation. To help alleviate this problem, a major group
within the political science profession has offered a far different solu-
tion-strong political parties and presidency.
IV. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE CIVIC VIRTUE
AND THE POLITICAL PARTY PERSPECTIVES
To summarize, two different approaches have been presented for
reforming the legislative process, each aimed at solving the special in-
terest problem. Recent scholarship in the civic virtue tradition is con-
cerned primarily with the tendency of actors within the legislative pro-
cess to act out of concern for, and to further the interests of, only those
groups likely to be responsible for their election, as distinguished from
concern for the public interest as a whole. The representatives' devotion
to furthering the interests of their supporters is not based on any nor-
mative view that their supporters are morally deserving of assistance,
but rather on the ground that their supporters have, or may have, the
power to remove their representatives from, or fail to return them to,
office.
In contrast, rather than attempting to change representatives'
motivations, the political party approach has offered solutions aimed at
increasing the size of the constituencies represented by those political
actors vested with decisionmaking authority. By strengthening the
power of the presidency, congressional leaders, and party leaders, these
scholars seek to expand the size of government institutions and their
constituencies, thereby diminishing collective action problems and the
deal with some of these problems in the budget context by a centralization of powers,
see J. SUNDQUIST, supra note 116, at 199-237.
144 D. PRICE, supra note 113, at 114-15. There also is some question whether in
today's system of widely dispersed authority, tyranny is likely to be a serious long-term
problem. See infra notes 206-18 and accompanying text (describing extreme decentrali-
zation of authority in current Congress); see also R. DAHL, supra note 39, at 133 ("If
majority rule is mostly a myth, surely it cannot be tyrannical, too. For if the majority
cannot rule, surely it cannot be tyrannical."); Sandalow, Judicial Protection of Minori-
ties, 75 MICH. L. REv. 1162, 1190-91 (noting that the inherent tendency toward plu-
ralist politics limits the possibility of tyranny of the majority).
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possibility that the consequences on persons outside a representative's
coalition will be ignored. In short, while the civic virtue scholars are
concerned with the self-interest of narrow special interest groups, the
political party scholars are concerned more with the size of such
groups.
On one level, one might view these two reform programs as com-
plementary solutions to different aspects of the private interest problem.
Infusing representatives of narrow constituencies with a concern for
those who are not part of their own constituency goes part of the way
toward alleviating the perverse incentives, and unwelcome results, of
special interest government and collective decisionmaking. At the same
time, increasing the size of a government actor's constituency may
sometimes achieve a similar result-not by changing the motives of the
actors, but rather by increasing the number of persons that legislative
representatives, by virtue of their self-interest, may be concerned with
protecting. Merging both strategies together, it could be argued, might
achieve the best and most complete solution to the special interest group
problem.""
At the same time, however, these approaches reflect contrasting
philosophical visions on how to advance the public interest. Many writ-
ers who pursue the civic virtue approach view the common good as
something to be achieved through rational dialogue-the making of
public policy through reasoned application of knowledge and the exer-
cise of judgment from a largely disinterested perspective. 146 Although it
is often unclear to what extent and in what sense these authors believe
in an objective morality, 47 many are less concerned with protecting the
5 Indeed, Macey might be viewed as pursuing this approach. See Macey, supra
note 18, at 261, 267; see also supra notes 75-78 and accompanying text. Some tech-
niques may serve both purposes, see infra text accompanying note 268-69, although the
structural changes for the legislature are not likely to fall into this category.
16 See Griffin, supra note 18, at 772-75; Mashaw, Constitutional Deregulation,
supra note 18, at 866-76; Michelman, supra note 18, at 506-11; Sunstein, Interest
Groups, supra note 18, at 45-48; Sunstein, Naked Preferences, supra note 18, at
1693-1704; Sunstein, Public Values, supra note 18, at 129-38; C. Sunstein, supra note
18, at 54-68; Tribe, supra note 68, at 301.
147 Compare C. Sunstein, supra note 18, at 16 ("[t]he requirement of deliberation
embodies substantive constraints that in some settings lead to uniquely correct out-
comes.") with id. at 2-3 ("republicans [do not] believe in a unitary public good"). Com-
pare Michelman, supra note 49, at 23 ("To meet modem individualistic concerns,
practical reason must . . . be a process of normative justification without ultimate ob-
jectivist foundations.") with id. at 24 (while "[m]y reading of the history will not show
the standard version mistaken in its ascription of either the objectivism of public good
or the teleology of civic virtue[,] I wish rather to suggest why the civic ideal retains its
hold despite its insults to modem liberal sensibilities."). This issue is complicated by
the recent attempt to redefine "objectivism" in terms of impersonality and/or the ac-
cepted rules of "communities" and "institutions." See, e.g., Fiss, Objectivity, supra note
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democratic roots of decisionmaking than with ensuring that the views of
a cross section of participants find expression in the debate, resulting in
a rich and diverse dialogue.'"" The political scientists and political
economists discussed above, on the other hand, tend to place their faith
in some form of majority rule, or in institutions capable of internalizing
externalities, as the best long run solution to making policy decisions. 49
Needless to say, in furthering these contrasting visions, the two
approaches also advance very different, often inconsistent, reform pack-
ages. In order to enhance the public-regarding motivation of the legisla-
ture, civic virtue writers, at least as exemplified by Sunstein, generally
have advocated strengthening those mechanisms that insulate political
representatives from the exercise of power. They explore such methods
as separating representatives from electoral responsibility; supplement-
ing checks and balances and points of access so that dialogue must be
undertaken before effective action; requiring public-regarding explana-
tions for the passage of legislation; and perhaps enhancing the proce-
dures or dialogic interactions that must be satisfied by Congress before
a piece of legislation can constitutionally become law. Some have even
considered a constitutional limitation on Senate terms or a prohibition
against legislators or their staff working on matters in which they have
a personal interest. 5 '
The public policy proposals advanced by those writing in the po-
litical party tradition, on the other hand, point in a different direction.
In their view, the independence of representatives (especially from cen-
tral party leaders) is the cause of the special interest group problem,
not its solution. From this perspective, the increased ability of incum-
bent representatives to retain office through constituency servicing,
51
4, at 734-35. Of course, whatever "objectivism" means, there is an inherent tension in
the view that it can be achieved through dialogism; for if there is some definite concep-
tion of "truth," and if the purpose of dialogue is to "find" it, then why need the dia-
logue continue once the truth or right has been identified? See generally Michelman,
supra note 49, at 32-33 (discussing this tension).
148 In this sense, the interests (or views) of the governed public find representation
through the power of their ideas. Andrzej Rapaczynski explores analogous issues in the
context of federalism, suggesting that decentralized units of government enhance the
ability for organization by nontraditional groups, which ultimately may be able,
through organization and the percolation of ideas, to influence federal policy. See
Rapaczynski, supra note 65, at 382-84, 399-405.
149 See supra notes 111-29 and accompanying text. To this extent, the two tradi-
tions draw support from different philosophies of political science-Bentham and
Burke. See H. PITKIN, THE CONCEPT OF REPRESENTATION 168-89, 198-206.
150 See, e.g., Elliot, supra note 58, at 1095, 1106 (recommending a twelve-year
term without possibility of reelection for senators); Purdy, supra note 66, at 71 (pro-
posing a model code of ethics for legislative drafters).
" A representative who undertakes constituency servicing utilizes the broad pub-
lic power at her disposal to solve the discrete, individual problems faced by her constit-
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gerrymandering, 52 and symbolic appeals,1"3 all obstruct the formation
of a majority coalition accountable to party leaders, who are in turn
accountable to the public. To further their vision, therefore, they have
backed a variety of reform proposals intended to centralize power
within Congress and political institutions. These proposals include:
limiting gerrymandering of the legislature, 5 moving the date of elec-
tions of representatives so as to increase presidential coattails and influ-
ence, 155 limiting recorded roll call votes in Congress or requiring party
voting on a specified number of bills, 56 strengthening the financing and
other resources of parties generally and in Congress, 15 7 and repealing
the incompatibility clause so that legislators may serve in the executive
branch. 5 '
At the same time, it is important to remember that these reform
packages are both derived from academic traditions that have exper-
uents. See B. CAIN, J. FEREJOHN & M. FIORINA, THE PERSONAL VOTE: CONSTITU-
ENCY SERVICE AND ELECTORAL INDEPENDENCE 50-76 (1987); R. FENNO,
HOMESTYLE: HOUSE MEMBERS IN THEIR DISTRICTS 101-13 (1978); infra note 226.
152 Gerrymandering, "the deliberate and arbitrary distortion of district boundaries
... for partisan . . .political purposes," Kirkpatrick v. Preisler, 394 U.S. 526, 538
(Fortas, J., concurring), has been criticized by a variety of scholars as protecting in-
cumbency. See, e.g., Adams, A Model State Reapportionment Process: The Continuing
Quest for "Fair and Effective" Representation, 14 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 825, 876-77
(1977); Elliott, Prometheus, Proteus, Pandora, and Procrustes Unbound: The Politi-
cal Consequences of Reapportionment, 37 U. CHI. L. REV. 474, 483 (1970); Wein-
stein, Partisan Gerrymandering: The Next Hurdle in the Political Thicket?, 1 J.L. &
POL. 357, 378 (1984). But see Mann, Is the House of Representatives Unresponsive to
Political Change?, in ELECTIONS AMERICAN STYLE, supra note 128, at 261, 271-80
(questioning impact of gerrymandering, though recognizing that it has some effect);
Schuck, supra note 13, at 1351-53 (discounting political benefit of gerrymandering);
but cf. Lowenstein & Steinberg, supra note 33, at 46-47 (questioning the normative
validity of attacks on the incumbency-protecting feature of gerrymandering given the
reality of legislative seniority systems).
153 A symbolic appeal is a plea intended not so much to achieve a goal instrumen-
tally as to locate its advocates on the political or moral map. See D. MAYHEW, supra
note 35, at 132-36.
I" See, e.g., Adams, supra note 152, at 876-77; Elliott, supra note 152, at 490;
Weinstein, supra note 152, at 379-80.
155 See J. SUNDQUIST, supra note 133, at 93-98; Cutler, supra note 133, at 38.
158 See D. MAYHEW, supra note 35, at 65-67, 179-80; Cutler, supra note 133, at
39; Sundquist, Strengthening the National Parties, in ELECTIONS AMERICAN STYLE,
supra note 130, at 217.
"I See COMMITTEE ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL SYSTEM, supra note 133, at 9; D.
PRICE, supra note 113, at 242-60; J. SUNDQUIST, CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM, supra
note 133, at 201; Orren, The Changing Style of American Party Politics, in THE FU-
TURE OF AMERICAN POLITICAL PARTIES 4 (J. Fleishman ed. 1982).
158 COMMITTEE ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL SYSTEM, supra note 133, at 11; J.
SUNDQUIST, supra note 133, at 167-77; Cutler, supra note 133, at 40-41. The incom-
patibility clause states that "no Person holding any Office under the United States,
shall be a Member of either House during his Continuance in Office." U.S. CONST.,
art. I, § 6, cl. 2.
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ienced serious intellectual ferment and criticism. Advocates of civic vir-
tue and rational dialogue, of course, usually draw support from Rawls,
whose heuristic device, the original position, envisions a disinterested
public regarding individuals deliberating on the structure of the just
society. 59 This device has been critiqued, however, on the grounds that
it provides insufficient information for rational or ethical decisionmak-
ing 6 ° and that it incorporates an incomplete vision of a human be-
ing."' 1 While real legislators charged with engaging in rational dia-
logue presumably would not be subject to these particular concerns, it
is unclear why their deliberations--affected deeply by their social back-
ground in the absence of a veil that was intended to filter out such
biases-would necessarily lead to an agreement on a particular method
for achieving the public good. 62
From the opposite perspective, political scientists' presumptive
faith in majority or democratic rule as the preferred system for pursu-
ing the public interest can be fundamentally challenged. According to
Arrow's impossibility theorem, in many circumstances no true majority
preference exists, or, as the economists would describe it, no stable ma-
jority rule outcome exists.
163
1I See supra notes 44-46 and accompanying text.
160 See R. NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE AND UTOPIA 228 (1974) (criticizing the
implicit assumption of the original position that the "distribution of material abilities is
viewed as a 'collective asset' "); Baker, Outcome Equality or Equality of Respect: The
Substantive Content of Equal Protection, 131 U. PA. L. REV. 933, 959 (1983) ("ex-
clusion [of information from the veil] leads to irrational choice"); Nagel, Rawls on
Justice, in READING RAWLS 8-10 (N. Daniels 1975) (arguing that principles of justice
cannot be derived without a prior conception of the good).
181 See M. SANDEL, LIBERALISM AND THE LIMITS OF JUSTICE 55-65, 78-80, 93-
94, 147-54 (1982).
162 Feminists and critical legal studies writers have criticized liberalism and dia-
logue on similar grounds-namely, that it is biased by the participants' social back-
ground. See, e.g., C. MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED 40-45 (1987). Sunstein,
however, may consider this diversity of perspectives as an advantage. See C. Sunstein,
supra note 18, at 22-24, 63-67. The attempt to view norms as objective within a partic-
ular interpretive community constitutes one attempt to respond to some of these
problems. See supra note 147 and accompanying text.
16 See supra note 14 (discussing Arrow's impossibility theorem). For expositions
of these ideas, and the circumstances in which the preferences of the electorate and/or
their representatives are multipeaked, see A. FELDMAN, WELFARE ECONOMICS AND
SOCIAL CHOICE THEORY 178-94 (1980); D. MUELLER, PUBLIC CHOICE 38-49 (1979);
P. ORDESHOOK, GAME THEORY AND POLITICAL THEORY: AN INTRODUCTION 56-65
(1986); A. SEN, COLLECTIVE CHOICE AND SOCIAL WELFARE 41-46 (1970). See also
W. RIKER, LIBERALISM AGAINST POPULISM 137 (1982) (in a society that believes in
decentralization of power, any system of voting may be manipulated to the advantage of
the manipulator). For an analysis of these problems for judicial decisionmaking, see
Easterbrook, Ways of Criticizing the Court, 95 HARV. L. REV. 802, 813-31 (1982)
(application of Arrow's theorem illustrates how the Court renders inconsistent deci-
sions). But see Kornhauser & Sager, Unpacking the Court, 96 YALE L.J. 82, 107-15
(1986) (criticizing the application of Arrow's theorem to judicial deliberations because
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Public choice experts have also criticized majority rule by detailing
some of the perverse incentives it creates when legislators can logroll."'
The result of such a system is an inefficient production of public re-
sources from a Pareto optimal perspective, especially as compared to a
unitary, centralized ("dictatorial") framework. 65 While these scholars
believe that majority rule is preferable to a government of dispersed
powers, they certainly do not suggest that majority rule represents any-
thing more than a second best solution to public policy, even under
their own models.' 6
Fortunately, to evaluate the civic virtue approach, these fundamen-
tal problems need not be resolved. The advantages of a public-regard-
ing deliberative debate are certainly not "proved" in the legal litera-
ture. If pressed, civic virtue writers presumably would not claim that
such discussions in a politically and socially diverse society are likely to
lead to particular, determinant results. Indeed, if this were true, they
presumably would rely on the courts, the quintessentially deliberative
and rationalist institution, rather than on a legislative body, to formu-
late policy.6 7 Rather, the civic virtue thesis appears to be that, all
things being equal, efforts to enhance the public-regarding and deliber-
ative component of political actors' motivation will improve the overall
quality of legislative deliberations and judgments and limit the perverse
influence of special interest groups.
judges are expressing a judgment, not a preference).
There have been recent attempts to demonstrate that cycling may not be as com-
mon as originally thought. See J. Mashaw, supra note 36, at 55. Most importantly,
various legislative institutions minimize the possibility of cycling problems through
agenda control and other devices. See Shepsle & Weingast, Uncovered Sets and Sophis-
ticated Voting Outcomes with Implications for Agenda Institutions, 28 AM. J. POL.
Sci. 49, 68-71 (1984); Shepsle & Weingast, When Do Rules of Procedure Matter?, 46
J. POL. 206, 208 (1984); Shepsle & Weingast, Structure-Induced Equilibrium and
Legislative Choice, 37 PUB. CHOICE 503, 511-14 (1981).
18 "Logrolling" is a term for mutual political assistance or vote-trading between
legislators. See W. SAFIRE, SAFIRE'S POLITICAL DICTIONARY 384-85 (1978).
165 See J. BUCHANAN & G. TULLOCK, supra note 34, at 131-45, 164.
168 See R. INMAN, FEDERAL ASSISTANCE AND LOCAL SERVICES IN THE UNITED
STATES: THE EVOLUTION OF A NEW FEDERALIST FISCAL ORDER 17-21 (National
Bureau of Economics Research Working Paper No. 2283, 1987) (discussing the effects
of unitary, majority rule, and dispersed power systems on federal grant programs);
Inman, Markets, Governments and the "New" Political Economy, in 2 HANDBOOK OF
PUBLIC ECONOMICS 647, 692-739 (1987) (reviewing public choice literature on dictato-
rial versus democratic rule).
117 See Michelman, supra note 49, at 73-77.
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V. THE EFFECT OF CIVIC VIRTUE REFORMS
ON THE INFLUENCE OF PRIVATE INTEREST GROUPS
A. Civic Virtue and Dispersal of Authority
In assessing the full policy implications of the civic virtue propos-
als, it is important to recognize at the outset that they would probably
lead to a dispersal of authority within Congress, and perhaps in gov-
ernment generally.""8 There are several reasons for this effect, which is
not specifically addressed by Sunstein or others but must be recognized
when weighing the practical costs of virtue.
First, as a theoretical matter, the goal of civic virtue reforms is to
stimulate dialogue among political actors, where colleagues' views are
consulted and, where appropriate, adopted. A true rational dialogue (as
articulated in a variety of contexts) presumes a system of formal equals,
with each representative capable, at least as an aspirational ideal, of
having her position accepted.' Since formal equality often translates
into substantial equality of power, with political actors treated as inde-
pendent ends, not means, the pursuit of rational dialogue should inher-
ently enhance the dispersion of power. 170 Strict obedience to party or
presidential directives is, if not inconsistent with this philosophy, cer-
tainly in tension with its goals.
18 Since the full package of reforms is still being developed and debated, any
conclusion must be tentative. Given the limited nature of existing proposals and of
existing constitutional doctrine, however, the clear presumption must be that any
changes would be incremental. Facilitating reasoned dialogue, increasing insulation
from popular accountability, and supplementing legislative procedures will not trans-
form a political institution such as Congress into a court. Barring a constitutional
amendment merging articles I and III, only the relative insulation of legislators would
be increased.
189 See B. ACKERMAN, supra note 24, at 4 (in "Neutral" dialogue, "[wihenever
anybody questions the legitimacy of another's power, the power holder must respond
not by suppressing the questioner but by giving a reason that explains why he is more
entitled to the resource than the questioner is"); Fiss, Foreword, supra note 4, at 13 (in
judicial dialogue, judges are obligated to listen and respond); Mashaw, supra note 68,
at 899-901 (protections for equal respect and equal voice are essential to "dignitary
approaches to due process"); Michelman, supra note 49, at 33 ("The dialogic themes
express the vision of social normative choice as participatory, exploratory, and persua-
sive, rather than specialized, deductive, or demonstrative."); C. Sunstein, supra note 18,
at 51-52 ("impartiality requires public regarding justifications offered after multiple
points of view have been consulted and (to the extent possible) understood").
10 Some political scientists believe that ideological politics can be inherently divi-
sive and that it has contributed to the decline of party cohesion. See J. WILSON, supra
note 130, at 358; Wildavsky, The Goldwater Phenomenon: Purists, Politicians, and
the Two Party-System, in A. WILDAVSKY, THE REVOLT AGAINST THE MASSES, 246,
253-54 (1971). While this thesis should not be overstated, since divisions themselves
create ideological debate, there is evidence of a relationship between an increasing ideo-
logical orientation to politics in Congress and decentralization of power. See infra notes
206-18 and accompanying text.
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Second, any attempt to ensure that legislators are "autonomous"
and "insulated" from political pressure, while focusing primarily on
constituent or lobbyist pressures, is likely to have a direct impact on the
ability of a president or central party leader to secure the support of
legislators for national programs. Legislators who are truly "autono-
mous" and "insulated" are quite independent of presidential or party
influence. Neither the president nor the party is able to secure support
by warning recalcitrant representatives that leaders will campaign
against their reelection.17 1 At the same time, to the extent that legisla-
tors recognize that they will not be held accountable by their constitu-
ents for presidential or party success, they are less likely to offer assis-
tance to party programs.1
7 2
Third, proportional representation, which Sunstein proposes,17 3
has the specific goal of increasing the division of power among repre-
sentatives within Congress and giving to each group a "piece of the
action." To the degree that each group in society with visible represen-
tation is assured a significant presence in Congress, depriving the party
in power of both the "victory bonus"' 74 and the "balloon effect," 175
there is likely to be a dispersal of influence among representatives. 76
Fourth, discouraging the use of particularistic incentives, such as
campaign funds or patronage, removes an important method by which
a centralized power, such as party leaders or a president, can extend its
influence. Historically, the president or party leaders have been able to
secure acquiescence in programs through pork barrel politics-spread-
ing funding among districts-or patronage appointments.7 Civic vir-
171 See infra notes 209-13 and accompanying text.
172 See M. FIORINA, supra note 124, at 209 ("With the separation of the presi-
dential and congressional electoral arena, voters no longer provide strong electoral in-
centives for Congressmen to follow a president or their party, or, if 'follow' is too strong
a suggestion for those times, incentives for Congressmen to help a president or their
party succeed.")
173 C. Sunstein, supra note 18, at 63-64.
11" A "victory bonus" is the advantages that accrue to the majority party in a
representative body-advantages that may be denied or weakened when factions under-
mine majority power. See Schuck, supra note 13, at 1359 (bonuses include patronage,
financial rewards, organizational authority, and voting power).
175 "Given the usual distribution of partisans among geographic districts, single-
member/plurality-vote districting produces a balloon effect that provides the majority
with more legislative seats, and the minority with fewer, than their shares of the total
vote alone would imply." Id.
178 Such a dispersal of power has been criticized for "paralyzing [the legislature
by] placing the entire burden of coalition-formation on the legislature itself, rather than
encouraging the formation of initial coalitions in the electoral process." Bickel, The
Supreme Court and Reapportionment, in REAPPORTIONMENT IN THE 1970s 57, 71
(N. Polsby ed. 1971). But see Note, supra note 33, at 184 (arguing that Bickel's cri-
tique is a political judgment and not supported by empirical evidence).
17 While old style political parties used cruder devices such as bribery and pa-
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tue theory implicitly relies on reasoned dialogue as a substitute for such
traditional means of securing support.
Finally, increased proceduralization of Congress-which may be a
direct objective of civic virtue theory or merely a means for stimulating
a dialogue in which "multiple points of view have been con-
sulted"-can also lead to dispersion. Unlike a court or administrative
agency, Congress ordinarily cannot act as a truly deliberative and fact-
gathering body without delegation of such responsibility to
subunits-in this case, committees, subcommittees, and their staffs.1"'
As a result, if Congress seeks to provide visible demonstration of its
commitment to dialogue and consultation, delegation of some authority
to committees would appear to be a likely result, necessarily devolving
power to the members of the committees.' 9
Given this dispersion, the civic virtue approach may affect the in-
fluence of private interest group behavior in two ways: first, although
not an object of any civic virtue program, dispersion may disadvantage
such groups simply by reducing the overall amount of legislation; or
second, it may imbue legislators with sufficient virtue so as to transform
fundamentally their mode of decisionmaking. For reasons discussed be-
low, neither result seems likely.
tronage to ensure party loyalty, see, e.g., E. BANFIELD, POLITICAL INFLUENCE 237,
240-44, 256-57 (1961) (discussing the role of patronage in Chicago politics), even mod-
ern political party advocates propose that party leaders be equipped with campaign
funds and other particularistic devices to ensure accountability. See D. PRICE, Supra
note 113, at 251, 254-60; J. SUNDQUIST, supra note 133, at 201.
178 The congressional workload is simply too great. See H. LINDE, G. BUNN, F.
PAFF & W. CHURCH, LEGISLATIVE AND ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESSES 122 (2d ed.
1981) (committees are needed to handle the large number of bills and to discuss and
determine the fate of amendments); A. MAASS, supra note 23, at 39-40 (committees are
essential for congressional oversight, the initiation of legislation, and the guidance of
representatives); R. RIPLEY, CONGRESSIONAL PROCESS AND POLICY 7 (2d ed. 1978)
(with the increased legislative workload, congressional committees and staff needed to
assume greater responsibility); Davidson, Subcommittee Government: New Channels
for Policymaking, in THE NEW CONGRESS 99, 99 (1981) ("legislative assemblies that
not merely ratify laws but draft them must rely on specialized subgroups to attend to
legislative details").
179 In his writing on administrative law, especially rulemaking, Sunstein has spo-
ken favorably of some centralization of authority in the president and the Office of
Management and Budget. See Strauss & Sunstein, The Role of the President and OMB
in Informal Rulemaking, 38 ADMIN. L. REV. 181, 189-92 (1986); Sunstein, supra
note 65, at 453-56. According to Sunstein, presidential oversight "diminish[es] the risk
of factional politics, . . . promote[s] decisions that tend to accord with the will of the
public," and permits coordination of different regulatory programs, see Sunstein, supra
note 65, at 460-all values which are consistent with the political party perspective.
Sunstein does not, however, defend these proposals on civic virtue grounds or discuss
their possible inconsistency with civic virtue theory. Thus, the central point remains
unaltered: application of a civic virtue philosophy in the legislative arena should lead to
a dispersion of responsibility.
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B. Dispersion of Power as a Mechanism
For Reducing the Amount of Legislation
Needless to say, civic virtue writers do not usually advance the
first argument, but it is a popular notion and deserves separate treat-
ment. Apart from any change in motivation of government actors, dis-
persion of authority tends to disadvantage legislation pursued by nar-
row interest groups merely because it reduces the overall amount of
legislation. In economists' language, it increases the decision costs.
Under this familiar perspective, which the Framers offered as one ra-
tionale for checks and balances between the branches of government,.8 °
the greater the number of independent sources of power, the more diffi-
cult it is for any one group to gain control of all the requisite centers to
secure legislation. Because legislation becomes generally more difficult
to enact, the amount of "regressive" laws is also reduced.
This analysis, however, obviously does not explain how dispersion
of power will improve the quality of the legislation actually enacted.
More importantly, increasing independent sources of power should,
under this theory, also reduce the overall amount of legislation, includ-
ing legislation with diffuse support. Thus, it appears to throw the baby
out with the bath water.' 1
180 See THE FiDERALTST, supra note 141, No. 10, at 82-84; see also Sargentich,
The Contemporary Debate about Legislative-Executive Separation of Powers, 72 COR-
NELL L. REv. 430, 450-52 (1987) (noting the need for rival power centers); Strauss,
supra note 141, at 578, 602-04 (checks and balances intended to promote effective
government against "transitory majorities" or h dominant branch).
As a method for preserving the status quo, this system has its defenders in the
separation of powers context. See Easterbrook, Statutes' Domains, supra note 13, at
549-50. As Hamilton stated:
It may perhaps be said that the power of preventing bad laws in-
cludes that of preventing good ones; and may be used to the one purpose
as well as to the other. But this objection will have little weight with those
who can properly estimate the mischiefs of that inconstancy and mutabil-
ity in the laws, which form the greatest blemish in the character and ge-
nius of our governments. They will consider every institution calculated to
restrain the excess of lawmaking, and to keep things in the same state in
which they happen to be at any given period as much more likely to do
good than harm; because it is favorable to greater stability in the system of
legislation. The injury which may possibly be done by defeating a few
good laws will be amply compensated by the advantage of preventing a
number of bad ones.
THE FEDERALIST, supra note 141, No. 73, at 443-44 (A. Hamilton). This perspective
reflects an implicit preference for common law distributions of entitlements to legisla-
tively adopted systems. See Sunstein, supra note 99, at 902-04.
"81 For discussions on the effect of congressional decentralization on reducing leg-
islation, see L. RiESELBACH, CONGRESSIONAL REFORM 21-23 (1986); Cutler, supra
note 133, at 28-29; Huntington, supra note 137, at 6, 27; cf. R. DAHL, DILEMMAS OF
PLURALIST DEMOCRACY 50-53 (1982) (decentralization results in increased obstacles
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In response, it might be suggested that the diffuse nature of sup-
port for legislation affords its advocates an advantage in a government
of dispersed powers. Under this view, actors who represent independent
sources of influence are more likely to reach agreement based on shared
diffuse values than on narrow private interest values, which are less
likely to be held by other representatives." 2
This argument, however, establishes only that legislation with
broad public support is more likely to be successful in a democratic
polity than narrow private interest legislation because the system is
based on majority rule. It does not follow that increasing the power of
different independent groups within legislative bodies such as the
House and Senate will favor legislation with diffuse support. To the
contrary, logrolling in a system of multiple decisionmakers would ap-
pear to have the opposite effect," 8' especially when one weighs the ad-
vantages a dispersed system affords narrow groups to secure electoral
representation and potential veto power.'84
to achieving policy goals and causes representatives to lose control of the policy agenda).
182 See Hazard, supra note 36, at 699-700 (in a dispersed legislative system, both
majority and minority must fashion their programs in broadly acceptable terms of com-
mon interest and appeal); cf. S. KELMAN, supra note 23, at 213 (according to Madis-
onianism, in a system of dispersed powers, "[p]olicies can . . . be adopted only when
there is wide agreement among [political] actors-and hence when the interests of the
community as a whole are being served."). For a law and econonmics articulation of a
similar argument in the separation of powers context, see Bruff, supra note 43, at 218-
20 (noting the Framer's awareness of the increased decision costs associated with checks
and balances); Macey, supra note 18, at 247 (suggesting that the Framers intended to
make special interest legislation expensive by increasing decision costs); infra note 184
(discussing the work of Buchanan and Tullock).
183 See supra notes 164-66 and accompanying text.
184 Buchanan and Tullock's theoretical observation that two differently constituted
legislative bodies (such as the Senate and House) may be less likely together to give
effect to narrow special interests than only one of those bodies acting alone, see J.
BUCHANAN & G. TULLOCK, supra note 34, at 247-48, is not to the contrary. Most
importantly, Buchanan and Tullock do not compare directly the benefits of a two-
chamber, dispersed system to a single-leader system, which is most directly analogous to
an ideal-typical two party system. As noted above, dispersion of authority in a particu-
lar chamber increases the opportunity for narrow groups to secure a foothold in govern-
ment and trade their influence (or perhaps veto) for legislative impact. See supra notes
173-76 and accompanying text. A political party system consolidates power in dispersed
institutions, making it analogous to a single-leader structure and more difficult for nar-
row groups to secure initial representation. See infra notes 214-15 and accompanying
text (discussing the increased influence of special interest groups in a dispersed legisla-
tive framework).
This scenario, however, does raise a factual question, not directly implicated by
the thesis of this Article, as to whether adding another dispersed chamber to a political
system will in fact reduce the overall amount of special interest legislation, as
Buchanan and Tullock predict. While the new procedural obstacle increases the likely
number of groups whose support must be obtained to pass legislation, it also increases
the number of groups with representative influence and potential veto power within
government. Given the collective action difficulties that diffuse groups ordinarily face in
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C. Dispersion of Power as a Mechanism
For Inducing Civic Virtue
1. The Civic Virtue Analysis
Civic virtue theory, however, envisions insulation of authority as
serving a separate, qualitatively different function: elevating the motiva-
tion of government actors. Independent political actors who are rela-
tively insulated from the constraints of coercive political power 85 are
supposed to make decisions on the basis of principle. In addition, as
Sunstein suggests, "multiplying the points of access to government"
should ensure a diversity of actors who must reach a rough agreement
before undertaking joint action. Thus, independent sources of decision-
making are not intended to lead participants to counter pressure and
ultimately compromise, 88 or even to face increased decision costs per
se, but rather to undertake rational debate in pursuit of the common
good.1
8 7
Although the theory behind this essentially factual prediction is
not explored in detail, this procedure may have some influence on moti-
vation and dialogue. Greater independence and greater insulation of
government actors from the effects of outside "pressures" does afford
increased opportunity for legislators to exercise civic virtue and cooper-
ative behavior. As discussed above, a representative and dispersed sys-
this dispersed environment, and the incentives for legislators to pay attention to concen-
trated interests, the ultimate political consequence is not apparent.
185 See supra notes 56-63 and accompanying text.
188 Pressure and compromise constitute the central (though often criticized) plu-
ralist thesis that government actors, through a system of "partisan mutual adjustment,"
achieve an optimal mix of legislation. See C. LINDBLOM, supra note 38, at 117-22
(discussing the mutual roles of political party leaders and interest group leaders in the
system of mutual adjustment). For a discussion of the criticisms of pluralism, see supra
notes 30-43 and accompanying text.
187 As Hamilton stated:
The oftener [a law] is brought under examination [and] the greater the
diversity in the situations of those who are to examine it, the less must be
the danger of those errors which flow from want of due deliberation, or of
those missteps which proceed from the contagion of some common passion
or interest.
THE FEDERALIST, supra note 141, No. 73, at 443. Hamilton continued: "It is far less
probable that culpable views of any kind should infect all the parts of government at
the same moment and in relation to the same object than that they should by turns
govern and mislead every one of them." Id.; see also THE FEDERALIST, supra note
141, No. 51, at 322 (J. Madison) (describing the "policy of supplying, by opposite and
rival interests, the defect of better motives"); Rapaczynski, supra note 65, at 357 ("The
very legitimation of political authority in the United States seems to rest on a theory
that views unfavorably the location of sovereignty in any well-defined institution, pre-
ferring instead a dispersion of power and authority as a mode of increasing political
accountability.").
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tem of government offers some independence to legislators to the extent
that the public is not aware of or does not care about everything they
are doing."s Although legislators are obviously not independent in the
same sense or to the same extent as Article III judges, their greater
freedom from direct constituent control, criticized by economists as a
principal agency problem,'8 9 can facilitate the exercise of legislative vir-
tue.' 90 In addition, the inability to pin responsibility on a particular
politician for government action because of the multiple actors in gov-
ernment' 91-the classic collective action problem-serves also as a
mechanism for facilitating independence, thereby increasing the oppor-
tunity for the exercise of virtue, as well as rational dialogue.'
The small size of our representative bodies, moreover, may facili-
tate more virtuous (or at least cooperative) behavior than if the popula-
tion at large were making judgments. To the civic virtue proponent,
smaller decisional bodies can allow for the inculcation of an elite ethos
in those performing public service. 93 To the public choice theorist,
188 See supra notes 120-22 and accompanying text; cf. Sunstein, Interest Groups,
supra note 18, at 79., 81-83 (comparing pluralist representation with republican
representation).
189 See Jensen & Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency
Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 308-10 (1976) (in general
agency relations, if both principal and agent are utility maximizers, some divergence
from the principal's interest is inevitable); see also Macey, supra note 18, at 244-45
(likening a representative democracy to an agency relationship).
190 See Sunstein, Interest Groups, supra note 18, at 69-72 (proposing that courts
employ strengthened rationality review to "ensure that representatives have exercised
some form of judgment instead of responding mechanically to interest-group pres-
sures"); see also Farber & Frickey, supra note 36, at 912 n.224 (agreeing that repre-
sentatives should be more insulated from pressure).
'91 See, e.g., Cutler, supra note 133, at 29; Schuck, supra note 13, at 1361.
192 See G. PARKER, HOMEWARD BOUND: EXPLAINING CHANGES IN CONGRES-
SIONAL BEHAVIOR 12 (1986) ("Since it is impossible for constituents to keep tabs on
their legislators, especially when [the legislators] are in Washington, they are largely
uninformed about the behavior of their Congressmen and Senators[;] [tihis 'invisibility'
can be exploited by incumbents to pursue personal goals without worrying about the
reactions of constituents."). For some historical evidence of this effect engendered by
prior efforts to decentralize Congress, see infra notes 209-13 and accompanying text.
19' The original model of a civically virtuous community was the town meeting.
See J. MANSBRIDGE, BEYOND ADVERSARY DEMOCRACY 39-138 (1980); Sunstein, In-
terest Groups, supra note 18, at 31; C. Sunstein, supra note 18, at 25-26; cf. J. Rous-
SEAU, THE SOCIAL CONTRACT 68-72 (R. Harrington trans. 1893) (civic republicanism
seeks to minimize the size of society to enhance the opportunities for the inculcation of
virtue). Under this view, small units of decisionmaking offer the best opportunity for
"deliberation and debate," which would "inculcate civic virtue." G. STONE, L.
SEIDMEN, C. SUNSTEIN & M. TUSHNET, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 6 (1986) [hereinafter
G. STONE, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW]. Unlike the prototypical town meeting, however,
Congress lacks the "spiritual and material homogeneity . . . required to support and
reward unselfish devotion to the common good," Michelman, supra note 49, at 19,
which is one of the reasons that the antifederalists opposed the formation of a strong
federal union. See Sunstein, Interest Groups, supra note 18, at 36.
[Vol. 136:1567
CIVIC VIRTUE REFORMS
smaller bodies facilitate cooperative behavior owing to participants'
greater ability to reach agreement with, and monitor the behavior of,
self-interested opponents and allies within a small group setting.
94
Thus, both perspectives suggest enhanced opportunities for public-re-
garding and/or cooperative behavior can be found within smaller insu-
lated groups like Congress and its committees."'
2. Limits of- the Civic Virtue Perspective
It is unlikely, however, that these methods to increase the insula-
tion of members and dispersion of responsibility in Congress will in-
duce civic virtue, or to the extent they do, that it will be worth the loss
in quality of political decisionmaking, given the state of existing
institutions.
a. Impact on Motivation
To begin with, barring a transformation of Congress into an arti-
cle III court, self-interested legislative behavior is likely to remain, for
several reasons. First, in the context of our constitutional structure, all
legislators will eventually be subject to popular accountability through
election. Even if legislators are not open to direct "pressure" through
lobbying or campaign contributions, they always must and will be sen-
sitive to how their actions will appear to voters at reelection or possible
elevation to a higher office. 96
Second, increasing the insulation of representatives-through ex-
panded procedures or loosened electoral accountability-may increase
their independence (or "slack") in some aggregate sense but also may
19 By decreasing the size of the decisional group from the general public to Con-
gress, the possibility of mutually cooperative behavior through continuing interaction is
ordinarily enhanced among participants. See R. AXELROD, supra note 22, at 16. Tech-
nically, this is not the result of civic virtue, but the ability to constrain self-interest
through bargaining and monitoring. Under this reasoning, however, decreasing the size
of the decisional group further-to two strong parties or a strong president-should be
even more successful. Moreover, a dispersed Congress creates agency and monitoring
problems by the public of group behavior, see infra notes 198-99 and accompanying
text, which may increase the advantages of a strong presidency or two party system
over a legislative system.
195 Scholars have begun to explore the complicated relationship of group size and
other characteristics to cooperative behavior in a dispersed group. See, e.g., R. HARDIN,
supra note 20, at 38-49; Hoffman & Spitzer, Experimental Test of the Coase Theorem
with Large Bargaining Groups, 15 J. LEGAL STUD. 149, 151 (1986).
19 Much, if not most, popular voting is retrospective in this sense. See M. Fi-
ORINA, supra note 124, at 7 (" 'The patterns of flow of the major streams of shifting
voters graphically reflect the electorate in its great, and perhaps principal role as an
appraiser of past events, past performance, and past actions.'" (quoting V. KEY, supra
note' 130, at 61)).
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improve the relative ability of special interest groups to affect their de-
cisions. As discussed above, one of the principal advantages of concen-
trated special interest groups is their greater monitoring capabilities,
especially over complex institutions such as Congress. 9 7 Focusing on
the mechanics of passage requires both experience and resources. If the
courts move to increase Congress's insulation and political complexity
through expanded procedural requirements, effective dispersion of
power, proportional representation, and enhanced legislative indepen-
dence, the possibility exists that the comparative influence of special
interest groups, paradoxically, would be enhanced.'98 Indeed, some
have argued that the increased complexity in government decisionmak-
ing associated with the decline of political parties over the last three
decades has also decreased popular understanding of and interest in
politics, thereby reducing voter turnout, especially among poorer and
less educated voters.' 99 As a result, popular electoral accountability may
diminish in a system of dispersed power, further enhancing the relative
influence of organized and concentrated special interest groups.
Third, greater insulation from electoral or public pressure may
serve to substitute one type of private-regarding behavior for another.
While insulation may reduce popular pressures, it may also increase
the opportunity for politicians to pursue their own private agendas.200
The assumption of the insulation strategy is that the public is more
likely to be private-regarding than politicians. Yet, individual politi-
cians' behavior often can have more direct influence on their personal
interests (that is, their careers) than individual citizens' political be-
havior, especially voting, since voters' effort is unlikely to have any nar-
rowly instrumental advantage for their own personal welfare. 0 ' Politi-
197 See supra notes 120-22 and accompanying text.
188 Indeed, one school of political science scholarship views the influence of special
interest groups as primarily an.elite phenomenon, in which power is exercised through
control over information, career advancement, and financial resources. See K.
SCHLOZMAN & J. TIERNEY, ORGANIZED INTERESTS AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 7-
9, 148-69 (1986) (special interest groups offer an impressive array o" inducements to
legislators, including information, political support, future jobs, PAC contributions, and
fact-finding junkets).
'99 See Burnham, supra note 130, at 103-04 (voter abstention, especially by less
educated and poorer voters, is due to decline of parties and the "breakup of electoral
coalitions along office-specific lines and the rise of personalistic incentives to replace
team incentives").
200 The traditional principal-agency analysis would presumably view the indepen-
dence in this manner. See Jensen & Meckling, supra note 189, at 308 (a principal
must incur monitoring costs to limit agent's divergence from the principal's best
interests).
.0. Technically, only when one's preferred candidate wins by one vote can the
individual voter claim that her vote made the difference. Given the difficulty of predict-
ing what the preferred candidate will do in the future (in contrast to the opponent) and
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cians in this context might be overly inclined to take dramatic stands
that draw media attention to themselves or pursue activities that en-
hance postgovernment opportunities. °2 For all of these reasons, the
ability to elevate the public-regarding motivations of legislative actors
through a system of political dispersion remains uncertain in a world
where some popular control still exists.
b. Impact on Collective Action
Equally important, whatever its effect on legislative motivation,
these changes are likely to influence perversely government decision-
making-that is, collective action coordination. As discussed above, the
dispersal of power increases the ability of narrower groups to secure an
effective foothold in government. By seeking to create a multitude of
legislative actors with independent authority, the civic virtue strategy
tends to afford more groups an opportunity to gain some influence.203
Once groups have been assured of a presence, moreover, the dis-
persal of power among legislative officials creates serious perverse in-
centives in operating government. As explained above, individual
groups and actors have an incentive to pursue their narrow interests at
the expense of more diffuse concerns, since their contribution will be
more significant on the former than the latter.2" The end result of a
dispersion of power might then be a system of government in which
narrow interests may be pursued at the expense, and to the detriment,
of diffuse values. On balance, there is no strong evidence that existing
proposals to increase marginally the independence of legislators would
sufficiently transform the motivation- of members of Congress to
the often tenuous linkage between the delivery of government services and one's own
economic well-being, the causative significance of the lone vote in a major election
becomes quite low. See N. FROHLICH & J. OPPENHEIMER, POLITICAL ECONOMY 97-
116 (1978); R. HARDIN, supra note 20, at 11. For this reason, it may not be instru-
mentally irrational for the public to vote for civically virtuous reasons. See A. DowNs,
supra note 40, at 270 (arguing that a voter receives "long-run participation value" in
return for participating in the democratic process, namely, the benefit of living in a
democratic society). Admittedly, however, a voter may still view the franchise in nar-
rowly instrumental terms, but subjectively believe hers could be the marginal vote that
decides the election.
Of course, other types of individual political behavior, such as political contribu-
tions, especially through PACs, can offer certain voters substantial political influence.
See L. SABATO, PAC POWER 10-16 (1985).
202 See D. MAYHEW, supra note 35, at 68 (a member of Congress in electoral
danger can innovate by "entrepreneurial position taking"); Nash, supra note 108, at
B10, col. 6 (posturing by Senator Garn).
203 See supra notes 35-36 and accompanying text.
204 Id.
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counteract these perverse tendencies.20 5
D. Historical Precedent:
Earlier Examples of Power Diffusion in Congress
Indeed, the evolving institutional structure of Congress over the
last thirty years offers compelling historical evidence that this strategy,
in the current dispersed legislative environment, may be counterproduc-
tive. The Congress of the late nineteenth century and early twentieth
century in many ways reflected the political science ideal: strong legis-
lative leadership in the Senate and House controlled the voting on most
decisions, with little defection by members. 0 6 This influence was facili-
tated by strong party identification within the electorate and large fi-
nancial and other support distributed by the party to individual candi-
dates for office.207 At the same time, there was minimal rational
dialogue or reflective analysis of legislation in committees of the House
and Senate.208
Power in Congress, especially the House of Representatives, has
become increasingly dispersed since that period. In the 1950's, acceler-
ating earlier trends, the Speaker was displaced by committee chairs as
the center of power, 09 leading to the serious difficulties in the early
sixties with President Kennedy's legislative programs.2"' More recently,
in the late 1960's and early 1970's, power has shifted to subcommittee
chairmen and even individual members of Congress on each commit-
tee."' This decentralization of power can be traced to the increasing
205 The fact that political actors are already public spirited to some degree, see
supra note 23, does not undermine this conclusion. To the extent that there is an ex-
isting reservoir of public spiritedness, the civic virtue approach would appear, if any-
thing, less necessary.
201 See D. PRICE, supra note 113, at 52; Cooper, Brady & Hurley, The Electoral
Basis of Party Voting: Patterns and Trends in the United States House of Representa-
tives, 1887-1969, in THE IMPACT OF THE ELECTORAL PROCESS 133, 137 (1977).
217 See D. PRICE, supra note 113, at 51-53.
201 See J. SUNDQUIST, supra note 116, at 369-72.
209 During this period, there was a gradual transition from a "hierarchical" to a
"bargaining" system of power management. See D. PRICE, supra note 113, at 56; see
also S. SMITH & C. DEERING, COMMITTEES IN CONGRESS 28-30 (1984) (noting the
"power broker" status of committee chairs during the 1947-1964 period).
210 For a description of President Kennedy's troubles in civil rights and President
Johnson's success in finally overcoming the legislative roadblocks to the Civil Rights
Act of 1964, see generally C. WHALEN & B. WHALEN, THE LONGEST DEBATE: A
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE 1964 CIVIL RIGHTS ACT (1985).
21 There is a voluminous literature on these structural changes. For general
overviews, see R. ARNOLb, CONGRESS AND THE BUREAUCRACY 212-14 (1979); L.
DODD & R. SCHOTT, supra note 35, at 106-29; M. FIORINA, supra note 35, at 62-67;
N. ORNSTEIN, CONGRESS IN CHANGE 88-114 (1975); R. RIPLEY, supra note 178, at
324-27; Cooper, Organization and Innovation in the House of Representatives, in J.
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electoral independence of members of Congress from party leaders and
the president, 12 which in turn is a result of reduced popular party
identification, increased media coverage, and enhanced opportunities for
constituent services. In this situation, many members of Congress, par-
ticularly in the House, can virtually ensure their own reelection today
without the assistance of the traditional sources of support-the party
leaders and the president. Incumbency, not political party affiliation, is
the most important determinant of a politician's electoral success.2 , 3
Unfortunately, the difficulty with this environment of independent
and dispersed legislative power is that Congress is far less able to with-
stand the influence of narrow interest groups, especially as compared to
the prior strong party system or strong presidency. A host of political
scientists have detailed the increased influence of narrowly concentrated
COOPER & G. MACKENZIE, THE HOUSE AT WORK 319, 320-23 (1981); Davidson,
supra note 178, at 102-108; Shepsle & Weingast, supra note 119, at 351-54.
212 There is a growing analytic literature seeking to explain why Congress has
moved to a decentralized or universalistic system, generally suggesting that it improves
incumbent reelection prospects. See Niou & Ordeshook, Universalism in Congress, 29
AM. J. POL. Sci. 246, 256-57 (1985); Weingast, A Rational Choice Perspective in
Congressional Norms, 23 AM. J. POL. Sci. 245, 249 (1979).
21 Ninety-eight percent of incumbent House members won reelection in 1986.
The 98.4% Solution, Wall St. J., July 22, 1987, p. 20, col. 1 (editorial). For academic
discussion of incumbency, see M. FIORINA, supra note 35, at 19-23; G. JACOBSEN,
MONEY IN CONGRESSIONAL ELECTIONS 101-04 (1980); Burnham, Insulation and Re-
sponsiveness in Congressional Elections, 90 POL. SCI. Q. 411, 412-15 (1975); Fer-
ejohn, On the Decline of Competition in Congressional Elections, 71 AM. POL. SC.
REV. 166, 169 (1977); Ferejohn & Fiorina, Incumbency and Realignment in Congres-
sional Elections, in NEW DIRECTIONS, supra note 93, at 91, 91-117; Kostroski, Party
and Incumbency in Postwar Senate Elections: Trends, Patterns, and Models, 67 AM.
POL. Sc. REV. 1213, 1215-20 (1973); Mann & Wolfinger, Candidates and Parties in
Congressional Elections, 74 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 617, 620-21 (1980).
Recently, Gary Jacobsen has questioned the magnitude of the incumbency effect,
suggesting that, while the margin of victory for incumbents has increased over the last
two decades, their success rate has not altered dramatically. See Jacobsen, The
Marginals Never Vanished: Incumbency and Competition in Elections to the U.S.
House of Representatives, 31 AM. J. Poi.. Sc. 126, 133, 138 (1987). Assuming Jacob-
sen's interpretation turns out to be correct, and one views the 1984 and 1986 congres-
sional elections as anomalies, incumbents still appear to enjoy a great deal of indepen-
dence even under his analysis, especially with respect to their legislative policymaking
activities. For example, Jacobsen recognizes that there is a distinct advantage to incum-
bency. See id. at 128. In his view, moreover, incumbents appear to be defeated more
often on the basis of local parochial or personality challenges, not their congressional
legislative activities. See id. at 136-37; see also G. PARKER, supra note 192, at 7
("[Tlhe adoption of an attentive home style provided incumbents with a way of staying
in office without subjugating their own policy preferences or goals to the whims of their
constituents."); Ferejohn & Fiorina, supra, at 93 ("the 1984 election provides still
more evidence of the continued importance of incumbency in congressional elections,
the limited effect of presidential coattails, and therefore the limited capacity of national
elections to impose a programmatic vision on a constituency-minded Congress"); Mann,
supra note 152, at 268 (describing "the long term trend toward the insulation of House
elections from national politics").
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groups in this setting.214 Thus, "[tlo the degree that legislative members
are able to secure electoral independence, they are less dependent on
executive success, less controlled by legislative leaders, and more capa-
ble of dealing independently with interest groups. [The result is] a
more decentralized policy-making process with greater room for partic-
ularistic considerations.
21
5
Paradoxically, these developments, generally lamented by political
scientists, appear to be welcomed, if not demanded, by the logic of civic
virtue theory. The substantial job security afforded by incumbency vot-
ing2 6 has made representatives far better able and inclined than their
predecessors to debate pieces of legislation and challenge the party lead-
ership, at least as evidenced by the increased length of committee hear-
ings and floor debates.2" Legislative deliberations over this period have
214 See, e.g., B. CAIN, J. FEREJOHN & M. FIORINA, supra note 151, at 14, 21; L.
DODD & R. SCHOTT, supra note 35, at 98-99; M. FIORINA, supra note 35, at 66, 73;
L. REISELBACH, supra note 181, at 88-89; K. SCHLOZMAN & J. TIERNEY, supra note
198, at 317; D. VOGER & S. WALDMAN, CONGRESS AND DEMOCRACY 91-97 (1985).
2" B. CAIN, J. FEREJOHN & M. FIORINA, supra note 151, at 21 (emphasis
added). These authors also observe that "party discipline unravels as increased re-
sources and influence interact with electoral independence in a mutually reinforcing
fashion. Power devolves to subunits; representatives feel free to defect on party votes;
norms of party responsibility crumble; and responsiveness to national electoral verdicts
gives way to bargaining among particularistic interests." Id. at 14. They conclude:
"Faithful representation of particularistic constituency interests goes with decentralized
policy making institutions. Such institutions tend to make distributive policies rather
than regulatory and redistributive policies." Id. at 228.
Overspending and budget deficits may be just two of the results of the decline of
party discipline. See R. Inman, supra note 166, at 30 (expansion of pork barrel legisla-
tion for state and local government during the 1970s was due to congressional transfor-
mation from a majority-controlled to a decentralized, universalistic system); A.
WILDAVSKY, How TO LIMIT GOVERNMENT SPENDING 46-47 (1980) (as parties have
declined, they have been less able to integrate demands of special interest groups).
The textual discussion, of course, deals with tendencies, not absolutes. The issue is
whether further decentralization of an already dispersed and decentralized process is
likely to improve decisionmaking.
28 See L. DODD & R. SCHOTT, supra note 35, at 59 (members of Congress de-
velop long term careers that may last as long as forty years); M. FIORINA, supra note
35, at 5-6 (discussing the "professionalized Congress" of the twentieth century); see
also The 98.4% Solution, supra note 213, at 20, col. 1 ("House elections today have
become pro-forma exercise" with House members enjoying "lifetime tenure"). The
same holds true, to a lesser extent, for members of the Senate. See Ferejohn & Fiorina,
supra note 213, at 96 (although "Senate races are more competitive than House races[,
tihere is little evidence that national issues and conditions exert any more of an across-
the-board effect in Senate campaigns than in House campaigns").
2 See J. SUNDQUIST, supra note 116, at 369-73, 391; Davidson, supra note 178,
at 124-26; Yang, Chaotic Congress: Lawmakers' Inability to Clear Up Gridlock Is a
Rising Frustration, Wall St. J., March 21, 1988, at 1, col. 1. But see Greenhouse,
Professor in Congress Is Doing Homework on Theory and Reality, N.Y. Times, Feb.
11, 1988, at A20, col. 4 (noting recent decline in committee hearings due to centraliza-
tion of budget process).
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also tended to be more ideological."'
Indeed, civic virtue theory is, in effect, exploring ways to acceler-
ate this trend, seeking to further stimulate committees and representa-
tives to consider and debate legislation and express their judgment
about the legislation in principled terms. At least as an ideal, legislators
are presumably not to demand party loyalty or make decisions based on
the fact that the party leader had given directions. Nor should they
make deals based exclusively on a particularistic self-interested inten-
tion to hold a coalition together. Unfortunately, these practices, while
inconsistent with rational dialogue, are also mechanisms that serve to
bind dispersed centers of power into collective entities capable of voting
as a majority unit. In short, these devices not only help sustain party
politics within a system of majority rule, but also counteract the influ-
ence of special interest groups.
This history also underscores two other points. First, the disper-
sion of authority in Congress suggests there may be a substantive dif-
ference between facilitating deliberation and dialogue within the legis-
lative process, as opposed to within the administrative process, where it
first received its strongest support in public law scholarship. 219 Because
administrative agencies are more likely to be, and are more easily, hier-
archically organized, imposing a deliberative obligation upon deci-
sionmakers-cabinet secretaries or their immediate subordinates-is
less likely to disperse authority.220 Within the legislative process, on the
other hand, where political actors are formal equals, enhancing deliber-
ation and insulation within a collectivity is more apt to decentralize
power and undermine central majority influence.221 Owing to the dif-
218 See Sinclair, Building Coalitions in Congress, in THE NEW CONGRESS, Supra
note 178, at 178, 217-20. Indeed, in contrast to the 1950s, members of Congress now
generally perceive their role as serving as a trustee for their constituents, rather than as
a delegate. See Parker, supra note 192, at 26. Not surprisingly, the current decentral-
ized legislative environment appears to be more conducive to the generation of new
ideas. See M. DERrHICK & P. QUIRK, supra note 23, at 252-58; Wilson, The Politics
of Regulation, in THE POLITrICS or RE(GuLATION 357, 370-72 U. Wilson ed. 1980);
Wilson, American Politics Then and Now, COMMENTARY, Feb. 1979, at 39, 42-44; cf.
United States v. Mendoza, 464 U.S. 154, 160 (1984) (discussing the need for "explora-
tion" of ideas by federal circuits to illuminate them for proper resolution by the Court).
219 For a discussion of the hard-look doctrine, designed to promote deliberation in
the administrative context, see supra note 101.
2 Since the actual dialogue in administrative agencies can occur in a closed fo-
rum and is subject to essentially final judgment by only one person-the agency head
or a designee-it is less likely to disperse authority within the agency, or create collec-
tive action problems. For an insightful comparison of the other differences between the
legislative and administrative processes in this context, see Bruff, supra note 43.
2 See supra notes 169-79 and accompanying text (discussing reasons why civic
virtue proposals are likely to disperse authority in the legislative process). To counter-
act this dispersion, Sunstein recently has argued for reinvigorating checks and balances
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ference in organizational structure, the lessons of the civic virtue expe-
rience in the administrative context-which are themselves open to
some difference of opinion-cannot be uncritically generalized to the
legislative arena.
222
Second, on the basis of this history, it also should be recognized
that certain techniques which epitomize self-regarding behavior may
actually facilitate the ideological orientation of various participants in
the political system. Nobody has satisfactorily resolved the exact
method by which representatives will be able to exercise civic virtue
without popular accountability to an often private-regarding public.223
In Sunstein's eyes, the insulation of representatives provides the neces-
sary discretion for the exercise of virtue. 24 Macey, on the other hand,
appears to assume that true popular scrutiny will facilitate public-re-
garding activities.22
The history of Congress over the past thirty years suggests that the
answer often falls in between: legislators' pursuit of their most particu-
laristic functions-local pork barrel legislation and constituent servic-
ing-actually frees them to engage in more ideological activities.22 ' To
in the administrative process through heightened review of agency rulemaking by courts
and the Office of Management and Budget. To the extent that this system affords the
president and his staff final decisionmaking authority, it would appear to centralize
decisionmaking further, and indeed is defended by Sunstein on that ground. See Sun-
stein, supra note 65, at 457-60. On the other hand, Sunstein also supports review in
this context on dispersion grounds, advocating intervention by the president, his staff,
and courts as competitive sources of authority within the executive branch. See id. at
489. Thus, it is unclear what the ultimate effect or purpose of his proposals will be in
the administrative context.
222 See supra note 101 (discussing the hard look doctrine in the administrative
context). Strategies may be developed that will stimulate a rational dialogue in a colle-
gial body without insulating political actors from popular accountability or dispersing
effective political authority. Indeed, this Article suggests below two areas for further
inquiry. The discussion, however, does underscore the need for such an analysis.
22 See supra notes 105-10 and accompanying text.
224 See Sunstein, Interest Groups, supra note 18, at 34-35.
22 See Macey, supra note 18, at 254 ("This publicity provides information to
those affected by the legislation to organize coalitions to protest it.").
226 Specifically, representatives are able to build stable home constituencies by de-
livering discrete benefits, such as local projects and constituent services, to their dis-
tricts. This electoral security can offer representatives greater independence in their
traditional legislative responsibilities. See J. JOHANNES, To SERVE THE PEOPLE 1-5
(1984) (the "burgeoning and increasingly specialized staffs, the expansion of congres-
sional offices in home districts and states, [and] a concomitant growth in federal agency
congressional liaison offices [form] an important element of the broader representative
function"); G. PARKER, supra note 192, at 171 (as a result of an attentive home style
"electoral safety increased . . . and members gained a measure of freedom from their
constituents to pursue legislative goals, such as policy influence or power"); id. at 28
("By behaving like delegates in terms of their attentiveness to district affairs, trustees
create levels of constituent trust comparable to that created by the representational
styles of delegates. This enables trustees to exercise a measure of freedom in their pol-
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the extent this continues to be true, adoption of a civic virtue standard
may actually undermine public-regarding debate by making such par-
ticularistic activities unconstitutional. Paradoxically, the most private-
regarding legislation enhances the ability of legislators to engage in ide-
ological, principled activities in other contexts.
VI. OTHER POTENTIAL DRAWBACKS TO THE CIVIC VIRTUE
PERSPECTIVE:
STRUCTURAL AND POLITICAL CONSERVATISM
In addition to its influence on special interest groups, the civic vir-
tue approach has the potential, in some cases, for incurring other
costs-reducing the overall rationality of government programs, pro-
moting gridlock, and diminishing the political influence of poorer
groups-all problems, paradoxically, that it is ostensibly intended to
alleviate 2 7 Although all of these tendencies have been alluded to above
in the general discussion of the political party literature, it is now ap-
propriate to discuss more precisely some of the other tradeoffs associ-
ated with the civic virtue perspective.
A. The Civic Virtue Vision Revisited
As noted above, civic virtue is to a large degree a theoretical re-
sponse to interest group politics,22 ' which has long been criticized on
the ground that it supposedly lacks a coherent defense for the logic of
the results it attains, other than the unreflective satisfaction of cer-
tain-usually wealthy-interest group desires 29 As a solution, efforts
to stimulate civic virtue are thought to produce more rational and
icy behaviors."); M. FIORINA, supra note 35, at 51 ("Experience in Washington and
congressional seniority count when dealing with the bureaucracy. . . .This incum-
bency effect is not only understandable; it is rational."); cf. R. FENNO, supra note 151,
at 151 (once a member wins her constituents' trust, the member has greater leeway in
voting on the vast majority of issues).
227 While these issues cannot be developed in detail here, they are important in
illustrating additional questions raised by importing a legal or dialogic model of deci-
sionmaking into the political process. They also serve to illustrate a difference in pro-
fessional perspective between political party scholars, who tend to focus most on the
exercise of power, and academic lawyers, who are concerned with the articulation of
ideas. Of course, these differences merely represent contrasting prototypes that charac-
terize many, but certainly not all, individuals in the two areas.
228 See supra notes 37-41, 44-46 and accompanying text.
229 See T. Lowi, THE END OF LIBERALISM 311-13 (1969); K. SCHLOZMAN & J.
TIERNEY, supra note 198, at 402; Kariel, The Pluralist Norm, in FRONTIERS OF
DEMOCRATIC THEORY 139, 158-59 (H. Kariel ed. 1970); Lowi, The Public Philoso-
phy: Interest Group Liberalism, in THE BIAS OF PLURALISM 81, 107-14 (W. Connolly
ed. 1969).
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thoughtful government policies. Historically, this belief in a rational
moral consensus can be traced to the antifederalists. 30 And the Madis-
onian response, according to Sunstein, was at least partially predicated
on the understanding that there existed an understanding of the com-
mon good toward which an elite public-regarding dialogue would con-
verge.231 The result was and is an appealing republican vision: political
actors who are intentionally considerate of the general consequences of
their actions-and are required or led to formulate and explain their
judgments in terms of general ethical norms and goals-should be more
apt to frame rational and morally defensible public policy.232
From a qualitatively different perspective, though reaching an
analogous conclusion, one can speculate that ideological and delibera-
tive politics, in contrast to pure interest group politics, may lead to
more rational public policy simply because voter ideological positions,
from liberal to conservative, may be more consistent, or "single
peaked," than they are in a splintered interest group system.23 3 If true,
220 See Sunstein, Interest Groups, supra note 18, at 35-38; see also G. STONE,
supra note 193, at 5-6 (the antifederalists believed that in small communities it "would
be possible to achieve the sort of homogeneity, and dedication to the public good, that
would prevent government from degenerating into a clash of private interests");
Michelman, supra note 49, at 19 (The antifederalists opposed an expanded national
sphere because it "would lack the spiritual and material homogeneity, . required to
support and reward unselfish devotion to the common good. .... ).
231 Sunstein, Interest Groups, supra note 18, at 41; see also C. Sunstein, supra
note 18, at 16 ("The requirement of deliberation embodies substantial constraints that
in some settings lead to uniquely correct outcomes.").
232 See Ackerman, supra note 18, at 1033; Mashaw, Constitutional Deregulation,
supra note 18, at 857-60, 867, 875-76; C. Sunstein, supra note 18, at 16, 22-24. Along
similar lines, various political scientists have described the United States as possessing a
consensual ideology. See L. HARTZ, THE LIBERAL TRADITION IN AMERICA 11 (1955);
S. HUNTINGTON, supra note 93, at 6-7. Indeed, Ackerman's theory of high and low
politics is predicated on the conclusion that Americans reach a rough type of consensus
during high political moments. See Ackerman, supra note 18, at 1049-50. There is
some debate, however, whether one should view any American "ideology" as necessa-
rily attractive. Compare D. PRICE, supra note 113, at 9 ("most Americans remain
'operational liberals,' favoring a range of activist governmental programs and policies,
even when they regard themselves as conservatives") with S. HUNTINGTON, supra note
93, at 41 (American ideological consensus is inconsistent with practical operation of
modern government). Cf S. VERBA & G. ORREN, supra note 23, at 255-56 (1985)
(American leaders are less in favor of income equality than their Swedish counter-
parts). See generally Miller, Pluralism and Social Choice, 77 AM. POL. ScI. REv. 734,
738-44 (1983) (discussing advantages of cycling and pluralism as a means of avoiding
consensual fascism and revolution).
... See Miller, supra note 232, at 741; cf. Macey, supra note 18, at 259 (inter-
pretations of special interest statutes are more likely to be multipeaked than explicitly
public interest statutes). Similar observations have been made about deliberation in the
judicial and administrative context. See Kornhauser & Sager, supra note 163, at 101
(criticizing the application of Arrow's theorem to judicial deliberations because judges
are expressing a judgment, not a preference); Mashaw, supra note 116, at 99 (in the
administrative process, "research factfinding, or natural experimentation with alterna-
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the exercise of civic virtue may, by increasing the likelihood that voters'
policy preferences will be interconnected, make resulting decisions more
logically consistent.
Finally, in addition to its consequences for deliberative public pol-
icy, a return to public-regarding dialogue has been advanced on the
grounds that it is likely to help certain groups, especially the poor,234
not only to express their interests, but to succeed within the political
arena."3 According to this perspective, the attraction of a public-re-
garding dialogue, like the courtroom model from which it draws intel-
lectual sustenance, is that ideas are important for their own sake and
will succeed or not succeed regardless of the power or resources of those
who present them. Thus, ideas or arguments that are influential merely
owing to the power or numerical support of their proponents would be
less likely to predominate, or if successful in the legislative arena,
would be struck down as unconstitutional.2 36 Those who serve to bene-
fit from existing organizational support-disproportionately the
wealthy and powerful-would be less likely to exercise influence.
2 37
B. Civic Virtue and Deadlock
The first difficulty with the above analysis is that the primary
strategy for inducing virtue-insulation and dispersal of author-
ity-may have the unintended effect of introducing a conservative struc-
tural bias into the political system. Promoting rational debate by creat-
tive policies [can] produce a unified view or construction of reality that ultimately yields
a rational or transitive collective ordering of preferences").
234 Scholars cite diffuse groups such as the poor as the losers in a traditional plu-
ralist system, since they lack money and often existing organizations support for assert-
ing political power. "The flaw in the pluralist heaven is that the heavenly chorus sings
with a strong upper class accent." E. SCHATTSCHNEIDER, SEMI-SOVEREIGN, supra
note 114, at 35; see also Connolly, The Challenge to Pluralist Theory, in THE BIAS OF
PLURALISM, supra note 229, at 3, 15 (summarizing the critics' view that "the pluralist
system is significantly biased toward the concerns of corporate elites"). While the extent
of this effect has been the subject of extensive debate, the most comprehensive study to
date suggests that there is a continued bias. See K. SCHLOZMAN & J. TIERNEY, supra
note 198, at 87-88, 395-403.
2' See C. Sunstein, supra note 18, at 19-21. But see Michelman, supra note 49,
at 21-27 (noting the limitations of republicanism). Decentralized political environments
are also thought to increase the opportunity for political participation, especially by
groups otherwise not contained in the ruling coalition. See B. BARBER, STRONG DE-
MOCRAcY 267-73 (1984); Rapaczynski, supra note 65, at 395-404; Stewart, Federal-
ism and Rights, 19 GA. L. REV. 917, 918 (1985).
... See Sunstein, Interest Groups, supra note 18, at 69; C. Sunstein, supra note
18, at 19-21.
"" There is much that is attractive about these arguments, which track normative
defenses of the adjudicative process. See Weisberg, supra note 1, at 239-43. While a
dialogical process takes time, the fuller discussion is the exact purpose of public-regard-
ing dialogue, as the civic virtue proponents observe.
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ing separate centers of authority within Congress and between
Congress and other institutions increases the probability that each insti-
tution and group will pursue its own program. When there is no legal
or political requirement that agreement be reached or that popular pol-
icy initiatives be consistent with one another, this can lead to inconsis-
tent outcomes (where bargains occur) or stalemate.
238
In contrast, the classic function served by political parties oriented
toward gaining a majority of the vote is to require that agreements be
reached. Electoral fragmentation, as the experience over the deficit has
shown, can lead to the opposite result- "[d]estabilization of domestic
policy initiatives and follow-through ....
The problem is exacerbated by the tendency of some ideologically
tinged discussions, however achieved, to make compromise and consen-
sus more difficult among elite political actors and the public.2"40 Pre-
cisely because pluralist nondialogical politics does not raise fundamen-
tal questions of morality and government policy, it may be better able
23 The most frequently cited examples in our current system are the govern-
ment's economic and energy policy. See Fiorina, supra note 108, at 39. For writers
making this criticism of dispersed power in the separation of powers context, see J.
BURNS, THE DEADLOCK OF DEMOCRACY 323 (1963) (criticizing the Madisonian
model of government in which "government action has been unduly delayed" by a
requirement for "us to await a wide consensus before acting"); J. SUNDQUIST, supra
note 133, at 7-12 (discussing the disintegration of political parties and the absence of
effective congressional or presidential leadership as factors contributing to the crisis of
competence in government).
This argument has been forcefully made in the report of the Blue Ribbon Com-
mittee on the Constitutional System, see COMMITTEE ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL SYS-
TEM, supra note 133, at 5-6, whose Co-Chairman recently described this problem in
the context of the budget deficit:
All elected politicians, from the President to the most junior member of
Congress, agree that this growing cancer must be removed, and they each
have a plan to do so. Each of these plans would reduce the annual deficit
by twenty-five to fifty percent per year over the next several years, but
they would do so in differing ways. Any of these plans would be better
than letting the deficits continue to accumulate at their present annual
rate. But those we elect cannot form a consensus about which plan to
adopt, and the cancer continues to grow.
Cutler, supra note 133, at 28 (footnote omitted).
2" Burnham, supra note 114, at 352.
240 The following discussion relies primarily upon an empirically and historically
based political science literature that raises various concerns about "ideological" polit-
ics. While these scholars draw a distinction between ideological and interest group
politics, just as a distinction is offered between "reasoned dialogue" and pluralism in
the civic virtue literature, few writers delineate with precision what is meant in the real
world by ideological politics as opposed to interest group pluralism. As a general mat-
ter, ideological politics appears to be marked by moralistic, symbolic, and abstract polit-
ical appeals and debate, as distinguished from appeals to a group or individual based
on perceived instrumental relf-interest. See J. WILSON, supra note 130, at 3-4, 17-20;
Orren, supra note 157, at 6-8.
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to achieve compromise and agreement. 24' A major school in political
science views "[p]ragmatic, professional political parties with their ten-
dency toward coalition and compromise [as] an important bulwark
against moralistic and extremist politics. '2 42 Conversely, "[t]he weak
partisan limited-issue and personalistic politics of recent vintage are
poor foundations for governing. "243
Significantly, this conclusion is the opposite of what many advo-
cates of "reasoned dialogue" expect: rational deliberation and explora-
tion of fundamental values are intended to facilitate acceptance of and
respect for an opponent's position. 4' Unfortunately, ideological politics
can increase participants' intransigence and unwillingness to accept the
autonomy of divergent groups.245 Coalitional politics, on the other
241 See A. RANNEY & W. KENDALL, DEMOCRACY AND THE AMERICAN PARTY
SYSTEM 507-08 (1956); J. WILSON, supra note 130, at 22; Wildavsky, supra note 170,
at 257-69. Related concerns underlie the view that some decisionmaking is best under-
taken through "incremental," rather than comprehensive, analysis. See Diver, Poli-
cymaking Paradigms in Administrative Law, 95 HARV. L. REV. 393, 400, 430 (1981)
(discussing the administrative process); Lindblom, The Science of Muddling Through,
19 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 79, 86 (1959) (same). See generally C. LINDBLOM, supra note
38, at 205-25 (outlining various aspects of the process by which decisions are made
through "partisan mutual adjustment").
242 Orren, supra note 157, at 30.
243 Id. at 25.
244 See C. Sunstein, supra note 18, at 22-23, 51-54; see also J. RAWLS, supra
note 44, at 358 ("In everyday life the exchange of opinion with others checks our
partiality and widens our perspective; we are made to see things from their standpoint
and the limits of our vision are brought home to us."); supra note 147 and accompany-
ing text (discussing the civic virtue theorists' belief in an objective morality).
Indeed, a longstanding debate has raged within political science over whether par-
ties should become, on the one hand, more ideological, presenting tightly packaged con-
sistent programs to the public, or, on the other hand, should become coalitional, deem-
phasizing the ideological bent of their proposals in order to remain attractive to the
broadest spectrum of voters and to facilitate subsequent governance. The controversy
has focused on the 1950 American Political Science Association Report by the Commit-
tee on Political Parties, which called for a stronger and more ideological two party
system. See AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE ASS'N, supra note 115, at 1-2.
In contrast to pluralist politics, ideological politics has also been criticized on the
grounds that it may lead to instability or even fascism. See M. ROGIN, THE INTELLEC-
TUALS AND MCCARTHY: THE RADICAL SPECTER 16-18 (1967) (summarizing plural-
ist writers adopting this perspective). It is doubtful, however, whether civic virtue,
which is conceived of in many respects as a dispersed elite dialogue, is subject to this
charge. A system of dispersed, nonconsensual politics may well diminish the possibility
of this problem. See Miller, supra note 232, at 738-44 (discussing the benefits of cycli-
cal majorities in promoting stability).
As a practical matter, in part as a reflection of the greater heterogeneity of Ameri-
can society, American political parties have tended to be less ideological than their Eu-
ropean counterparts. See J. SUNDQUIST, supra note 116, at 471-72.
215 See J. WILSON, supra note 130, at 358 ("[t]he need to employ issues as incen-
tives and to distinguish one party from the opposition along policy lines will mean that
political conflict will be intensified, social cleavages will be exaggerated, party leaders
will tend to be men skilled in the rhetorical arts, and the party's ability to produce
agreement by trading issue-free resources will be reduced."); Wildavsky, supra note
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hand, where legislators more often bargain for, logroll, and compromise
interests, may lead to greater acceptance of alternative views and inter-
ests, giving "to each group some but never all of what it wants."246
Thus, the process of decisionmaking may have a significant influence
on the value preferences of the general population and its representa-
tives, though in the exact opposite manner than civic virtue theory
envisions.
2 47
C. Civic Virtue and Popular Accountability
In addition to its effect on compromise, ideological politics can also
reduce democratic accountability and rationality in the electorate, espe-
cially among poorer and less educated voters. If true, this may raise the
specter of greater elite dialogue being achieved at the expense of popu-
lar understanding.
As noted above, scholars have praised party identification because
it supposedly "offers the best clue to candidates' positions on a range of
issues, the interests they will be at pains to accommodate, the coopera-
tive ties they will be able to establish, and the kinds of people they will
be likely to bring into government." 248 The decline of party identifica-
tion, and the rise of single issue politics, some have argued, may have
decreased popular accountability and rationality; voters, especially the
poor and less educated, are frequently at a disadvantage, through a
type of information overload, in evaluating specific issues on a mass
level. 249 The result, paradoxically, is that " '[c]andidate appeal' is often
based on the most superficial, contrived kind of media image"; ulti-
mately, "incumbent voting has loosened the link, not only between the
issue positions of individual voters and their representatives, but also
between national public opinion trends and Congress as a whole."25
170, at 253-54 (referring to an observation about Goldwater delegates in 1964: "I don't
understand them at all; they talk like they don't care if we win;" and quoting a dele-
gate: "I'd rather stick by the real principles this country was built on than win.").
246 A. RANNEY & W. KENDALL, supra note 241, at 508.
247 Indeed, Congress has frequently been criticized on the grounds that "officials
do not govern, they merely posture." Fiorina, supra note 108, at 44; see also Nash,
supra note 108, at BI0, col. 6 (discussing "posturing" by members of Congress). Plac-
ing primary emphasis on what politicians say runs the risk of exacerbating this phe-
nomenon; the electoral requirement would continue to be "not [to] make pleasing things
happen, but [to] make pleasing judgmental statements." D. MAYHEW, supra note 35,
at 67.
248 D. PRICE, supra note 113, at 110; see also W. HAWLEY, supra note 132, at
145-49 (discussing the advantage of partisan elections); supra note 130-32 (discussing
the benefits of party identification.
241 See Burnham, Shifting Patterns of Congressional Voting Participation, 1981
in W. BURNHAM, supra note 132, at 196.
250 D. PRICE, supra note 113, at 110.
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As a result, a philosophy or system that seeks to stimulate an even more
dispersed ideological debate has the potential for reducing popular un-
derstanding and accountability.
Of course, in some respects, civic virtue theory may envision only
elite discussion. As Madison originally proposed, members of Congress
would be relatively insulated from direct accountability through such
devices as indirect election of Senators.25 Regardless of the original in-
tent of the Framers, however, under our current constitutional frame-
work, representatives are directly accountable to the public and are
likely to remain so. In this context, a system geared toward generally
promoting ideological debate may have a perverse influence on the abil-
ity of the general population, though probably not of concentrated spe-
cialized interest groups, to judge the quality of their government and
representation.
D. Civic Virtue and Political Conservatism
Finally, there is some question whether this system will even pro-
mote the interests of the poor. As noted, the assumption of the civic
virtue approach is that changing the language of the legislative dia-
logue-either through constitutional review, statutory construction, or
enhanced procedures-will indeed transform the dynamics of the legis-
lative process, and the nature of its output.2 52 Even assuming these
techniques are effective, 253 however, it is still likely that certain groups
will be able to pursue their goals (or depending upon one's perspective,
their interests) within an ideological or public-regarding sphere.
Although generalizations about the relationship between ideologi-
cal orientation and class background can be quite hazardous, legislators
and groups historically have employed symbolic language to pursue
policies that disadvantage the working class, beginning with the Pro-
gressive movement, and the nineteenth and twentieth century urban re-
form movements.2 " During the 1950's and 1960's, moreover, political
scientists observed large differences in the conceptual understanding of
elite and nonelite groups within American society, finding that "as one
moves from elite sources of belief systems downwards . . . the concep-
251 See supra note 57 and accompanying text.
252 Legislators who speak in public-regarding terms will be more likely to exercise
their discretion to pursue public-regarding goals devoid of self-interest; where they lack
independence, it will be more difficult for groups to pursue their private-regarding
goals through public language. See supra notes 52-78 and accompanying text.
253 As discussed above, there is some question about this conclusion. See supra
note 98-103.
254 See, e.g., E. BANFIELD & J. WILSON, supra note 133, at 46, 331-35; S. HAYS,
AMERICAN POLITICAL HISTORY AS SOCIAL ANALYSIS 228-32 (1980).
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tual grasp of 'standard' political belief systems fades out very rap-
idly." '255 While subsequent social changes, such as increased education,
candidate appeals, and media coverage have reduced this divergence,25
it still is probably true that "individuals manifest issue positions with
more consistency on local issues and on specific issues than on general
political [ideological] issues. '2 57 To the extent this is the case, attempts
to elevate political dialogue may have a disproportionate impact on the
influence of the less wealthy and less educated.25
215 Converse, The Nature of Belief Systems in Mass Publics, in D. APTER, IDE-
OLOGY AND DISCONTENT 206, 213 (1964). Much of this literature is from the 1960's.
See, e.g., G. ALMOND, THE AMERICAN PEOPLE AND FOREIGN POLICY 126-30 (1961);
A. CAMPBELL, P. CONVERSE, W. MILLER & D. STOKES, supra note 130, at 366-68;
McCloskey, Consensus and Ideology in American Politics, 58 AM. POL. SCI. REV.
361, 372 (1964); Prothro & Grigg, Fundamental Principles of Democracy: Bases of
Agreement and Disagreement, 22 J. OF POL. 276, 287-88 (1960). More recently, polit-
ical scientists have found continuing evidence of this discrepancy. In describing this
divergence, W. Russell Neuman states:
The mass public apparently responds to political stimuli in funda-
mentally different ways from those of political elites. The generally held
belief among elites that the public understands political abstractions is an
optical illusion, generated by the fact that the elite stratum is consumed in
political conversation with itself and only rarely has occasion to discuss
politics with the apolitical mass citizenry.
W. NEUMAN, THE PARADOX OF MASS POLITICS: KNOWLEDGE AND OPINION IN THE
AMERICAN ELECTORATE 22 (1986).
"I The ideological sophistication of voters appears to have increased during the
1960's and 1970's as a result in part of greater ideological appeals by candidates and
political events. See N. NIE, S. VERBA & J. PETROCIK, supra note 114, at 307-11;
Miller, Miller, Raine & Browne, A Majority Party in Disarray: Policy Polarization
in the 1972 Election, 70 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 753, 776-78 (1976); Pomper, From
Confusion to Clarity: Issues and American Voters 1956-1968, 66 AM. POL. Sex. REV.
415, 417-20 (1972). See generally G. POMPER, VOTERS CHOICE: VARIETIES OF AMER-
ICAN ELECTORAL BEHAVIOR 178 (19.75) (voters' "' political consciousness' has been
raised, so that they are now better able to . . . respond electorally on the basis of
particular issues, as well as more general and ideological stances").
27 S. VERBA & N. NIE, PARTICIPATION IN AMERICA: POLITICAL DEMOCRACY
AND SOCIAL EQUALITY 113 n.23 (1972); see also W. CROTTY, supra note 114, at
276-79 ("An issue-oriented electorate is one likely to increase the dominance of the
better-educated and upper-income groups over electoral decisions. Lower socioeconomic
groups face enormous difficulties in reincorporating themselves into the electorate with-
out the political parties to encourage, organize, and guide their efforts."); R. HARDIN,
supra note 20, at 123-24 (the poor are more likely to want monetary collective goods
than "morally desired" goods); Burnham, supra note 130, at 132 ("The relative disap-
pearance of partisan teams in campaigns and their replacement by personalistic and
imagistic appeals to voters create conditions that make individual utility calculations
difficult, if not impossible[, with the result that] some people will remain far better
positioned to make accurate utility calculations than others"). Of course, the magnitude
and significance of the divergence in conceptual and ideological orientation of the mass
public and elites is a continuing subject of debate. See generally W. NEUMAN, supra
note 255, at 169-89 (discussing variations in political sophistication among different
social strata).
258 To be sure, it is possible to argue that conservative beliefs, and the interests of
the well-off, are more likely to predominate in an ideological debate, regardless of the
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Indeed, this concern with the transformation of the debate and its
concomitant impact on lower echelons of society finds support in the
historical literature on the decline of the party system and party identi-
fication. Political parties, which traditionally were based partly on par-
ticularistic incentives, have tended disproportionately to serve the inter-
ests of lower and working classes and have been important devices for
enhancing voter turnout among these classes. With their relative decline
and the rise of personalistic and single-issue ideological politics, some
believe the upper class may have a qualitative advantage in pursuing its
political agenda, due both to a disproportionate decrease in voter turn-
out among the lower and working classes and to these groups' relative
disadvantage in participating in elevated political debate.259 While it is
possible that these historical trends cannot be extrapolated into the fu-
ture-that perhaps "a higher order of electorate is evolving . . . with a
direct concern for policy outcomes" 26 0-the current evidence does not
point strongly in that direction.
Of course, Sunstein has attempted to deal directly with this prob-
lem, positing a constitutional prohibition against enforcing ideological
arguments that are based on "existihg relations of power."261 Unfortu-
self-interest of the participants. But the concern is that the predominance is due not to
the inherent persuasiveness of the position, but to the power such groups have over the
education and ethos of the society and the relative lack of influence less educated groups
in society have in this sphere. The potential bias of such a consensus in the United
States is noted supra note 232. Analogous criticisms have been made more generally of
claims to objectivity in legal analysis. Compare Brest, supra note 4, at 772 (commit-
ment to "the rule of law really seems [to be] a commitment to the rule of our law")
with H. COLLINS, MARXISM AND THE LAW 43 (1982) ("laws enacted according to the
dictates of a dominant ideology will appear to the members of that society as rules
designed to preserve the natural social and economic order").
259 See Burnham, supra note 130, at 132-33. Over two-fifths of eligible American
citizens, disproportionately drawn from the poor and the less educated, do not vote, a
far different statistic than in other western industrial counties. See id. at 97; see also
W. BURNHAM, supra note 249, at 196 (the mass electorate is "baffled by the complex-
ity of our constitutional arrangements, has extremely low levels of information, and has
not been educated by any social instrumentality . . . to an understanding of politics");
Thus, at least on a national level, the possibility exists, contrary to the classic civic
virtue view, see C. Sunstein, supra note 18, at 24-26, that dispersion of authority to
increase points of access will decrease general popular participation.
Curiously, this differential in voter turnout may be less significant during periods
of critical elections (or so-called high political moments). See Burnham, supra note 130,
at 105. For a discussion of Ackerman's proposed system of judicial review, relying gen-
erally on judicial construction of popular understandings arguably reached during such
periods, see supra notes 92-97 and accompanying text.
261 W. CROTTY, supra note 114, at 282.
261 Sunstein, Interest Groups, supra note 18, at 57. As noted above, Rawls' origi-
nal position seeks to eliminate the effect of self-interest in two senses: the decisionmaker
has no knowledge of her own position in society nor of her preexisting value sys-
temn-values that may tend to further those interests. See supra notes 44-46 and accom-
panying text. Sunstein seeks to deal with both of these problems by his proposal that
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nately, it is unclear how this requirement would achieve his progressive
goals, that is, how Sunstein would "objectively" distinguish those nor-
mative arguments that are acceptable from those that are not. Two ap-
proaches arguably might serve these purposes, but neither appears to
be promising.
First, one may believe that any argument that furthers or supports
the existing power structure should be declared invalid for that reason.
A rigid application of this approach, however, would obviously lead
either to chaos or uniform equality. By invalidating any ideological ar-
gument that supports the power structure, the courts would presumably
become supporters of all arguments in favor of those out of favor. The
result would either be a cycle of acceptable and unacceptable doc-
trines-depending simply upon who is in control-or strict equality. In
the end, the invalidation of an argument merely because it supports
those with influence lacks any normative bite.
Second, Sunstein may be positing the existence of a neutral theory
of dialogue that all positions advanced in a sanitized political debate
would need to satisfy in order for the courts to find them constitu-
tional.2" 2 According to this view; certain types of arguments, even
though not referring to the promotion of a group's special interest,
would still be unacceptable because they do not satisfy some transcen-
dent level of neutral dialogue. Presumably, arguments in support of the
existing power structure would be more likely to be held invalid,
though certainly not necessarily.263
Unfortunately, Sunstein has not presented any system for delineat-
ing the bounds of this neutral dialogue.264 Rawls' own effort has not
normative ethical arguments that are themselves based on what he calls "power rela-
tions" should be struck down as unconstitutional. See Sunstein, Interest Groups, supra
note 18, at 54-55. This proviso is critical to the theory, for in the absence of such a
restraint, the end result of the principled debate may not be any better-indeed it could
even be worse-than the private interest debate to which he is objecting.
262 Sunstein intends to make this second argument. Telephone conversation with
Cass Sunstein (Mar. 18, 1988).
263 This system of neutral dialogue would serve to reintroduce on a substantive
level what Rawls had hoped to achieve through the veil of ignorance-a filtering out of
ideological views that were adopted merely because of the influence of certain powerful
groups within the society.
264 Indeed, he recognizes:
If the ideas of endogenous preferences and cognitive distortions are carried
sufficiently far, it may be impossible to describe a truly autonomous pref-
erence .... It is difficult indeed to generate a baseline from which to
describe genuine autonomy, and an approach that tries to abstract entirely
from social premises is unlikely to be fruitful.
Sunstein, supra note 48, at 1170-71. Ackerman has probably made the most sustained
effort to articulate such a standard. See B. ACKERMAN, supra note 24, at 18 (develop-
ing norms for liberal society based on a system of "Neutral dialogue").
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proved resistant to charges that individuals placed behind a true veil of
ignorance may lack sufficient information or be devoid of necessary
human qualities. In the absence of a veil, on the other hand, rational
dialogue appears to lead to quite disparate outcomes and be subject to
the claims of bias that the veil sought to avoid. 65
More fundamentally, Sunstein's substantive approach seems in
tension with his original goal of perfecting the political process. If in-
deed a deductive theory of ethics exists, and courts are able to discern
it, it would appear most reasonable for courts independently to formu-
late those principles, as some academics have already suggested. 66 Why
should the legal system transform political processes into public-regard-
ing dialogues if the nature of acceptable decisions are apparent before-
hand? In the absence of a fuller theory, then, the attempt to transform
the legislative process into a deliberative discussion creates a risk that
the debate will simply serve as a surrogate for preexisting interests.
This is not the place to attempt to resolve these vexing issues-the
potential conservatism, structural rigidity, or lack of political accounta-
bility of civic virtue reforms. Their existence, however, underscores
once again the need to appreciate the large costs of wholesale promo-
tion of ideological thinking in Congress through constitutional
intervention.
CONCLUSION
This Article has evaluated the civic virtue proposals by sketching
and contrasting two different strategies, or ideal types, for dealing with
the special interest group problem. One approach, the civic virtue ap-
proach, seeks to imbue government actors with a public-regarding
ethos, thereby ensuring through rational debate that representatives
will give due consideration to the legitimate aspirations of all within the
populace. The second approach, the political party approach, attempts
to create centralized institutions that will aspire through electoral com-
petition to serve the interests of the population as a whole, or at least a
major portion of it.
To achieve their structural objectives, civic virtue writers focus at-
tention on the insulation of political actors as the best method for stim-
ulating deliberative dialogue and improving legislative motivations.
Courts would require legislators to demonstrate that all the relevant
actors had considered the issue, and that constituent or interest group
283 See supra notes 160-62 and accompanying text.
288 See, e.g., Fiss, Objectivity, supra note 4, at 762; Fiss, Foreword, supra note 4,
at 12-13.
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pressure had not influenced their decisionmaking.
The political party approach, on the other hand, combats the spe-
cial interest group problem by centralizing power, not dispersing it.
Proponents of this view support the establishment of powerful central
committees, the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings time limitations on legisla-
tive action, and the concentration of power in the president and party
leaders.
Given the tensions between these two approaches and the recent
history of legislative reform in Congress, however, any strategy in pur-
suit of civic virtue must be able to accommodate the traditional insights
of political science, or else run the serious risk of producing quite un-
welcome results. Even though it is probably impossible to return to an
era of strong centralized presidential power or political parties, those
advocating increasing insulation run the risk that their proposals will
further enhance the influence of narrow self-interested actors, stimulate
legislative deadlock, and disadvantage the nonelite electorate. As pres-
ently envisioned, the cost of this philosophy appears to be unacceptably
high.
At the same time, there are possible avenues available for those
wishing to transform political motivation that may not raise the same
type of concerns. As discussed above, legislation like Gramm-Rudman-
Hollings and constitutional amendments seek to transform political mo-
tivation without dispersing political responsibility or insulating actors
from political accountability. 6 ' Rather, these devices attempt to induce
public-regardingness by expanding the time frame of the
decisionmakers.
Alternatively, it may be possible to achieve some of the goals of
civic virtue writers, without undermining democratic principles, by pro-
moting a strong ideological two party system. As noted above, a long-
standing debate has raged within political science over the values of
"ideological" versus coalitional politics. 6 ' Advocates of ideological po-
litical parties recognize all of the advantages of strong central political
institutions, but also contend that political parties can and should them-
26 Of course, these systems raise different problems, a few of which were previ-
ously identified. See supra n6tes 232. In theory, a civic virtue system can enjoy one
advantage over the traditional political party strategy which should be noted. While
their defenders believe political parties often minimize collective action problems, they
are ordinarily representative only of today's constituency. Budget deficits are in part a
consequence of the fact that future generations are unable to be counted in today's
electorate. See J. BUCHANAN & R. WAGNER, DEMOCRACY AND DEFICIT: THE POLIT-
ICAL LEGACY OF LORD KEYNES 17-18 (1977). A successful civic virtue approach might
be better able to confront this problem, although the recent experience on the deficit
tends to suggest otherwise. See supra notes 84-91 and accompanying text.
26 See supra note 244 and accompanying text.
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selves be more ideological. To the extent that such a system can be
developed, emphasis would be placed more on stimulating dialogue be-
tween central party leaders, rather than between individual members of
Congress over each specific piece of legislation. Moreover, particularis-
tic private-regarding incentives and party discipline could be used to
bind members of the party together."6 9
Whichever strategies are explored,2 1  however, there is a need to
focus on the entire system, not on individual pieces of legislation or
individual members of Congress. Particularistic private-regarding in-
centives are powerful tools for facilitating the independence of individ-
ual legislators from their narrow home constituencies, a primary goal of
the civic virtue writers, and for binding groups together into majority
coalitions, a primary goal of the political party advocates. A constitu-
tional system that views such incentives as unconstitutional may serve
to undermine the goals of both democracy and virtue.
On balance, it is not surprising that the pursuit of civic virtue
should appear so attractive; it provides a distinct legal solution to two
problems that have vexed economists and political scien-
tists-externalities and private interest groups. Civic virtue, as an ex-
tension of the old legal process perspective, seeks to solve these
problems by positing a dialogue that will make government actors con-
siderate of those outside their coalition, as well as more thoughtful
about their own constituency. In pursuing this approach, however, we
should not ignore the insights of economics and political science. If we
do, we may run the risk of compounding the problem.
269 Ideological paries are certainly no panacea. The difficulties in creating strong
(let alone ideological) parties have been debated at length in the political science litera-
ture, and are beyond the scope of this Article. See supra text accompanying notes 151-
58 (describing techniques for strengthening parties). Moreover, even if we could return
to a more responsive two party system, many political scientists view strong ideological
politics as inherently divided and ultimately self-defeating. See supra text accompany-
ing notes 240-47. Conversely, there is some question whether ideological parties are
indeed principled or deliberative in the full sense envisioned by civic virtue advocates.
Nevertheless, the purpose of their proponents is to accommodate the goals of democracy
(or centralization) and deliberation. See AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE ASS'N, supra
note 115. In this sense, they may serve some of the objectives of both traditions.
217 It is not my purpose to advocate these alternatives. They raise a host of other
issues and potential problems that would have to be examined. See, e.g., M. Fitts, Look
Before You Leap: Some Cautionary Notes on Civic Republicanism, (forthcoming in 97
YALE L.J. (1988)).
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